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Like many developing countries of Asia and Africa,
Korea was first introduced to the alien institution of .
political parties in the wake of her independence from
colonial rule. This study probes into the performance
of political parties in the Korean political rirocess
from 19^5 to 1969 by utilizing the historical-institution-
al approach along with select aggregate and survey
research data.
The ruling parties in Korea have been externally cre-
ated parties. The Liberal Party was founded by the decree
of an authoritarian President who saw it indispensable
for consolidating his power against the National Assembly;
the Democratic Republican Party was organized preemptively
by military men after they seized power through a coup.
As externally created parties, they have tended to be iden-
tified with the executive branch rather than the legislature.
The opposition party, during the Rhee era, on the other hard,
was created in the legislature more or less as a response to
President Rhee's assault on the legislature. Other than that
however, it had little or no common denominator which
guaranteed unity of action and thought within it.
The conservatism of Korean parties was assured when
her international position dictated the elimination of
the leftist and progressive parties. This in turn has
produced party politics to struggle for power and con-
fined the political dialogue to the procedural matters
rather than the suhstantive ones. Institutionalization
of party structure and leadership has been delayed by per-
sonality-centered political parties. At the rank-and-
file levels, the commitment to a political party is rarely
made on the basis of ideology or nolicy, but for reasons
of money, personal power, special interest, blood relations
and the like. Although there has been a conscious attempt
made on the part of the founding members of the present
ruling party (DRP) to overcome the past ills of Korean
parties, it is much too early to tell whether such an at-
tempt has met with complete success.
Since the associ ational interest groups in the Korean
context lack autonomy from state power, they have tended
to shy a'way from taking independent nolitical actions. The
strength of the institutional and anomic interest grout>s
in Korea may be viewed as a consequence of the failure of
party politics. Where the legitimate interests cannot be
articulated into government policies, the likelihood that
the public discontents and social maladies explode beyond
the prescribed procedures are increased.
The imported system of liberal democracy and political
parties appears to be on the way oi" earning legitimacy
through some twenty-five years of challenge, opposition,
acceptance and adaptation. The "gap" evident in Korea
between the urban and rural voters in terms of party ore-
ference, political parti cit>ation and the other aspects,
of electoral behavior has substituted the ethnic, religious,
and class cleavages evident in other political systems.
In the legislature, the militant struggle and confron-
tation between the ruling and opposition parties have been
the norm. This has been eloquently expressed in the fre-
quent opposition walkout and the so-called "one party Nation-
al Assembly." Through a number of years of confrontation
in the National Assembly, the Assemblymen from the two
major parties appear to have internalized distinct value sys-
tems;the different life-styles have often resulted in the
paralysis of the legislative process and the domination
by the executive branch in the lawmaking function of the
National Assembly. The consequence has been that the
politicians have lost touch with the general public and
the party politics have become a "game" among the elites.
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INTRODUCTION
Since Korea emerged from the four decades of Japanese colonial
rule in 19^5, she was introduced to the idea of Western liberal
democracy and its institutional apparatus, including political
parties. Needless to say, the constitutional ^jcverrjr.ent established
in 19^8 was an alien form of government, and the values it represented
were different from Korea's traditional political culture, if not
in direct opposition to it. In some twenty-five years since the
liberation, the Korean political system has performed well short of
the standards of a stable democracy. One most obvious failure has
been its breakdown of constitutionalism: since her independence, the
transfer of political power from one group to another has never been
effected through constitutional means.
In i960, the Liberal rarty regime of Syngman Rhee was ousted
by the April Student Uprising. It was followed by a brief interim
regime under H5 Chong. In May, I96I, the Second Republic of the
Democrats was overthrown by a military coup d'etat . After two years
of rule by men in military uniform, the Democratic Republican Party
government of Park Chung Hee came to power with the resources and
advantages accrued during the military rule and with the help of
the preemptive organization of a new party. Under various pretexts,
the rule of each of these regimes has been facilitated by resorting
to constitutional, legal and political manipulations of dubious
ii
merit. By the time of the writing of this study, martial law has
been declared five times; constitution has been revised six times.
The apparent failure of the constitutional government in Korea
demands explanations and solutions. Students of the Korean political
system have described such failure in terms of "trial of democracy,"
"the triumph of personalism over institutionalism, " "instablity,"
"authoritarian rule," and so on and so forth. The burden of this
thesis is to argue that the roots of such failtire lie in the defects
of Korean parties and party sjrs terns.
In the chaos of the post-liberation era, a kaleidoscopic number
of parties emerged overnight. These "parties" were not parties in
the strictest sense. They resembled the cliques, clubs and groups
of notables. These political groupings had little durability and
practically no structure other than paper organizations required by
the United States military authorities. In this period, these
parties reflected the fragmentation of the Korean nationalist
movement. With the coming of independence and the election of the
Constituent National Assembly, these parties were no more than
parliamentary negotiating groups without any social base. The
groupings split and merged in a confusing series of permutations
and combinations. The competition among them was a "closed system"
in which the actors continually shifted partners and antagonists
without ever enlarging the number of participants.
Iiii
The attempts to perpetuate power though constitutional
amendments polarized the politicians. This polarization is significant
in the context of party development in Korea and eventually helped
to bring about a fairly stable division of the electorate, ^ith
the third party having been eliminated for various reasons, a
modified version of two party politics has been the norm of Korean
politics at least since. 195^.
The aim of this dissertation is to probe into the place of
political parties in the Korean political process from 19^5 up to
the time of 1971 elections. The word "place" is carefully chosen.
The massive recent literature on political parties notwithstanding,
political scientists have failed to agree on the most desirable
methodology on approaching the problems of political parties. The
chief difficulty arises as to whether the operations of political
parties and party systems should be seen as functions in the course
of political develooment, or whether the general course of development
has instead shaped parties and party systems, or simply whether
decent monographs and articles on political parties are too
numerous to mention. £ut to name a few: Joseph LaPalombara and
Myron Weiner, Political Parties and Political Develonment ( Princeton:
Princeton University Jress, 1966); »;illirum Chanoers, Political
Parties in a Lew Pation: The American Zj<:rerience (i.ew York: Oxford
University Press, 1963); William Chambers and waiter Burnham, The
American Pa^'ty S:/s terns : Sta^-es of Political Development ( Pew York:
Oxford University Press, 19o7); Samuel rumtin.- ton, rolitical Order
in Changing Societies ( Pew Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Kenneth
Janda,."The International Gomoarative Political Parties Project"
(Prepared for delivery at 65th Annual Peeting of the American Political
Science Association, Kew York City, September 2-6, 1969).
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parties can serve as an organizational setting for the occurrence
of political behavior. At one juncture, according to William Chanbers
and Walter i:urnhain, "parties may be viewed as the outgrowth of a
developTient process— the culmination as it were of process of
social, economic and political change,"^ thus confirming their
dependent role. At another juncture, however, they "can be seen as
an independent institutional force affecting political development
itself." "Thus the capacity of a society to cope with the crises
of integration, participation or distribution... may in large measure
be affected by the kinds of parties which have materialized. Parties
may thus be seen here as independent variables which have profo'and
effects on the process of political, social and economic change."^
In this study, the author chooses to approach the problem of
Korean political parties both as dependent and independent variables.
The development of political parties in Korea should be seen within
the framework of the series of crises the country was subjected to
in the postwar era. Like many new nations of Asia and Africa, a
series of political, social and economic crises decended upon Korea
2
Chambers and Burnham, on. cit . , p. ^ and see also Janda,
op . cit . , p. 5»
LaPalombara and -Reiner, oo. cit . , pp. 41-42.
•^The concept of "crises" is discussed in Lucian W. rye. Aspects
of Political Develo^ment ( Boston: Little, Brown iz Co., 1966), pp. 62-
67. Also see Leonard Biner, et. al.. Cruses and Sequences in
Political Develoment C Princeton: Princeton university Press, 1971)
»
pp. 3-72.
Vovernight. Inability to deal with these crises in an orderly and
leisurely manner spelled problems for achieving stability. Joseph
LaFalombara and Kyron Reiner have hypothesized that the configuration
of political parties will continue to be strongly conditioned by
the manner in which historical crises, subsequent to the onset of
parties, materialize and are responded to.^
Second, it should be imtxjrtant to probe into the role of Korean
political parties as an institutional force affecting the course of
political development and the question of democracy itseK. Among
the earlier writers of political parties, there had been a tendency
to equate democracy with xxslitical parties. There seems to be a
good reason for this assumption for the rise of political parties
in the West roughly coincided with the democratic impulse. Although
Roberto Kichels' "iron law" questioned this assumption, many political
scientists nevertheless have come to argue that the study of political
parties is synonymous with the study of democracy itself. Competition
among parties was held to be necessary, if not sufficient proof of
democracy. Perhaps the strongest statement regarding the inseparability
of parties and democracy has been made by E. E. Schattschneider in
his Party Government .
^
-
-^LaPalombara and Weiner, op. cit . , p. 2.
^E. S. Schattschneider, Party Goveir.ment( :;ew York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston,. 196?), p. 1. inphasis mine. lerhaps
Schattschneider overstated his case. It may be safe to say that
when democracy is considered to be in crisis, a considerable
portion of the blame is assigned to political parties.
vi
The parties, in fact, have played a major role
as makers of governments, more especially thev have
been makers of democratic erovernment. It should be
stated flatly at the outset; this volume is devoted
to the thesis that the political p£.rties created
democracy and that modern democracy is unthinkable
save in terms of parties.
In light of the importance accorded to political parties in the
functioning of democracy and political develoment, it should be
fruitful to make a study of political parties in the Korean democratic
process
.
In accordance with this broad guideline, Chapter I will be
devoted to a discussion of several themes in Korean political
tradition that set the framework for the modern Korean political
parties and processes. I fully recognize that there is an inherent
limitation in discussing such a vast topic in so limited a space,
but I also realize that some attempts must be made to provide the
historical, cultural and social profile of premodern Korea from
which modern Korea has em.erged.
In Chapter II, I shall probe, in a rather detailed fashion,
the origins and the stages of development of political parties
within the peculiar context of postwar Korean politics. The Korean
parties are seen here as dependent variables. For convenience's
sake, I have divided the period under study into four sections,
one each for the three republics and a separate section on the
period of the American military occupation. Here, I shall explore
the functions and operations of Korean political parties relating
to significant political events.
vii
In structural terms, a party can be said to be composed of
three sectors, which are unevenly and differentially involved in'
various activities
: the party organization which includes
,
among
other things, party leadership and formal as well as informal machinery
or hierarchy; the mrty in the rovernment
. which is that part of
the party structure in the executive and the le-^islative branches
of the government; the party in the electorate
, composed of
individuals or groups of individuals who have varying degrees of
loyalty to the party. I call this trinity of party sectors party
7
structures. These structures have, in turn, sub-structures and
they perform certain activities in the pursuit of Power, we shall
use this scheme in discussing Korean political parties as an
independent variable.
In Chapter III, the major existing parties are discussed from
the perspectives of ideology, organization, and leadership* The
nature of the variables such as ideological orientations, the formal
structure, the locus of power, the degree of centralization, the
patterns of decision-making, the recruitment of resources, and the
values and goals of the individuals will be the subject of scrutiny.
Chapter IV will examine the party in the electorate, including
such problems as the nature of the ties between interest groups--
'^Eere, I owe my ideas to Frank Soraif , Party Politics in
America(Boston; Little, Brown & Co., 1963), pp. 1-25.
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of associational, institutional and anemic variety and political
parties. An attempt vrill be made to sketch a profile of the Korean
electorate uith the help of the available opinion surveys and
aggregate data— the electorate's view about democratic institutions,
political parties, the differences between the urban-rural and
regional voters in all aspects of voting behavior. Unfortunately,
I did not possess the resources sufficient to conduct my own opinion
survey of the Korean electorate.
In Chapter V, a case study of the 1971 presidential election
is made in the belief that the activity and the vitality of the
party can be best discerned in times of electoral campaigns. I shall
discuss the strategic environment, the procedures for selecting
candidates and the campaign activities themselves.
Chapter VI discusses the hold of the party in terms of the
degree of cohesion, the conception of representation and the style
and the intensity of oppositions in the legislature. In this chapter,
the emphasis is placed upon the social and psychologicsil differences
between the ruling and opposition party legislators.
Finally, some clarification of terminology seems to be in
order. A "political party" in this study will be understood simply
as any "organization that pursues a goal of placing their avowed
ix
representatives in government positions."^ A "faction" is used as
a value-free word, as opposed to such synonyms as "clique," "cabal,"
or "sect," and simply means a grouping within a political party
regardless of the basis of cohesion. The "mainstream" or the
"maincurrent" faction is defined as that grouping within a political
party which controls m.ost of its decision-making agents and the
"anti-maincurrent" or "anti-mainstream" faction is used to mean .
that minority grouping within the same party.
This is the definition provided by Janda, oo. cit
. , p. 6.
To list but some other definitions of a political oarty, LaPalonbara
and Weiner say: "An or~anization that is vocally articulated, that
interacts with and seeks to attract the electoral support for the
general public, that plays a direct and substantive role in political
develoTDment, and that is committed to the capture or maintenance
of power, either alone or in combination with others." LaPalombara
and Weiner, ov, cit
. , p. 29. The same co-authors list additional
characteristics which a political party should have; (1) continuity
in organization; (2) manifest and presumably permanent organizations
at the local level with communications with national units;
(3) self-conscious effort to gain pov;er; (4) a concern on the part
of the organizations for seeking followers at the polls or in some
manner striving for popular support. Ibid., p. 6, Sigmund Neumann
defines political oarty as "the articulate organization of society's
active political asrents, those who are concerned with the control
of governmental power and who compete for popular support with
another group or groups holding divergent views." As such, it is
"the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies
to official governmental institutions and relates them to political
action within the larger political community." digmimd Ueumann,
Modern Political Parties (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1956),
p. 396.
CHAPTER I THE SETTING
The Legacies of Premodern Korean
Politics and Societ;;^
The twenty-five years of party politics in Korea must not be
viewed in isolation from the political tradition and cultures that
have preceded this period. The introduction of party politics and
liberal democracy was in fact a superimposition of one kind of
political system, upon another which had existed for centuries. It
is Lmtxirtant, for this reason, to exr)lore those characteristics of
the traditional Korean political culture which have helped mold the
environment under which the reoublican form of government has
functioned. In particular, I shall closely examine the Political
tfilture of the Yi Dynasty(1392-1905) which was heavily influenced
by Confucianism, and the characteristics of the Japanese colonial
rule (1910-19^5) because these legacies seem to have had a greater
impact on the post-war socio-political milieu. I shall also examine
socio-economic change since 19^5*
It is widely agreed that Korea's heritage of Confucian thought
and social pattern has had a strong indirect influence on Korean
society."^ During the early years of Yi Dynasty, Chu Hsi's (1130-1200)
^ee Geors-e McCune, Korea Todav( Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1950), T3. 93; Cornelius CsFOod, T>e Koreans and Their Culture
(Mew York: The Ronald Press, 1951), "o. 12^1-; KLm Doo-hun, "Confucian
influences on Korean Society," Korea Journal , Vol. Ill (September, 1963)
pp. 17-21, 40-41; and Yim Kyoncrgu and william A. Douglas, "Korean
Confucianism Today," Pacific Affairs, Vol. XI, I.'o. 1 (Spring/Summer,
1967). op. 43-59.
2Neo-Confucianism was adopted as the state cult replacing decaying
Buddhism. The Confucian hold on the Yi society for nearly five •
hundred yeaio had affected practically every sphere of Korean life
then and, to an important degree, up to the present time.
The ethical system of Confucianism in a form practised during
Yi Korea was particularistic and family-oriented as opposed to
universalistic and state or religion oriented. The elaborate social
ethics based on sankan? wulun, or the "Three Bonds and Five Relationships,"
defined the individual's orooer conduct in a hiearchically arranged
natural order in human relationshins and society. 5y preaching the
virtues of obedience, loyalty and remonstrance, the Confucian syster
played a sipnificant role in naintaining social order and stability.
However, these nrecepts were essentially conservative ones and tended
to be status-quo oriented. Aside from having an authoritarian undertone
in human relationships, this ethical system has had the effect of
the
atomizing/individual's loyalty and heightening his reliance on
small groups.
In its political aspects, the atomization of the individual
combined with the social conditions that prevailed during Yi Dynasty
precluded the development of social groups and other organizations
that could check the central power of the state. As a homogeneous
state', no substantial cleavages and loyalties existed in terms of
religion, lanruae^e or ethnicity to allow for pluralism in society.
As Gregory Henderson has put it, "the [xi^ system gave the development
of pluralism no prop and tended to cantilever society... powerfully
3toward central power." In addition, Henderson has said:
Exclusion of foreip^n trade and the control and
deroTation of commercial functions by the central
bureaucracy prevented the development of business class,
ports or specialization that could serve„local strength.
Local institutions were weak, diffuse...
The existence of an all-enconroassing central bureaucratic power
and the concomitant lack of social orr;anizations meant that nearly
all aspects of people's lives were controlled by the state power.
The relationshio between the ruling elites and the masses was defined
in the idea of kwanion minbi, "ftespect the Officials and Despise
the Commoners," in which the officials demanded unconditional
obedience and loyalty from the masses. When the quality of adminis-
tration deteriorated to an intolerable degree in the latter half of
the Yi Dynasty, such servile masses could not help but be alienated
from the state and its a^^ents. Generally speaking, the government
bureaucrats, central or local alike, were a feared lot who extracted
unreasonable levies and labor services from comrr.oners. This fear
of bureaucrats^^ intensified to a significant degree during the
4
Japanese rule, has persisted to the present day. Meanwhile the
Gregory Henderson, Korea : The Politics of Vortex (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 19^9) , ?• 24.
-^Ibid .. p. 195.
4
• For a brief but interesting discussion of centralization in
Korean history, see Grerary Henderson, "Centralization and Korean
Political Develolament
,
rteoort ( International Conference on the
Problem of Modernization in Asia) (oeoul: Asiatic .tesearch Center,
Korea University, I966), pp. 309-322.
existence of a powerful central bureaucracy inhibited local initiative,
In an agrarian society, all local matters of agriculture and marketing
were supervised by the state bureaucracy. As the peasants were
discouraned from taking an independent action, they were in the
habit of vraitinf: for the state to recornize problems and present
solutions. The lack of local initiative, a^ain greatly accentuated
under the Jananese colonial acininistration, presents itself as a
problem in Korea today.
The Yi society was divided into four distinct classes: the
yanrban
.
the aristocrats composed of higher echelon officials of
the government and their families and descendants: chuji^^'in
. or
a.ion
.
lower echelon officials and clerks in both the central and
provincial administration: san;-min
.
mostly peasants: chgnmin
. the
lowest social stratum comprised of butchers, peddlers and servants.^
The social status and occupations of these classes were patrimonially
fixed for their oosterity, although in rare instances, a rise or
fall in status did occur. ^ The top positions in the government
were onen only to the members of the yan.^ban class, and the latter
found the orecepts of Confucianism a convenient tool to perpetuate
^Han T'ae-su, Hyondap Hankuk Chonrch ' iron (Contemporary Korean
Politics) (Seoul: Huimun Ch'ulpansa, 19Ct)f pp. 36-39'
'^For social class system during the Yi Dynasty, see Han //oo-keun,
"The Stratification of Yi Dynasty Society and the i rocess of Its
Change," Korean Affairs , Vol. II, r^o. 1(1963), PP. 3b-^3.
5their power. Hence, the traditional society in Korea was marked by
a dual cultural system— that of the yan=rban and of the masses.
"
The ruling elites, by holding political power, held and monopolized
economic resoirrces as well. Therefore, the history of the Yi Dynasty
was, in a way, that of struggles among the members of the top social
class to maintain and rain access to officialdom, which was the
single and the only source to power, wealth and social prestige.
Competition among the members of the yanp-ban contributed
toward the widely condemned phenomenon called factionalism during
the Yi Dynasty. As one student of Korean history has put it, "the
causes of txDlitical factionalism in Korea are a lot m.ore difficult
7
to explain than its characteristics." Ko one has come forward with
a satisfactory causative theory of factions during the Yi Dynasty
and subsequent periods of Korean history. As a pervasive phenomenon
then and later, it is im.perative that we make an attempt at explaining
the causes of faction. Han Wu-kun had explained the origin of
gfaction in the following manner:
The yangban in the ruling stratum, because of their
hereditary status, eventually increased as time passed.
Since the prime purposes of the yan.^ban was to occupy civil
public offices, whose number was fixed at approximately 500
»
it became obvious that there were not enough offices for the
number of officials .... Competition among the yan;:ban for
the limited number of public offices led to strife within
'^Edward j^, Warner, "Korean Modernization: Some Historical
Consideration," Comment . No. 20, 1963, p.
Han Woo-keun, on. cit.
,
p. ^1
6their class. In fact, the political conflict among
the mid-Yi Dvr.asty can largely be attributed to this
fundamental social condition.
It could fui-ther be hypothesized that the fragmentation of the
ruling elite during the Yi Dynasty had been a product of kwako
.
the Civil Service Examination System, which emphasized mere
recitation of Confucian Classics. The successful candidates
recruited into officialdom hence were generalists in their functions
and roles, which became highly undifferentiated. This fact made
few persons indispensable.
The origin of factional disputes during the Yi Dynasty was
related ostensibly to the question of correct interpretation of
Confucian doctrines and decorums. Gradually these disputes degenerated
into a political controversy on such small and insignificant matters
V*> Q
as/whether the queen should be mourned for a year or for three years.
Starting toward the middle of the sixteenth century, the factional
rivalries were stabilized in Sasaek or "four Colors", representing
four factions, members of each having distinguishing colors and
dress styles. Each of these factions was formed usually along
clan or provincial lines to recruit individuals in the struggle
9 ^
For issues of factional disputes, see Kim Duk-hwang, Hankuk
Sasanrsa (A History of Korean Thought) (Seoul: ivamsandang, 195^)
»
pp. 140-143.
"^^For Yi factionalism, see Choi Suk, "The Factional Struggle
in the Yi Dynasty of Korea, 1575-1725, "1 and II, Koreana -Quarterly
Vol. VII. Ko. l(3pring, 1965), pp. 60-91; and iXo. 2(3ummer, 1965),
pp. 70-96.
7to place their members in influential positions. Each consanguinary
faction gathered around one dominant personality, and this pattern
of personal factionalism has its present-day manifestations in all
Korean organizations.
Personal factionalism has had other consequences. Organized
vertically and horizontally by blood relations, the victory of one
faction meant that the members of that faction would be recruited
to minor positions in the central or a provincial administration.
Under a recruitment policy based virtually on linea?re, the chokbo
.
lineage register, played an important part in the factional battles.
The confrontation of the cliques for the purcose of gaining power
was in a way a fight of one lineage clique against another, and this
was, in another dimension, one region against another where each of
these lineage cliques was concentrated.'''"^
Regional or sectional factionalism actually dates back to the
time of the Three Kingdoms and the struggle among the three kingdoms
of Kokuryo(37 3.0. -668 A.D.), ?aekche(l8 B.C. -660 A.D.), and Silla
(57 B.C. -935 A.D.) for hegemony in the peninsula. The confrontation
between Silla and Paekche, which roughly occupied the present-day
Kyongsang and Chonra provinces, was especially prominent and the past
animosities were carried over to the present generations, albeit in
^i Ki~baek, "Hankuksasangui Chibang Taerip, "(.-tes-ional
Confrontations in Korea History), in his Lin.jokkwa Yoksa(The Nation
and the History) (Seoul: Iljogak, 1971) t PP. 6b-d9.
t8
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a different form. In present-day Korea, regional origin often
becomes an important criterion for appointments to key government
posts. Charges of preferential treatment for certain regional
groups and persons are often heard.
If the causes of factionalism in traditional Korea are yet to
be explored, it is relatively easy to discern its consequences. In
this regard, Edward W. V/agner says:"'"-^
The most striking consequence m.ay be summed up,
though all too mildly, in the \rov%A maladministration. In
terms of mechanics of rovernment, this meant administrative
paralysis, bureaucratic inertia, irresronsibility and
insufficiency, crisis c^overnment. In the realm of political
m.orality, it meant corruotion, neootism, character assassi-
nation, ooT?ortunism, toadyism.. Elsewhere in the Korean
value system factionalism brought an excessive emphasis on
individual, clan, school, and regional loyalties it brought
an overriding concern with individuals rather tharuwith issues,
with minutiae rather than with matters of substance; and it
brought the conceot of dissent into dangerous proximity with
that of treason. Some of these features of traditional
Korean political life, this herita?-e of factionalism have
in some measure passed from the scene. But many of them
still today hamper the Korean effort to build a healthy,
modernized society.
To summarize several themes in the political tradition in premodern
Korea, it can be said that the rigid social class system prevented the
12
One of the ten testaments proclaimed by the founder of Koryo
Dynasty(93^-121l) , Wanf^ Kon, reads as follows: "The topographic features
of the territory south of Kon^^ju and beyond the Kongju aiverQnresently
the Chonra orovinces] are all treacherous and disharmonious , and its
inhabitants sLre also treacherous and disharmonious. For that reason,
if th.ey are allowed to participate in the affairs of the state, to
intermarry with the royal family, aristocracy, and royal relatives and
to take power of the state, they might imperil the state or injure the
royal safety— grudging the loss of their o>m state which used to be
the Kingdom of Paekche and being resentful of unification, quoted
and translated in Hahm Fyong-choon, The Korean Political Tradition
and Law(Seoul: Hollym Corporation, 1967), pp. ^9-50.
13-
-^^agner, og. cit . , p. 25.
9masses from participating in the political process in any form, and
that in the homogeneous socio-cultural environment, no viable
interm.ediary organizations were able to c^n-vive, with the state power
being comprehensive and authoritarian. The Confucian precepts defined
the relationship between the masses and the state in a hierarchical,
authoritarian manner: the state was paternalistically authoritarian
and the masses were obediently submissive.
Toward the end of the Yi Dynasty, the social class system based
on the Confucian ethical values was difficult to maintain. The number
of yan=:-ban increased tremendously without the corresponding increases
in government posts. This caused a great number of the members of
thiat class to be unemployed and impoverished. As conflicts between
Western Powers and Japan and China were mounting during the latter part
of the nineteenth centiiry, many of the imtxsverished yanrrban members
took part in several extragovernmental attempts to awaken the decaying
kingdom to modernity and to the outside world. Kon-governmental groups,
such as the Independence Club, founded by So Jae-p'il( Philip Jaesohn)
in I896, emerged to counter encroachments by foreign powers, but they
1^failed to attract widesiDread support from the masses.
The Independence Club is regarded by some Korean political
scientists as a forerunner to political parties that emerged after 19^5
•
That the founder of the Club rerarded it as a political party is
revealed in his autobiography: "Since I believed that it would be
difficult to spread the reform ideology of liberal democracy only
through the medium of a newspaper Independence Press, published in
I896, I have decided to organize a political faction and to spread
that idea with the helD of many persons. Herein lay my motive for
organizing the Independence Club." Quoted in Han Hung-su, "Toknip
Hy5phoeui Chongch'i Jiptanhwakwachong, "(The f-oliticization of the
Independence Club), Sahoekwahak i.'on.iip ;.o. 3» i'onse University, (Seo'J.:
Institute of Social Sciences, 1970) » P« 29.
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The Colonial Situation
After Korea was annexed by Japan in 19IO. a highly centralized
and authoritarian colonial rule was imposed on Korea. Korea was
ruled by decree under a line of active and retired Japanese generals
and admirals. In what amounted to a police state, the Government
General of Korea( Chosen Shotokufu) and its Japanese and Korean
agents were the objects of fear and hate. As far as the masses
were concerned, the image of the government was one of exploitation
and extortion.
Introduction of a public educational system, industry and a
modified administrative system had the effect of weakening the strati-
fied social structure inherited from the Yi Dynasty. In fact, the
social class system of Korea had been in the state of disintegration
even before the Japanese came to Korea. During the Japanese rule,
the social class system was abolished by law, but many of the former
yangban were able to retain their high social status because of their
land base. During the Japanese rule, although many of the former
yangban class were forced to sell their land for use by the Japanese,
many were allowed to retain it. It was principally those sons of
the landed aristocrats who could afford higher education either at
home or abroad. With better education, they were able to keep
their high social status which the commoners could not achieve.
The Japanese policy called for the domination of the government
by Japanese personnel. Including a small number of the Yi cabinet
ministers who were made Japanese peers, only about one-half of all
11
government employees were Koreans by 19/4.5. ^gt Koreans were
appointed to clerical and other minor posts. In I936 there were '
altogether &7,552 government employees in the various bureaus of the
Government General's office and in the provincial, municipal and
educational offices. Of these, 35,282 were Koreans and the rest
Japanese. More than 80 percent of the top grade officials
(chokunin and sonin ) were Japanese; about 60 percent of the officials
in the intermediary ranks (hanmin) were Japanese: Koreans occupied
about 50 percent of the clerical, secretarial and other minor posts in
the colonial government. The only all Korean body allowed by the
Japanese was the Central Advisory Council( Chushuin ) . nominally
representing Korean interests in advising the Governor General.
Com.posed of sixty-five Councillors, who were ap7X)inted by the Governor-
General and who were predominantly former yangban landed aristocrats,
this body had no substantive power. The council could offer advice only
at the request of the Governor-General and then upon a specific subject. "^"^
The oligarchical rule by the yanp-ban class diaring the Yi Dynasty
was replaced by the Japanese bureaucrats. The development of a modern
transportation system and modern comjnunication channels allowed the
colonial bureaucracy to penetrate deeply into the rural population.
. George M. McCune, Korea's Postwar Political Problems ( I, ew York:
Institute of Pacific iielations, 19^1-7), p- ^. oee also Pak Tong-so,
Kankuk "Cwanryochedo ui Yoksajok Chonkae (A ;''tudy of the Koreaji
Bureaucratic System) (::3eoul: P.ankuk i'on'gu Tosok;>ran
,
I96I).
^^'IcCune, oD. cit . , p. 4.
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The massive bureaucracy affected the everyday lives of ordinary
peasants. The imap;e of the exploitive and oppressive Yi Dynasty
adjninistrators was reolaced by the ordeal of the repressive
alien rulers. In the beginning of the Japanese era, a village
administrative structure based on kinship groups was introduced for
better control, increased production and more efficient collection
of taxes. In so far as the Koreans were concerned, the structure of
power in the society remained unaltered, though power itself was in
alien hands. The "reforms" carried out by the Japanese failed to
alter the traditional oligarchical pattern of distribution of power
in society. It is no wonder that almost half of the members of the
19^8 Constituent rational Assembly listed their occupation as "farmers."
It is easy to see that most of these farmers were actually landlord
by backcrround and txissibly descendants of yangban families.'^'''
Korean nationalism budding with the Tonghak Rebellion of 189^,
went into full gear during the Japanese rule. That the nationalist
movement, having been suppressed by the omnipotent and omniscient
Japanese police, remained ineffectual inside Korea left a serious
problem as far as the post-liberation politics was concerned. The
main thrust of the nationalist movement v/as forced to operate abroad,
."'"''Eae Ko Hahn, "Mature of Social-Political Change in Contemporary
Korea," Korean Affairs . Vol. I, ::o. ZiV.ay/June) , 19o2, pp. 152-153.
^^or history of Korean nationalism, see Chong-sik Lee, The
Politics of p:orean ! ationali5m(rerkeley: University of California
Press , 1963) . For the ororrams of reform and nationalist or:^c>jiizations
that had existed from the l890's up to 19^5, see Yi Ki-ha Iiankuk
Chonr-dan- ?altalsa(A History of Korean Political Parties) (oeoul:
Uihoe Chonrch'isa, I96I), pp. 4-49.
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with China, Russia and the United otates as its main centers. On
April 9, 1919, the Korean Provisional Government was established in
Shanghai with Syn,gman Ahee as its first ^resident. But the failure
to make headway in the 1920 's and 1930's left the leaders of this
"Government" deeply divided and frustrated, hence unable to provide
the sorely needed unified leadershii. in the critical period after the
liberation, during which the major criterion of leadership was one's
anti-Japanese record. A writer has m.ade the following sarcastic remark:^^
Any persons who returned from China or Lancbaria
enjoyed the refutation of bein-: ardent anti-Jacanese
nationalists. Almost all of those who vrere freed from
prisons in Korea transformed into patriots and received
fabulous treatment from the populace. It was indeed
difficult to pick out a true oatriot.
The Japanese surrender brought these exiled nationalist revolutionaries
home from abroad. They were men of various backgrounds with varying
claims of contributions to the nationalist cause. They included^
among others, rightist revolutionaries, socialists, Communists,
anarchists, syndicalists, and liberal democrats of various levels of
commitment. Samuel Huntington once noted that the importance of the
political party in providing legitimacy and stability in a riodernizing
political system varies inversely with institutional inheritance of
20the si^-^tem from traditional society. The above analysis of the
19 V/ ^
Kan? Chin-hwa, Taehanminkuk Konkuk Sinnyon.jiCA Ten Year History
of the Republic of Korea) (deoul: Taehaniy.inkuk Konkuk Sipnyonji
Kanhaenffhoe, 195^), o. 186.
20
, Huntinp-ton, "Political Development and Decay," world i olitics
.
Vol.. ri/II, ::o. 3(1965), pp. 386-436.' By "institution," uuntin-ton
means "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior."
1^
premodern Korean political traditions and the colonial situation
clearly shows that such "institutions" of great variety have cast
their shadov-3 upon the post-liberation p-iod and beyond.
Social Change After 19'!4.5
As was discussed earlier, the Confucian ethics combined with the
centralism of Yi Dynasty prevented the rise of organizations that
could stand between the atomized individuals and the all-inclusive
state power. This tradition was reinforced during the bureaucratic
rule by the Japanese colonial overlords. In a society which is
homogeneous ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously,
the cleavares that are attendant upon other "new" states do not exist
in Korea. Cleavages occur along the lines of urban-rural, industrial
-agricultural, modern-traditional, or educated-uneducated. The
social class system, already in a state of disintegration in the
last one hundred years or so of the Yi Dynasty, was undermined legally
by the Japanese and then further shattered by the land reform program
immediately after independence, by the impact of the Korean War, and
by the availability of mass educational opportunities. The only
social class that possibly inherited its status from the premodern
era and the Japanese rule was the peasants.
By the time of liberation, there were large number of absentee
landlords who were left alone by the Japanese colonial administration.
During the Jaoanese period, some of these landlords, many of whom
were former members of the yangban class or their descendants, sold
15
their land and redirected their reso^^'ces to business where the
Japanese industrialization program left ooen many opportunities. •
The social Lase of the Korean Democratic Party that emerged at the
wake of liberation was lar.^ely this landlord class. The economic
base of these men. however, deteriorated wh«i the land reform pro-am w
initiated by the American occupation authorities and finally carried
through by the new Korean Government in 1949. The Agrarian Reform
Act that year redistributed close to 25 percent of the total fanr.ing
area in South Korea to more than a million and a half farm households
which represented about 70 percent of all farm households in South
21
Korea. The absentee landlords were compensated by installment
payments in cash from the national treasury. As the value of money
was eroding rapidly by postwar inflation which came imm.ediately after
the implementation of the pro.gram. the landlord class reinvested what
was left of their resources in other endeavors— such as in education
of their sons, or in business. By weakening the economic base of the
landlords, this land reform had a levelling effect on the society.
Another factor at work was the newly arrived opport'onity for
education. In a rigidly stratified society like the Yi Dynasty,
educational opportunity was severely limited to the yan?ban class and
few others. "Letteredness" was the mark of yangban and this cultural
tradition helped the Koreans to respond enthusiastically to the newly
21
Kahn-Eeen Lee, Korea : Time, Chanre and Administration
.
(Honolulu: East-,/est Center Press, 1966), p. 51.
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opened opportunities for higher education. Public educational system
was introduced during the colonial rule, but opportunities''^''^ in fact
severely limited. Only the first sons of the well-to-do landlords
could afford a university education, and some attended colleges abroad,
particularly in Japan.
A compulsory public educational system was introduced at the
elementcxy school level by the American military authorities in 19^5
and it was formally adopted by the Korean Government in 1948. This
system was accompanied by a tremendous rise in secondary and university
level school population throughout South Korea. As the following
22Table 1 indicates. the school population increased from 1.5 million
in 19^8 to 3.8 million in 1955 and six million in 1964-.
Table 1, School Population in Korea, 1945-1964
1945 1955 1964
Elementary 1,382,000 2,959.000 4,744,000
Secondary 85,000 748,000 1,066,000
Higher 8,000 87,000 143,000
Total School Population (a) 1,^75.000 3,77^.000 5.953.000
Total Population (b) 16,000,000 21,000,000 28.000,000
(a) as percentage of (b) 9 18 21
The spectacvilar rise in the school population reflected the people's
awareness that in the newly established order of "equality", the only
Ibid., p. 49.
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chance for unuard mobility lay in education. Preoccupation with
education was so crreat that even many of the not-so-well-to-do farmers
sent their sons to Seoul for a university education, even at great
sacrifice to their financial status at home. Eventually, the
consequences of such preoccupation were expressed in the j-reat many
educated unemployed who could not be absorbed into the labor force,
thus creatine: social problems of a serious magnitude.
The effects of the Korean v/ar( 1950-1953) ^ere far-reachin.- in
many resioects. The human casualties and physical dajna.^es broke up
families and brouf^ht in refugees from the north. Through a universal
conscription system, young men from the rural villages were introduced
to the army camps' modern technologies and organization miodeled after
the United States Army. The Korean Arm.y, now with some 600,000 men
in uniform, has served as the nation's largest educational system,
contributing significantly to reducing widespread illiteracy rate in
Korea. The military forces also provided great educational opportunities
to those of peasant background, who were otherwise without means to
receive a civilian education. Through various programs at home and
abroad, principally in the United States, a strccng corps of m.odernizing
elite in uniform was born. As a student of Korean society has
observed, "Korea today comes close to having no class structure at
all."^ From the perspectives of the political parties, this
situation hinders a party from having a distinct class base. This
23
V/illiam A. Douglas, "The Current Status af Korean Society,"
Korean Affairs, ^ol. I. ICo. ^-(1962), p. 390.
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is why the interest group activities based on socio-economic growth
have largely been ineffectual.
One significant social development f n the postwar period has been
the tremendous impact of urbanization. Impacts of modern education
centered in Seoul and large cities, industrialization which has occurred
in the vicinity of large cities, the Korean War which has created a
tremendous exodus from rural areas, and also the agrarian reform,
these
fragmenting average farm size and aggravating rural poverty—/are some
of the reasons for the growth of urban population. The following table
recapitulates the trend of urbanization (Table 2).^^
A more recent survey by the Korean Ministry of Agriculture and
Forestry indicates that as of 1970. 55.3 percent of the total population
Table 2. Urbanization in Korea 19^-1960
Administrative Percentage of the Total Population
Subdivisions with
Population of: 19^* 19^9 1955 I960
50,000 and Over 11.2 28.3 25.3 28.5
20,000 to 49,999 19.5 27.5 33.9 ^.9
The figure for 19^0 includes both North and
--South Korea.
lived in the cities of 50 $000 or over. Compared with the figiire
28.5 percent ten years ago (I960), this has meant a 27.8 percent
Adapted from Economic Planning Board. Korea Statistical
Yearbook (Seoul: Economic Planning Board. 1965), Table 27, p. 17.
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increase in a short span of ten years .^^ The city is defined in Korea
as an administrative area with a population of 50.000 or more. There
were fourteen such cities in Korea in 1950. This number grew to 28 iu
I960 and 32 in 1970. Similarly, the proportion of population living
in large cities of 100.000 and more was only 8.? percent in 19^0.
However, the same proportion increased to Ik.? percent in m9. 19.
6
percent in 1955. and 20.1 percent in I96O. The rate of annual increase
in the size of urban population is as high as 6.4 percent. In the
metropolitan area of Seoul, the population increased by 55 percent in
the five year period from 1955 to I96O. From I96O to 1970. the figure
period .
for the same /was 220 percent. As has been suggested, such a tremendous
tempo of urbanization has not been effected with concomitant changes in
other socio-economic variables, but it was a consequence of rural
dislocation caused by the war, the educational revolution, the agrarian
reform and the industrial development in recent years. This unbalanced
growth has had a significant political implication, which we will
discuss in a later chapter.
25^
For the characteristics of Korea urbanization, see Lee Taikwhi,
"Urbanization and Its Political Implications in Korea" Korean Affairs
.
Vol. Ill (December, 1964), pp. 304-314.
^^The Dong-A Ilbo
.
June 30, 1971, p. 2.
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CHAPTER II THE GENESIS A^JD THE DEVELOMNT
OF POLITICAL PARTIES, 19^^5-1969
Liberation and the American Military
Government, 19^5-1948
In the delirium of liberation the expected onrush of political
activities commenced with various political groups and personalities
claiming their past virtues and presenting, their vision for the
liberated country. Coming together of groups and personalities on
the political stage in this critical period of Korean history was
dictated largely by the circumstances of the liberation. When the
Japanese defeat in the war was imminent, the Japanese colonial
administrator in Seoul. Governor General Abe Nobuyaki. began to make
overtures to prominent Koreans in his quest to protect Japanese lives
and property. Abe and his Political Affairs Bureau Chief Endo Ryusaku
approached Song Chin-u. a well known conservative publisher of the
Ilbo, the oldest and the most prestigious daily newspaper, to
form a caretaker government and to accept the transfer of authority
in return for the guarantee of the safety of Japanese lives. Song
declined the proposal on the grounds that the American occupation
forces would arrive shortly and that any cooperation he would give
would be to these forces and not the Japanese.'^
The Japanese authorities then tiirned to a leftist publisher of
the Chung 'ang Ilbo. Yo Un-hyong, who had taken part in the Korean
Chung'ang Son'go Wiwonhoe( Central Election Management Committee).
Taehanminkuk Chon£dangsa(A History of Political Parties in Korea),
(Seoul: Central Election Management Committee. 196?). p. 76.
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Provisional Government in the early 1920 's and who was equally well
known as Song. Yo. who had anticipated the Japanese defeat and
secrettly organized the Korean Alliance for Independence inside
Korea as early as 19^. accepted ^only a few days before the surrender
was announced, the Japanese proposal under several conditions. They
included, among other things, the immediate release of all political
prisoners from Seoul cells; provision of food and supplies for Seoul
citizens for the month of August, September and October; and no
interference with Yo's organizing activities among students, laborers
2
and farmers. The decision on the part of the Japanese was a
critical one for this period, the rational for which can only be
speculated. Yo's reputation among Koreans was an important factor
but the Japanese authorities, lacking information on the Allied
agreement on the 38th parallel and apparently believing that Seoul
would be occupied by the Russian troops shortly,-^ turned to the
leftists.^
On August 15, when the Japanese surrender was announced, YS
called a meeting of his allies, including prominent Communists^ many
of whom had been freed from Seoul cells, socialists and progressives.
He also invited rightist nationalists to work with him during the
period of transition. The result of this effort was the creation
^Ibid.
3 / ^On August 16, Endo called on Yo to tell him that the Americans
would occupy only the extreme southern part of Korea, and the
Russians the rest of the peninsula. This is a rumor that had been
said to have originated in the active Soviet Consul-General in Seoul,
See Henderson, og. cit.
, p. 115»
Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics (Berkeley; University
of California Press, 196?), p. 6?.
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of the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence(CPKI)
.
Although some rightists joined this organization, most of them
refused to join the CPKI on the grounds that Yo should await the
return of the Korean Provisional Government and its leaders from
Chungking and also that it would be unwise to cooperate with the
Japanese. During the interval between the Japanese surrender and
the return to Korea of such recognized leaders of the independence
movement as Syngman Rhee who had been in the United States, Kim Ku
and Kim Kyu-sik(Kim Kiusic) who had been in China, Yo's CPKI had
no rivals in the first three weeks of the liberation. Having
partially taken over the existing administrative machinery, it was
in far better position than any other group to wield power. In the
opening days of the liberation the CPKI proceeded to organize "local
committees" throughout South Korea, effectively maintaining law and
order. ^ Its representatives told the Americans at their September 8
•Inchon landing that 135 such local committees had already been
established.^ Without the participation of the rightists, the CPKI
proceeded to hold a "national convention" on September 6, two days
before the arrival of American occupation forces. By then, the CPKI
was already bearing progressively to the left. Three moderate
leftists were ousted from its Central Executive Committee on
September 3. The intention of the CPKI leaders was unmistakable:
^Ibid., p. 68.
.
Henderson, ££. cit. , p. 118.
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it was to present the General Hodge's entourage with a fait accompli
that a "government" in South Korea was organized. The proclamation
that emerged on September 6 stated, among others, that more than a
thousand delegates comprising of "nationalists from all walks of life"
had decided to "establish a Korean People"s Republic and that the
delegates were chosen to run the government.""^ It went on to say:®
From this day forward, by the demands of the
Korean people and their delegates, it is our intention
to overcome any difficulties on our way to eliminate all
the remnants of the Japanese imperial government, and
to struggle against all foreign elements who stand in
the way of establishing an independent nation based on
democratic principles.
In the "cabinet" announced on the same day, the delegates, most of
whom were leftists, elected, in accordance with an almost universal
sentiment, Syngman Rhee as Chairman and Y6 as Vice-Chairman. One
significant development was the election of Ho Hon, then a non-
Communist leader who later became a North Korean leader, as Prime
Minister. Most of the ministerial portfolios were given to extreme
leftists and Communists, and only a few ministries were headed by
rightists.
Alarmed at the inroads the leftists were making in the rapidly
changing political scene, the rightists countered with the organization
of the Korean Democratic Party(KDP) which sought to win the support
of any non-Communists at the time. To this party flocked many who
"^Central Election Management Committee, Taehanminkuk Chongdangsa
(A History of Political Parties in Korea), p. 77.
^bid.
2if
had collaborated with the Japanese rule over Korea. The beginning
of September saw the formation of two other rightist parties, the
Korean ^Nationalist Party and the Korean People's Party. In addition
to these. Song Chin-u. who had refused to cooperate with the Japanese
authorities and the CPKI earlier, organized a group of rightists in
the Welcoming Committee for the Korean Provisional Government. The
Welcoming Committee, in its proclamation stated that the naation "has
felt a clear presence and received spiritual guidance of Korean
patriots abroad," and that the government which should replace the
colonial government was the "Korean Provisional Government which has
existed continuously from 1919."^ On September 8, the rightist groups
issued a joint statement deploring the CPKI: "We solemnly oppose
any group or organization purporting to exercise governmental authority
in Korea, except the Korean Provisional Government, which was the
climax of our independence movement and which has been so recognized
by foreign nations. "^^
In addition to these relatively coherent and lasting groups,
the internal political scene in the first weeks of the liberation
witnessed a kaleidoscopic proliferation of parties, committees,
youth groups, farmer, labor and student organizations. These
organizations were unstable alliances, some of which organized one
morning and were extinct by nightfall . Organizations were made,
remade and unmade as their leaders switched their alliances. The
^Ibid.
, p. 78.
lOlbid.
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confusing alignment of political forces in the early weeks and months
of the liberation is well attested by the common joke current during
this time that whenever any five persons met to discuss the future
of Korea, they formed a new political party.
When General Hodge arrived in Seoul with his entourage on
September 8, he was ill-equipped to handle the complex political
12
picbjre. He immediately ran into difficulties and back tracked
the first few moves he had made. The source of his difficulty was
varied and the roots of all problems lay in the vague framework of
directives he carried with him from his home government. It is,
therefore, essential to sketch the outline of the United States
policy toward Korea and the state of preparedness for occupation
prior to the conclusion of the war. All evidence seems to indicate
that the United States had not clearly formulated its objectives and
policies with regards to liberated Korea.
The decision to make Korea an independent nation was first
reached in the Cairo Conference on December 1, 19^3 by the United
States, Great Britain and China. The Cairo Declaration took note
of the state of "enslavement of the people of Korea" and stated the
three powers' "determination" that "in due course Korea shall become
free and independent." In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 19^5*
setting out the terms of Japanese surrender, the three powers
^Cornelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture ( New York:
The Ronald Press, 1951), p. 303.
^^or American "comical" preparation for Korean occupation,
see, Henderson, o£. cit.
, pp. 120-125.
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reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration regarding Korean independence and
the Soviet Union expressed its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration
in her declaration of war against Japan on August 8, 19^5
.
The primary duty of the occupying forces was to demobilize the
Japanese military forces and to liquidate the Japanese administration.
The former turned out to be a relatively easy task but the latter
was a painstaking process since it necessitated establishment of a
substitute regime. The directives General Hodge carried explicitly
instructed him to superimpose an American Military Government upon
the framework of the Japanese Government General in Korea and to
oust the Japanese personnel by substituting them with Koreans
wherever possible, but he was not to recognize any Korean group as
13having governmental authority. One of the first declarations of
the American Military Government read: "United States policy prohibits
official recognition or utilization for political purposes of any
so-called Korean Provisional Government or any other political
14
organization by the United States Forces."
The initial Korean reaction toward the occupation forces was
a series of hostility and dismay. An official publication of the
-^The Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew stated on June 8,
1945 in reference to the Korean participation in the United Nations
Conference that the "'Korean Provisional Governnent' and other
organizations do not possess at any time the qualifications requisite
for obtaining recognition by the United 'States as a governing authority."
He went on to say: "It is the policy of this government in dealing with
groups such as the 'Korean Provisional Government' to avoid taking action
which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend
to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form
and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish."
Quoted in George M. McCune, Korea Toda,y , , p. 42.
The United States Military Government in Korea, Summation of the
United States Army Military Activities in Korea, No. 1, p. 177.
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military government frankly admitted that the initial step of the
American Command to retain Japanese administrators created intense
dissatisfaction. 15 This prompted an explanation by President Truman
on September 18: "Such Japanese as may be temporarily retained are
being utilized as servants of the Korean people and of our occupying
forces only because they are deemed essential by reason of their
qualifications. Immediate steps were taken to remedy the trouble,
and, in a few days. General Hodge had removed the high Japanese
officials and begun the process of de-Japanization.
In the political realm. General Hodge's difficulty hardly
improved. Having proclaimed the "People's Republic", the leftists
refused to drop the world "Republic" and function as a political
party as General Hodge requested them to do. Despite Hodge's
repeated press statements that the "military government is the only
government in southern Korea," the "Republic", now almost exclusively
controlled by the well-known Communists began to label the military
authority as "American imperialism" and publicly questioned the
sincerity of American intentions for Korean independence. On
December 12, Hodge's patience ran out: "I feel it necessary to the
public understanding to announce that, regardless of what it calls
itself, the Korean People's Republic is not in any sense a 'government'
•'•
^Ibid .
•^^The United States Department of State Bulletin . Vol. XIII
(September 23, IW), p. ^35.
17
'Quoted in. Cho, op. cit .
. p.
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On that day he directed that the activities of any organization "in
any attempted operations as a j^overnment" were to be treated as '
unlawful activities.
This was a fateful decision and perhaps indicative of the
pro-rightist inclination of the American occupying forces, as one
participant in the Military Government put it, "... it was no secret
that it (the Military Government) favored the right and was anxious
for the parties of the right to acquire strong popular support. "^^
When, on October 5, an eleven-member Korean Advisory Council was
announced to helo the United States Commander, it called the "aepublic"
an "irresnonsible rxDlitical ^rouo."^^ This advisory group was concosed
mostly of the rightists and headed by KLm Song-su, then the most
prestigeous rightist in Korea and the owner of the Dong-A Ilbo. In
hiring personnel for the government care was taken to exclude leftists.
In the opening struggle between the rightists and the leftists
which had taken the form of confrontation between the followers of
the Provisional C-overnment and the Republic, the former gained an
upper hand in winning the favor of the American Military Government.
It was no secret, however, that the Republic's main source of support
lay in the well organized support of the Communists at the time of
the liberation. The history of Korean Communism dates back to 1918
when the Irkutsk Communist Party established a Korean section by
18
.Quoted in ibid., d. 50»
19Bertram D. Sarafan, "Military Government in Korea," Far
Eastern Survey
.
November, I9A-6, p. 35O.
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January of that year. The KoryS Con^unist Party was established in
Kharvosk in January. 1921. and the pavement spread first to some
60.000 Korean residents in southeastern Siberia, and then the party
under the direction and financial support of the revolutionary
regime in Russia began to gain supfxsrters in Manchuria and other
parts of China as well as inside Korea. Although the Coimnunist
Party was forced to operate underground during the Japanese rule.
the party nevertheless came to possess a well-knit hierarchy of
leaders. Pak Hon-yong. its acknowledged leader who had little foreign
bonds, arrived in Seoul on August 1? from brick-laying in Ch^nra
Province, carrying party lists and plans for reorganization. On
September 12, he revived the party and was elected Chairman of the
20
Korean Communist Party.
As a well organized group, the Communists became the heir of
the sudden emancipation from the Japanese rule. In the opening
weeks of the liberation, the Communists and their affiliated
organizations had no rivals. The "peoples* committees" in both
North and South Korea collected taxes: they also took over many
Japanese factories. One writer concluded that the Communists who
controlled the "people's republic" in the opening months of the
liberation "was imperium in imperio in South Korea, unquestionably
the country's most important single force for at least the first
20
Henderson, o£. cit.
, pp. 312-32^.
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year. "21 the grassroots, the left continued to gain strength.
The New York Tirnes report on January 5. 1946 stated that the
conservative elements had "fallen far behind liberal as well as
radical factions" and that the People's Republic "continues to gain
strength in rural areas." The Christian Science Monitor article of
January 3 of the same year stated that "the so-called People's
Republic, composed of socialist and Communist elements, enjoys far
more popular support than any other single political grouping. "^^
Until the reappearance of the Dong-A Ilbo on December 1. most of
the newspapers were leftist inclined. The gain by the Communists
was impressive. From roughly 4,000 members at the time of liberation,
Pak Hon-yong, its leader in South Korea, claimed 29.000 on March 1,
1946. The Military Ctovernment itseK estimated 15,000 to 20,000
Communists during this period.
The rightists' position was strengthened considerably by the
return of Syngman Rhee on October 16, 1945 and the arrival of some
twenty other leaders of the Provisional Government on November 23.
including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik. This trinity of leaders later
split, but in the early months of the liberation, they rendered the
rightists tremendous prestige and legitimacy. The most famous of
the three was Syngman Rhee. His popularity was based on the fact
that he was the first President of the Korean Provisional Government
2
^bid
. . p. 322.
22Quoted in McCune, Korea Today
. p. 50.
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and almost single-handedly agitated for Korean independence abroad. Rhee.
on his return from the United States, disavowed any connection between
him and a political group. Rhee stated that "... the reason that
I come home without prior notice is not because I was on any secret
mission or I had any previous arrangement with any particular political
party. My wish is that all political parties and factions unite and
cooperate for independence of a free nation in Korea. "^^ He seemingly
stood a'uove the political turmoil and later organized the National
Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence( NARKI)
.
Kim Ku, another aging revolutionary, was one of the original
members of the Provisional Government, and, at the time of liberation,
its President. His fame was based primarily on the fact that he was
a moving spirit behind the most successful assassination plot ever
undertaken by Korean exiles in China. In the Shanghai bombing of
1932, which was plotted under his direction, several Japanese generals
were killed or wounded. The incident made him a hero in the eyes
of most Koreans and his eminence was further emphasized by his
marriage to the daughter of An Chung-kun, the assassin of Prince
24
Ito Hirobumi at Harbin in 1909- He became the leader of the Korean
Independence Party(KIP). The last of the three leaders, Kim Kyu-sik,
joined the Provisional Government in 1919 and represented it in
^^Quotfxi in Robert T. Oliver, Syngran Rhee ; The Man Behind the
MythCNew York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1954), p. 370.
24
For his autobiography, see Kim Ku, Baekbom Ilji(Member of
Kim Ku), 8th Ed., (Seoul: Chonpung Publishing Co., 1969).
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4-^^ t5 • -r, Isst positionthe Pans Peace Conference. A recipient of « ^ .a doctorate degree in the
provisional Government was Vice President.
Given the political situation at the time, any form of unity of
political groups was conceivable only under Rhee. A .oil taken by the
Doa^ llbo on January 23, 19h6
, vhich asked questions of passers-by
on four street corners of Seoul, showed that Rhee was a definite front-
runner as the "first President of Korea" with 29 percent (out of some
T.OOO respondents.) Kim Ku was a distant second with 11 percent; Kim
Kys-sik 10 percent; and the moderate leftist leader of the "Republic"
2 5Yo Un-Hyong with another 10 percent.
When the decision on December 27. 191+5 by the Moscow three-power
conference to impose a five-year trusteeship over Korea was announced,
the Korean reaction-of all political groups- was immediate and
hostile. The Korean press condemned it and variously characterized
it as a "Second Munich," "mandatory rule," "insult to Korea,"
M 26international slavery," and "violation of international treaties."
25
The Don^-A llbo
, July 2U, 19^+6, p. 1.
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The key passages in the Moscow declaration which dealt with theKorean question stated in part: "It shall be the task of the JointCommission (U.S. Command in South Korea and the Soviet Command' in North
Korea), with the participation of the provisional Democratic Government
and of the Korean Democratic organizations, to work out measures also
for helping and assisting the political, economic and social progress
of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and
the establishment of the national independence of Korea.... The proposals
of the joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation.! with
the provisional Korean Government, for the Joint consideration of the
United States, Great Britain, Russia and China... for working out an
agreement concerning a four power trusteeshit) of Korea for a period up
to five years." Quoted in Report of the United Nations Temporary
Commi s s i on on Kore a , Vol. I, General Assembly, Official Records: Third
Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/5T5), Lake Success, New York, 19U8, p. 8.
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Without waiting for the clarification of the reports, the rightists
organized a general work stoppage and mass demonstrations throughout
the country. They attempted to take over the police force and the
judicial system and whipped up public hysteria in opposition to the
Moscow decision. The movement was impressive and the following among
Korean employees of the Military Government gave them additional
power. The leftists joined in opposition to the t2;steeship proposal.^?
but on January 3. W6, they suddenly reversed their position,
allegedly under instructions from Cominform, and came out in support
of the trusteeship. On the same day, the rightists held a mass rally
in Seoul in protest of the Moscow decision.^^ Any prospect of bringing
about the unity of the left and the right was now foreclosed.
As provided for in the Moscow Declaration, the first session
of the United States-Soviet Joint Commission was convened on March 20,
19^6 at Doksu Palace in Seoul. Before the representatives from both
sides got down to substantive matters, however, a considerable number
of differences arose with regards to the procedure to be followed in
consulting with Korean "democratic parties and social organizations"
referred to in the Moscow Agreement and the meeting broke down finally
on May 8. Each side blamed the other for the deadlock. The United
States Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring explained that the
27
For the leftist statement opposing the trusteeship proposal,
see Han T'ae-su, Hankuk Ct^ngdangsa(A History of Korean Political
Parties) (Seoul: S hint ' taeyangsa
,
1961), pp. 66-6?.
28 -J
Haebang Yisipyinyonsa ( Twenty-two Years Since Liberation)
(Seoul: Munhaksa, 196?), Vol. I, p. 23^.
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cause for the deadlock was the Soviet contention that "all Koreans
who had opposed in anyway the terms of the Moscow Agreement should
be excluded." Since the Communists were the onlor group supporting
the agreement in question, "the Soviet criterion would have effectively
limited the Commission to consultation with one minority group. "^^
The Soviet explanation blamed the United States for proposing the
inclusiOii of "seventeen political parties and social groups of
Southern Korea which opposed the Moscow Agreement and only three
democratic parties which supported the agreement, ""^^ and further
claimed that certain parties and social organizations had been
debarred for purposes of consultation by the Military Government
in Seoul.
Another session of the Joint Commission did not convene until
May 21, 19^7. After lengthy discussions, the Commission was dead-
locked again on the requirement of consultation with Korean parties
and social organizations. The United States delegation took the
position that all parties and organizations willing to uphold the
Moscow Agreement and abide by the decisions of the Commission should
be consulted. The Soviet counterpart, however, insisted that the
representatives of parties and organizations belonging to the so-
called "anti-trusteeship committee" formed by Kim Ku should not be
eligible unless they had officially announced withdrawal from this
committee.
^^The United States Department of State Bulletin . Vol. XV
(March. IW), p. 5^5.
•^
^Report of the U.N. Temporary Commission ojei Korea, p. 10
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Among other Issues that divided the American and the Soviet
delegates were that the United States objected to the alleged
exclusion from the Soviet list of consultees of twenty-four political
parties claiming a total membership of over fifteen million. The
Soviet delegates, on the other hand, countered with the argument
that democratic parties and organizations which supported the Moscow
Agreement were being subjected by the Military Government to the
"severer t restrictions" including seizure of their premises, arrest
of leaders and suppression of press organs.-^"*" On the problem of
establishing a provisional Korean government, the American represen-
tatives proposed that a provisional representative legislature should
be elected by universal suffrage in each zone as a means of constituting
a national provisional legislature, to be made up of representatives
selected from the legislature of each zone in proportion to its
population. The national provisional legislature would then establish
"a provisional government for a united Korea." The Soviet delegation,
on the other hand, proposed that a provisional All-Korean People's
Assembly, constituted of representatives of democratic parties and
organizations having 10,000 or more members, and which were known to
"sincerely support the Moscow decisions and not be opposed to the
Joint Commission or to the Allied Powers," should be established.
In the Soviet scheme, representation of the two zones in the Assembly
32
was to be equal.
^"Ibid., p. 11.
^^Ibid.
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In the face of these irreconcilable differences, the fate of
the Joint Commission was sealed. On August 26, 194? , the United
States Government proposed that the question of implementing the
Moscow Agreement should be referred forthwith to the Four Powers
adhering to that agreement. The Soviet Union announced the refusal
to participate in the Four Power discussions on September 19k7,
The Unit3d States, convinced that further efforts to reach an
agreement on the basis of the Moscow plan would be futile, brought
the question of Korean independence before the United Nations on
33September 1?. The General Assembly ,on November 12, despite Soviet
opposition, adopted a resolution calling for a general election in
all of Korea before March 31, 19^8, representation of which was to
be based on population and created the United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea ( UNTCOK )
.
The question of trusteeship drove the nation into a deepening
political turmoil. Any chances of reconciliation between the
followers of the People's Republic and the Korean Provisional
Government now appeared to be doomed. Adversary organizations in
rapidly
this battle took on different names in these moving times,
but the battle line was drawn between the leftists and the rightists,
On January 19, 19^6, the leftists including the Communists met to
discuss the formation of a united front. The resulting Democratic
People's Front(DPF), organized on February 15, brought together
^^George M. McCune, "Postwar Government and Politics of Korea,"
Journal of Politics , Vol. IX(Kovember, 19^7). P. 608.
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leaders of four leftist organizations which kept separate entities
throughout the opening months of the liberation. Kim Won-bong of
the Revolutionary Party, Ho Hon of the South Korean Labor Party,
Pak H5n-y6ng of the Communist Party and Yo Un-hyong of the Korean
People's Party were elected to the Supreme Committee of the DPF."^^
The leftist strategy was to use their support of the Moscow Agreement
as a stepping stone to political power. They tried to discredit the
rightists, branding them as pro-Japanese and "national traitors"
and contrasting their own support of the Joint Commission to the
rightist opposition.
The leftist chances for gaining an upperhand deteriorated
rapidly. After having been suspected of a massive counterfeit
scandal involving Communists, which was heavily publicized by the
Military Government authorities, the leftists', especially the
Communists' image suffered considerably. The incident gave the
military authorities pretext to tighten the control of the leftists
and Communists. The latter, as the most powerful group in the
early post-liberation period, was an anathema to Hodge and his
military government. The rightists under the protection and
encouragement by the military government were beginning to gain
- popular support. The military authorities lost no time to
capitalize on the scandal. On May 8, 19^6, two days after the
"^Haebang Yisipyinyonsa( Twenty-two Years Since Liberation),
p. .236. .
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scandal was revealed to the public, the military authorities searched
the Communists' headquarters in Seoul. This act was followed by a
series of moves which tended to vitiate the Communists. On Kay 18,
the occupation authorities proceeded to close the Haebang llbo
. an
official Communist daily, and closed six other semi-official Communist
newspapers on September 6. To make the Occupation authorities*
dis pleas-ore with the Communists complete, the Military Government
ordered the arrest of Pak Hon-yong, the head of the Communist Party
35in South Korea. The leftist movement was now captured by the
Communists. With Yo's assassination in June, 19^7, any hope of the
moderates holding the reigns of the leftist movement was doomed.
The rightists, on the other hand, united under the name of t,he
Emergency People's Committee on January 2l' and proceeded to lead
the protest movement against the trusteeship. The leadership of
this group included all prominent rightists including Rhee, Kim Ku
and Kim Kyu-sik. This committee soon dissolved itself in favor of
the NARKI under the chairmanship of Rhee. This loose federation of
rightists of various backgrounds and experiences, however, had to
endure another realignment when the first session of the Joint Com-
mission folded amid differences between the participants. The
differences among the rightists emerged over the question of whether
to establish a government south of the 38th parallel or for all of
Korea. The J.ine was drawn as a military expediency for the Soviet
and the American troops to disarm the Japanese.
^^Ibid., p. 238. Pse Also Henderson, o^. cit., p. 322.
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Syngman Rhee. who had been travelling throughout Korea in his
campaign against the trusteeship, announced on June 3. W6 that he
was considering "some sort of a provisional government or a committee
in South Korea alone. "^^ ^his marked the departure of Kim Ku and
Kim Kyu-sik from Rhee's camp. Kim Kyu-sik. who had been advocating
one government for all of Korea, flatly refused to cooperate with
Rhee on his proposal from the beginning. Kim Ku at first consented,
but announced withdrawal shortly thereafter, stating that he favored
a "unified government of North-South. Left-Right."^'' The KARKI.
however, received the support of the KDP. whose leaders were princi-
pally those nationalist leaders who had been in Korea at the time
of liberation, and who were under special favor by the American
military authorities. Rhee's political line was also supported by
those rightists who served in the Japanese bureaucracy. Hence the
rightists were divided into two large camps— the followers of the
NARKI and its leader Rhee on the one hand and the Provisional
Government circles and their leaders, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik on
the other. With the birth of the Korean Independence Party in
April, 19^6, this division was to endure right up to the time of
independence.
While the right wing groups were beginning to drift apart,
the moderates of the left and some right wing elements attempted
to bring about some sort of unity. One such movement was organized
^bid
.. p. 237.
37.Ibid.
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on the initiative of Kim Kyu-sik and Yo Un-hy^n, in July, 19^6.
However, the so-called Left-Ri.ht Unity Conference stalemated after
a month of discussion due to the participants • widely diverging
views. 3S
^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^
participate in such a venture foreclosed the fate of the Unity
Conference. The Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, a .half-
elected and half-aor^ointive organ formed in December, I945, was
largely a consequence of the efforts by Kim Kyu-sik and those
others who favored the union of the leftists and the ri^^htists.
Here arain. m.any prominent political leaders refused to participate
in the Occupation sponsored Assembly with advisory functions.
As of June, 1946, Political parties registered with the
American Military Government numbered 10? and a year later, this
number increased to 344 in South Korea. When the Joint Commission
invited the political parties and social organizations to file
applications so as to determine their qualification to be consultees,
some 463 parties with a massively inflated membership of 60,000.000
40
responded. The Korean population at the time was hardly 26,000,000,
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For insistence by both sides, see Kim Chon?r-hun. Hankuk
ChoncdancsafA History of Korean Political Parties) (Seoul: Seoul
Koshinhakhoe, I969), p. 25.
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vnien the second session of the Joint Commission was deadlocked
toward the end of August, 194?, the lU^RKl began to push for the
establishment of a government in South Korea alone. The United
Nations General Assembly resolution introduced by the United States
representative called for a general election on Karch 3, 1948 and
a United nations Temporary Commission on Korea, composed of
representatives from ei^ht nations, was created to implement the
resolution and to oversee the election. As the UKTCOK members were
refused entrance to r:orth Korea by the Soviet Occupation Forces, the
decision was made by the Commission to hold a general election in
South Korea alone on Kay 10, 1948. This decision by the Commission
practically sealed any hope of uniting the three prominent rightist
leaders, who, previous to that, had generally acted in unison in
their confrontation with the leftists through the second Joint
Commission. Rhee reiterated his position on September 18, 194?
when he called for "an immediate establishment of a provisional
government in South Korea with a right to negotiate directly with
Soviet Russia and Am.erica on matters of occupation of Korea..."
and he added that the "American forces... should stay in Korea until
41the Soviet forces are withdrawn from North Korea."
Kim Ku's position on the future of Korea diverged widely with.
Rhee^s. In the statements he made to the UNTCOK hearings on January
28, 1948, he called for "a unified, sovereign, independent government.
• 41
(Quoted in Lee, Joung-sik, "Some Characteristics of Korean
Political Culture: A Study of Korean Political Leaders* Statements,
I948-I96O," Koreana ^^uarterly . Vol. VIII, I.o. 3(Autumn, 1966), p. 66.
k2
established throuf^h a general election for the entire country;"
"Iimnediate withdrawal of IS-OSSR troops from Korea... with the
'
United IJations takinc, the responsibility for maintaining public
peace durinr. the interim period;" and "A meeting of prominent
leaders from North and South Korea [in order thatl the Korean
problem could be solved by the Korean people. "^^^ The hardenin- of
Kim Ku's position was manifested in several concrete steps he took
jointly with the leaders from the moderate ri?^htist camp such as
Kim Kyu-sik. In early March, 19^8, it was announced that both
Kims' had sent a letter, which was later made public," to Kin Il-son.-,
Chairman of the i\orth Korean People's Committee and Kim Tu-bon-,
Chairman of the North Korean Labor Party, outlining their proposal
for a l^orth-South Korean Leaders' Conference. In this letter, they
reaffirmed that the Koreans themselves should settle the problem of
Korea and that the measures for the establishment of a unified and
democratic government should be discussed through a conference of
political leaders of both zones. In the event that the proposal
was acceoted by the North Korean leaders, the representatives from
South Korea to attend the conference were to be elected from those
political parties of South Korea which vere in favor of holding such
conference. On Karch 13, seven prominent South Korean leaders
including Ki:n Ku and Kim Kyu-sik issued ^, joint statement calling
• Simmation
,
February, 19^8, p. 171,
^-^Ibid., Karch, 19^8, p. 153.
for a unified independence of Korea and vowing never to participate
in the election in South Korea, which, they claimed. «,uld perpetuate
the division of Korea.
^
When the invitation list was announced by North Korea, it mostly
included leaders of organizations of moderate and leftist inclination
despite the fact that the initiative came from Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik.
both rightist leaders. The so-called National Unity Conference was
convened with some 5^0 members of ^6 organizations from North and
South Korea in P'yongyang from April 22 to 23. Upon returning
from there. Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik issued a joint statement on April
30. It claimed that the leaders' conference "has pointed the road to
construction of a united, democratic nation," and it was a "further
testimonial that Korea, freed of foreign interference, can begin a
prosperous national life in peace." The basis of the national unity
envisaged by the unity conference were:^^
1. Withdrawal of the two occupation forces from Korea.
2. The organization of a provisional government by a
national political conference immediately after
the withdrawal of troops.
3. The adoption of a national constitution and the
formation of a united national government by
representatives to be elected through a national
election.
^Ibid .
Donald G. Tewksbury, ed. , Source Materials on Korean
Politics and Ideologies (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations,
1950), p."9^.
The last minute efforts by some rightists notwithstanding, the
hour for a unified government for all of Korea had already passed.
There was nothing achieved as a result of the Unity Conference
except that it had a tremendous propaganda boost for the Communists.
an
The mJTOCKdecision to hold/election in South Korea alone proceeded
with the blessing of rightist groups headed by the eventual victor
in the tliree years of political turmoil since liberation.
Witnout the participation of the leftists and those organizations
that had gone to P'yongyang for the Unity Conference, both of which
urged the boycotting of the election, 91 percent of the eligible
the
voters went to /polls on May 10, 19^8 to elect their representatives
to the Constituent National Assembly. Amid the reported incidents
of interferences by the leftist organizations, especially in the
rural districts of Cheju Province and the southwestern provinces
where the police was unable to establish and maintain order, 198
members were elected on the basis of the single-member district
system ,with two electoral districts in Cheju Province unable to hold
elections due to riots created by the Communists.
in
In the election that was participated /by some 942 candidates,
the NARKI candidates showed remarkable strength. The NARKI won 59
seats. The Korean Democratic Party, whose support of Rhee was
instrumental to the eventual victory of his political line, followed
with 29 seats. Next came the candidates of two youth corps: the
Taedong Youth Corps of Yi Ch'ong-ch'Sn won 14 seats; the Nationalist
^5
Youth Corps ,le.d by Yi Bom-so^k^won Ik and 6 seats respectively.^^
The nation's first election saw the proliferation of independents.
Some 85 men without party affiliations were elected to the first
National Assembly. The voting criteria seemed to have been the
candidate's record as an independence fighter and as an anti-
Japanese. Where parties were organized and dissolved overnight,
the party label could not provide the voters with meaningful images
that corld guide the voters. One surprising result of the election
was the small number of winners for the Korean Democratic Party.
As the most highly organized and wealthy political group among the
rightists and having accrued advantages as an extensive participant
in the American Military Government, it was expected to have a better
showing. But it is noteworthy that the KDP had by far the highest
ratio of candidates to winners(32 percent), considerably higher than
the national average of 21.1 percent.
The election brought to a close a turbulent chapter in Korean
politics. The shape of politics in the post-liberation era was more
or less determined by the extent to which the two superpowers agreed
or differed. Liberation having been attained through their hands,
the American-Soviet occupation of the Korean peninsula had left a
The Secretariat. National Assembly, the Republic of Korea.
Kukhoe Sipnyon.ii(Ten Years of National Assembly) (Seoul: The
Secretariat of the National Assembly. 195B). pp. 2-3.
The figure for the independents was 20.^ percent. This
seems to indicate that being a member of a political party or
groups brought no appreciable benefit for the candidates in this
election.
he
deep imprint on the course of Doiifi^oi ai p l t cal development in Korea.
Independence was achieved hnt +v,^ua a, bu the price to pay was dear.
The First Republic and the Shaping ofParty Politics, 19U8-I960
Syngman Rhee
,
as the oldest member of the newly elected
Constituent National Assembly, convened its first session on
May 31, 10^8. On the opening day, Rhee was chosen as Speaker
and Kim Tong-won and Shin Ik-hi as Vice-Speakers. The new
Assembly immediately proceeded to write a constitution and
an organic law for the forthcoming government. The Constitution
Drafting Committee was said to have favored the cabinet system
as were the leaders of the KDP. Having supported Rhee through
the turbulent post-liberation politics and having supported Rhee
in securing the speakership, the KDP leaders expected to
share the spoils of power with Rhee. The cabinet system would
have been more amenable than a presidential system to suit
their purposes. It was also known that Rhee himself had
been in favor of the cabinet system at one time.^^ But
he seemed to have a change of heart overnight, believing
that a cabinet system would entail sharing power with the KDP,
which had deeper roots in Korea at the time than himself. At any
rate, when the draft constitution was reported out of the drafting
committee, it called for among other things, a presidential system
See Yu Chin-o, "Reflections on the Days of Drafting the
Constitution," Kukhoebo, No 2 (1958), p. 32. See also Yun Ch'^n-.1
Hankuk Ch5ngch ' i Ch ' egye (The Korean Political System) (Seoul:
Koryo University, I961), pp. II5-II6.
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a unic^eral legislature, and indirect election cf the President by
the National Assembly.
The new Constitution was promulgated by Rhee as Speaker of
the National Assembly on July 17;and there was no doubt as to who
was going to be the first President of the Republic of Korea. Rhee
won one-sidely. obtaining 180 out of I96 votes. Kext came Kim Ku
who won 13 votes despite the fact that he boycotted the first
general election. Rhee's prominence was widely recognized, and the
loose political groupings of the first general election were not
a factor in Rhee's election. The vice presidential post went to
the octogenerian Yi si-y5ng. the former Vice Chairman of the Korean
Provisional Government at the time of liberation. On July 2k,
Syngman Rhee was inaugurated as the first President of the First
Republic.
Public attention now turned to the appointment of a cabinet.
Rhee's inauguration speech was indicative of what was to come:
"... regardless of party affiliations or personal relations, men
best able and best suited to administer the enacted laws in
accordance with the wishes of the people will be chosen to
governmental positions." ^ When the cabinet was announced on
August 6, the KDP hopes to dominate the new cabinet were betrayed.
Kim Song-su, the head of KDP was given no government post at all,
and only one of the active members of tha.t party was given a
49^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo, July 25, 19^8, p. 1.
ministerial post. Kim Song-su was later offered a post as Minister
without Portfolio, which he declined.^° Reactions to Rhee's choices
were unfavorable. Newspapers in general felt that the cabinet was
nothing but a gathering of Rhee's friends and followers, most of
whom were mainly mediocre men. One paper criticized that the
criterion for the appointment seemed to be the ability to speak
English. More than half of the cabinet appointees were educated in
the United States or in Great Britain. For the KDP and its members,
power in the newly established nation appeared to go elsewhere,
particularly to the Nationalist Youth Corps: its leader Yi Bom-sok
received simultaneous appointment as Prime Minister and Defense
Minister. Another influential ministry, the Home Ministry ,went to Rhee
another loyal follower who had a previous connection with the
Youth Corps in question.
Deeply disappointed ty having been blocked in their expectations
to share power with Rhee, the KDP revived the issue of a cabinet
system they had favored
. From late 1948 on, the party was
launched on the steady road to becoming the first opposition party
According to Rhee himself, Kim Song-su was the "most
appropriate person to become the Prime Minister" due to his
"integrity, personal virtues and patriotism." The reason why he
avoided designating Kim Song-su as his Prime Minister, he stated,
was because of the fact that Kim was a leader of a political party.
In 19^8, he also repeated his fundamental distrust of political
parties in his message to the nation. See Cho Il-mun, Sae
ChSngdangron ( New Theory of Political Parties) (Seoul: Samhwa
Ch'ulpansa, 1971), pp. 23-24. In the initial stages of his presidency,
Rhee appeared to have a deep distrust of political parties, an
inclination which is consistent with his populist proclivities.
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in the republic. The party platform announced at the conclusion of
the October, I949 party convention included a program for a
constltutioral amendment in favor of a cabinet system. At first
such constitutional issue attracted very little public attention.
but it did Win the sympathy of some Assemblymen who later Joined the
party. As Rhee-s authoritarian rule becar.e manifest in time, the
issue of the constitutional ^endment gradually became synonymous.
vith the "anti-dictatorship issue.-Sl
^s Rhee battled the Assembly
on such post-indeoendence issues as punishin, the collaborators,
land reform, local autonomy and the disposition of the culprits of
the unsuccessful ySsv rebellion. Speaker of the Assembly Shin Ik-hi
led a lar.e part of his 70-member confederation of minor politicians
into the KDP on the issue of cabinet responsibility. The new group,
now renamed Democratic Kationalist Farty(DKP) became the first
the
Korean group formed with explicit purpose of being an opposition
party.
The prewar period also saw the beginnings of political amalga-
mation on the government side as well. In IW Khee ordered that
all youth groups combine into the Taehan Youth Cores and that all
combuie
unions/into the Korean Federation of Trade Unions. They led directly
into party politics in 1951, when tx)th of these organizations became
ancillary organizations of the Liberal Party(LP). In the National
Assembly, Rhee quietly moved to absorb inzo his own circles independent
^''Henderson, od. cit.
, p. 291.
^^Ibid.
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legislators and legislators belonging to splinter groups with the
objective of weakening the opposition in the Assembly. He began to
win the sunrx^rt for his glides in the legislative body.
Even before the I95O general elections, a large number of
independent legislators in the Assembly, in the course of deliberating
various important bills, had begun to form friendship circles and
associations,
"starting out strictly as a grouping based on personal
relations and goodwill, it became not uncommon for each friendship
circle to win m.ore le^^islators on the basis of agre^ policy, and
this also provided the basis for a new circle. The amalrar.ation
process received a tremendous boost when on September 29, 19^9 the
Assembly passed a law concerning negotiation groups within the
National Assembly. A negotiation group was defined as a group of
twenty or more legislators, who, as a group, were given the privilege
to "negotiate" on the Assembly floor.^^ The adoption of such system
brought a tremendous change in the rower configuration of the Assembly.
Lesser friendship circles were forced to fold and its members found
their places in the larger negotiation groups.
53.
'"^^ Jin-hak, Jehon Kukhoesa(A Historv of
the Constituent national Assembly) (Seoul; ohinjo Ch'ulp'ansa," 195^)
,
^' J-nitially, the negotiation ?:^rouo appears to have been
created^as a way of expediting business on the floor of the Assembly.
The assignment of seats, selection of standing and ad hoc committees
and the designation of speakers during the Assembly sessions were
made accordm- to the negotiation groups. Later, the ner-otiation
groups were made to consult on the agenda of the assembly session.
See The Secretariat, the National Assem.bly, Kukhoe-^p Haesol(A
Commentary on the Laws Governins: the I.'ational Assembly) (Seoul: The
Secretariat of the National Assembly, I96&), op. 64-65.
By the fifth session of the Constituent National Assembly, the
floor was composed of five "clubs" and political parties. The
Independent Club had 29 Assemblymen: the Sinchor^(the New
Politics Club). 23; the Nodon^ang( the Korean Farmer-Labor
Party). 23; the Ilmin Kurakbu(the One People Club). 55; and the
DNP. 70. By the final session of the Assembly, the number of
negotiation groups was reduced to four. The Independence Club had
28 legislators: Taehan Kukmindan^(the Korean Nationalist Party),
organized by Rhee by uniting members of the New Politics Club, the
Korean Farmer-Labor Party, and a portion of the One People Club. 71;
the One People Club, having lost 25 of its members to the Korean
Nationalist Party, now had 30 members; the DNP's strength numbered
69.^
Confrontation between Rhee and the Assembly reached its climax
when the DNP members, along with several independents
, introduced a
constitutional amendment bill in favor of a cabinet system on
January 2?. 1950. The bill also included a provision in accordance
with which the term of the Assembly could be prolonged for one year
in case of "emergency." The 19^7 Constitution provided a two year
term for the National Assembly. The adoption of a cabinet system
would be clearly advantageous to the DNP at that time, and by
elevating President Rhee to a ceremonial post and transferring the
locus of power from the executive branch of the government to the
Han T'ae-su. Hanguk Chongdangsa(A History of Korea Political
Parties), pp. 118-119.
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Assembly, the DNP wanted to emasculate Rhee's power. A cabinet system,
its supporters argued, would be a superior system than the presidential
system as responsibility could be more easily located. A cabinet
system would also better foster oarty politics on the basis of
political platforms or policies. The presidential system, on the
other hand, invites factionalization of parties, with each faction
vying for the confidence of the President, and results in the
defeneration of Dolitical parties, because there is a danger for the
political parties to de^renerate into an arm of the executive branch
headed by the President. rthee's supporters held on to the principle
that any aj-.endm.ent to the Constitution should be effected only after
the unification of the country. The proposed amendment, moreover,
would be an invitation for political instability and would encoura-e
"thirst for TX)wer" on the part of the political parties, while the
adversaries were engar'ed in the exchange of naive constitutional
volleyball, the amendment bill reached the floor of the National
Assembly but failed to receive the required two-thirds vote^ despite
the fact that it received 79 favorable votes to 33 opposins^ votes.
The fate of the bill was decided by 66 abstentions.-^^ This narked
the beginning of the vicious cycle of the politics of constitutional
amendment which prevailed through most of ahee's Liberal Party
regime.
^^Ibid., D. 118.
^^The Done-A Ilbo, March 15, 1950, p. 1.
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In response to the inability of the government to deal effectively
with the confusion, terror and spiraling inflation which affected'
everyone's life in the first two years of the republic, the Kay 30.
1950 General Election returned only 31 members of the Constituent
National Assembly. The two major parties which were the adversaries
in the amendment struggle fared badly. The opposition Di;P's strength
was reduced to 23. The Korean People's Party, which sided with .
Rhee toward the end of the Constituent National Assembly, won 2k
seats. Once again the independents won most seats^or 12? to be
57exact. Once again, a new alignment of Assemblymen was in the
offing. The new Assem.bly opened just 9 days prior to the start of
the Korean War on June 25, 1950.
The Assembly moved six times as the fortunes of the war changed
durine the next six months, i^en it reconvened in March, I951 in
Pusan, the war-time capital, the battle between the Assembly and
Rhee was renewed. With few exceptions the negotiation groups
registering with the Assembly now had taken different names. The
New Politics Club had the largest membership with 70j the DI\P had
^0; the Konghwa Kurakbu(the Reoublican Club), k-C; the Kinuhoe(the
People's Friends Club), 20; the independents, who numbered to 12?
at the time of election, were now reduced to five. In crucial votes,
the New Politics Club and the Republican Club sided with the governrrient.
57
-^Central Election Management Committee(CE2-':C) , Yokdae Kukhoewiwon
Son 'to San"-hwang(The Status of the Fast National Assembly Elections)
(Seoul: Central Election l-.'anagement Committee, 1967), pp. 173-17^.
5^
whereas the DNP could count on the help of the People's Friends
Club.
The battle line was drawn again for a showdown. The DKP fired
the first shot when its members exposed and criticized the conduct
of the Korean army and its hi?h rankincr officers in the so-called
K^ch'anfT and Defense Corps incidents. The turmoil, accusations
and counter-accusations that prevailed over these incidents were
fii?rhtened by the resi^rnation of Vice President Yi 3i-yong on May 9,
1951. His Iptter to the oublic on the followin?: day scored .-thee
for giving his Vice President no role, and explained that his
resignation was tendered to the National Assembly because he wanted
to assuine "the moral responsibility for the sad state of affairs
59this nation is in."^^ In the ensuing election of a new Vice
President, the pro-government candidate lost to Kim dong-su, the
former head of the KDP by 73 to 151 votes. The deadlock between the
government and the opposition in the Assembly continued. For Rhee,
the situation could no longer be tolerated.
eg
Koch'ang incident involved the killing of more than five
hundred innocent civilians by a Korean army unit after the latter
failed in a guerilla sweeoin? operation behind the battle lines.
For details, see Haebanc- Yisir)yinyon.-ii ( Twenty-two Years 5ince
Liberation), oo. 319-322. The Defense Corns incident was of far
greater seriousness than the incident at K^ch'anp- as it involved
graft by the Coros Commander and his aides, resulting; in hunger
deaths of t'lousands of militiamen waitin: to join the re.;fular
Korean arm.y. Several Assemblymen in the i\ew rolitics Club were
also allegedly imolicated, as the Assembly investigation team
disclosed. For further details, see ibid., op. 315-31S.
59For his resignation statement, see ibid., op. 321-322.
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On August 15. 1951. Rhee took the first major step in order to
do away with the troublesome Kational Assembly, or at least to tame
it for easier manipulation. In his independence day speech on
August 15. 1951, he announced his intention to form a new political
. 60
party:
So far I have considered premature to install
a party system until the people can fully understand
the meaning of a political party.
. .. But the time has
has come to organize a large party covering the whole
coimtry on the basis of farmers and working people,
in order to promote national welfare and to protect
the common interests of the people, vie shall have
to make such a political party a permanent base upon
which the government can firmly stand.
The independence day proposal drew immediate response as
soon as Rhee's intention was clarified through the Office of
Public Information. On September 3. representatives of various
social organizations organized a preparatory committee for the
establishment of a new political party. These steps by social
Rhee's independence speech is translated in Hahn-Been Lee.
0£. cit.. p. 72. For a different translation, see Henderson.
22* cit., p. 293. Yi Jae-hak. later Vice Speaker of the National
Assembly, arxi then of Konghwa Kinchonghoe C the Republican Democratic
Society), the largest negotiating group and the supporter of Rhee.
stated in his memoirs that he and another member called on Rhee
in early May of 1951 to win support for their intention to form a
new party. Yi reports that Rhee at first told them that the
formation of a political party at that juncture would be inappropriate
for the exigencies which required the "unity of the people."
However, the two visitors finally convinced President that such a
move would help stabilize the political scene and to "normalize"
Assembly po3itics. Rhee gave them blessing and assurance of
assistance. See Yi Jae-hak in 3 as ilui Jonpurul Kisulhanda(All
Truths are Told: Collected Memoirs of Nine Political Leaders)
(Seoul: Himang Ch'ulpansa, 1966). p. 183.
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organizations were matched by a similar initiative in the National
Assembly on September 6. Finally on November 13. these two separate
groups, each with 95 delegates, met to discuss the establishment of
a new party, and on November 30. the delegates of both groups had
adopted a temporary organizational framework.
While these steps were being taken. Rhee introduced a bill for
a constitutional amendment in favor of a bicameral legislature and
the direct election of President. It is not certain why the government
proposal for the constitutional amendment was announced while the
efforts were being made to create political parties. Of the two
groups that were simultaneously undertaking the organization of a
new political party, Rhee hinted on several occasions that he
inclined toward the extraparliamentary group. On November 15. Rhee
stated that a democratic nation should be ruled by the majority of
its people and that as farmers and workers were in the majority in
Korea, "the party membership should be constituted of these strata,"
whereas "the wealthy and the powerful should be prevented from becoming
wealthier and more powerful. This statement must be considered
as an appeal for gaining support among the extraparliamentary group.
Considering Rhee's distaste for the Assembly, the timing of the
proposal for the constitutional amendment might be viewed as a move
to dii5credit the Assembly and its constitutional viewpoint.
The seeds of discord between the two groups that were vying for
Rhee*s favor, however, were laid during the preparatory stage. The
^The Korea Times
. November 15. 1951, p. 1
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^oup outside the Assenbl, insisted on the direct election of President
and the adoption of a bicameral legislative system, whereas the
'
Assembly ^ouo was singularly opposed to such proposals. ^^^^
group went about its own way to fou^d a party with a new name: the
Assembly ^our announced the founding of the Liberal Party(LF) on
December 13; the extranarliamentary ^rouD followed with the sai^ie
four days later. The extraparliamentary group elevated
..hee as •
Chairman of the new Liberal Party and the vice chairmanship went to
Yi B5m-s2Jk, r.hee's first Prime Linister. and the head of Jokch'^ng.
the neofascist youth cores. The parliar-.entary Liberal Party left
the chairmanshit. of the oarty's Central Committee vacant, sho^old
Rhee want it; and elected two leading Assemblymen. Yi Kap-son^ and
Kim Ton^-sonr as Vice Chairman. Some 93 members of the National
Assembly left their neprotiatin^^ groups to join the Liberal Party.
Other ^oups in the Assembly lined up as follows: the DKT
, 39; the
People's Friends Club. 25; the independents. 18.
Although it was understood from the beginning that the two
seoarate Liberal Party organizations would come together, the issue
of the constitutional amendment still pending in the I^jational Assembly
precluded such rossibility as the two groups were sitting on the
opposite side^ of the fence on this issue. On January 1^, 1952, in
his statement
-o political parties, Rhee expressed his satisfaction
62y „ , ^wan 1 =i=^su, Kankuk Chon.^dan^-saCA history of Korean Political
Parties), pr. Ii9-190.
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for establishing a party which was based on Ilminism^^ and. which
would pave the way for the realization of democracy, "sovereignty
of the people." and prevent the "tyranny of minority over the
6^
majority." When the extraparliamentary party held its first
National Party Convention^March 30. 1952 and reaffirmed the elevation
of Rhee to its chairmanship, Rhee stated that his "life-long
dreazn has been realized."
Meanwhile the amendment bill on the floor of the Assembly
provided a good test for the diagnosis of Rhee's strength in the
parliamentary Liberal Party. The motives behind the proposed
amendment were clear to all. First. Rhee's reelection, which was
forthcoming in several months, would be guaranteed by such a move,
as the popular vote could be canvassed easily by the ubiquitous
police, the armed forces and the well known terrorist youth group,
Jokch'ong. The second amendment was designed to dilute the strength
of the National Assembly under a bicameral system as it would be
possible to manipulate one house against another. In its explanation
of the amendment, the government argued that the adoption of the
unicameral legislature as provided for in the 1948 Ckjnstitution
•^Ilminism
.
translated as "One People Principle" represents
the core of Rhee's political thinking. Similar in some respects to
Sanminchui of Sun Yat-sen, this was rather a vague set of political
thinking. For detailed treatment of this, see Koh Kwang-il, In
Quest of National Unity and Power ; Poli-cical Ideas and hractice of
Syngman RheeT Unpublished Ph. D. dissertat.ion, Rutgers University,
1963).
64 ^
Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, Hankuk Chonran
Yinyon.ii(Two Years of the Korean Conflict) (Seoul: Ministry of
Defense, 195^), Section C, pp. 143-144.
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was dictated by the need to expedite the parliamentary procedures
in the face of tremendous pressing tasks in the initial phase of
the country. The advantages of a bicameral system, it argued,
lies in its inherent ability to avoid rash mistakes, and to minimize
abuse of power by a majority party. As for the direct election of
President, it is more in keeping with the democratic principle of
popular sovereignty and the principle of separation of powers. The
forces opposed to the amendment led by the DNP. on the other hand,
insisted that a bicameral legislature would only succeed in dividing
the popular will, weaken the National Assembly and delay the performance
Donation's business. The direct election of President is not
suitable for the people with insufficient political experience and
knowledge and only helps to aggravate partisan feelings among the
people.
Rhee's fears were realized when most of the parliamentary
Liberal Party members voted with the opposition in defeating the
proposed amendment in an overwhelmingly one-sided tally, 1^3 to 19
on January 18, 1952. Rhee had no intention of having the Assembly
play the trump card. He retaliated on February 16, when he declared:
- The presidential elections should be conducted by
the voting of the people... I believe our assemblymen
will come to understand where the will of the people
%an T'ae-su, Hankuk Chon,?dangsa(A History of Korean Political
Parties),
.
, pp. 121-122.
^^Quoted in Han T'ae-su, "A Review of Political Party Activities
in Korea: 1(1945-195^)" Korean Affairs
. Vol. I. No. 4(1962), p. 426.
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lies and immediately and voluntarily reverse their
previous decision and present a new bill for the
vnTiSc^- °^ ^^"^ Constitution. Or if otherwise theoters in each electorate decide by votes to callback their representatives and notify the NationalAssembly of their decision, the legislative body willhave to act in accordance with the decision.
These were strong words. In pointing out the possibility of
"recall" of defiant Assemblymen, he was clearly overstepping the
bounds of the constitutional framework. He seemed to be encouraging
extra-legal methods to change the minds of opposing legislators.
On the morning of February 18, some 200 members of the Jokch'ong,
first of the "political action groups surrounded the Assembly hall
in a planned demonstration. For forty minutes, they were heard to
shout: "Let us have a new election for the opponents of the amendment
bill" and "Throw out those National Assemblymen who disregard the
will and the fundamental rights of people. "^"^ The Assemblymen
immediately resolved to call Rhee to the session for an explanation,
but, two hours later, Rhee informed the A-^sembly that he was ill and
unable to attend.
That these demonstrations were undertaken under Rhee's blessing
was made evident in his written responses on February 26 to a list
of twelve questions the Assembly submitted to the President. The
recall of the Assemblymen demanded by the demonstrators, Rhee
explalined^was "a genuine expression of the public will" to rectify
the opposition to the amendment bill which runs counter to the
^^The Dong-A Ilbo
.
February 18, 1952, p. 1.
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-spirit of Constitution. He continued to state that no one
could stop the recall of Assemblymen, if the public
. so demanded,
and that he v«>uld like to see the amendment passed. On February 29,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in his testimony before the
National Assembly stated that while he would like to avoid comment
on the overall issue due to its "complex political implications,"
he believed that recall of legislators, to be effected, must be
"clearly prescribed in the Constitution" and that the detailed pro-
cedures should be defined by law.^^
The extraparllamentary party in the mounting crisis resolved
to support the government amendment proposal which was reintroduced
in the Assembly on Hay 14, but it disclaimed any connection with the
"recall" movement. The parliamentary Liberal Party, however, was
now divided into two factions: the unity faction composed of ^3
members advocated accomodation with the extraparliamentary party;
the remaining 48 members opposed such move and joined the other
opposition forces to the amendment on April 1?.
The political crisis deteriorated when the Assembly had before
it for deliberation three bills on constitutional amendment. The
government bill was essentially the same one that was defeated in
January earlier that year: the Assembly bill introduced by 122
opposition legislators and others was for instituting a cabinet
go " wT ^Quoted in Yun Ch'on-ju, "Kwonwijuijok Kwollyok Chochongkwa
Chongdang HyongsSng, "(The Authoritarian Power Manipulation and the
Party Formation in Korea), Asea Mun.ie ( Journal of Asiatic Studies)
Vol. IV, No. 2, December, 196I, p. 72.
^9ibid.
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system; and the third bill was a "compromise" plan introduced by
Prime Minister Chang T'aek-sang on May The last bill, which was
claimed by 5ts author as/'eclectic" plan called for an unlikely
combination of a bicameral legislature, direct election of the
President and Vice President, and the provision giving legislators
of the lower house the right to cast a vote of non-confidence against
cabinet ministers.^^
While the bills were being reported, the rallies and demonstrations
in support of the government proposal continued outside the Assembly
hall. Rhee, on May 24. appointed Yi Bom-s2k. the head of Jokch'ong
and Vice Chairman of the extraparliamentary Liberal Party. Home
Minister, and on the following day proclaimed martial law under the
pretext of anti-guerilla operations, which, the government claimed,
71was a "military exigency."*^ That in proclaiming the martial law
Rhee had designs on the defiant National Assembly soon became evident.
A series of arrests of Assemblymen was made under the various accu-
sations of "murder" and "international conspiracy." A warrant was
issued for former Prime Minister Chang Myon(John M. Chang) for having
conspired with Communists. In the atmosphere of terror ruling the
day, many Assemblymen went into hiding. Despite the UNCURK(The United
Nations Commission on Unification and Reconstruction of Korea) statement
70
' For details of three amendment pioposals. see Han T'ae-su,
Hankuk Chongdangsa(A History of Korean Political Parties),
pp. 129-131 and pp. 13^135-
For details of this period, see Haebang Yisipyinyon.ii (Twenty-
two Years Since Liberation), pp. 325-328.
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on May 28 urging the lifting of martial law and the release of
arrested Assemblymen. Rhee stated that the on-going struggle was
"between the Assembly and the People" and that he was not implicated
in it. President Truman's and the United Nations Secretary General
Lee's concern about the situation conveyed to Rhee fell on deaf
ears. Vice President Kim Song-su tendered his resignation on May
29 in protest against Rhee's "assault on the Constitution," but
the defiant Assembly refused to accept it. The power configuration
in the Assembly was as follows: the LP's unity faction had 52
members; those elements of the LP which sided with the opposition
DNP and the Peoples Friends Club bolted the LP to form the Shinraho e
had 1^
(Shinra Club)^; the DNP had 39.
On June 8, Rhee indicated that he would accept a "compromise
proposal." If the Assembly would accept the two provisions of the
government proposal for the constitutional ainendment( direct election
of the President and a bicameral legislature), the Assembly "may
vote for whom it chooses as the next President" and Rhee would step
down "regardless of who may be chosen as my successor." The next
day, Prime Minister Chang tried unsuccessfully to negotiate the
"compromise." Rhee's position hardened on June 15. Rhee announced
that "if the Assembly does not pass the t7rc> constitutional amendments
we have demanded, I may have to be obedient to the people and
declare the dissolution of the National Assembly." "And the
question will be easily settled. There will be a general election
6^
for a new Assembly."''^
Demonstrators, with or without Rhee's urging, were now demanding
the dissolution of the National Assembly. coupled with Rhee's threat
to "comply with the public will" if a solution could not be found.
"Spontaneous" demonstrations continued. A group of pro-Rhee
representatives from local assemblies, agitating near the Assembly
hall, called for a hunger strike on June 23. and vowed to continue
tV«.
it untii^ President dissolved the Assembly. It was reported on the
radio, heavily censored by the government, that President Rhee tried
to calm them down but had "admitted" that "something practical had
73to be done." On July 30, President Rhee informed the closing
Assembly session that action could not be postponed any longer.
After rounding up Assemblymen to achieve a quorum, the government
proposal for the amendment was passed on July 5 by a vote of 163 to
0 with three abstentions after a forty-eight hour session during
which no A'cssemblymen could leave the building.
The "compromise" bill, as a measure to pacify the Assemblymen,
also included provisions for the legislative confirmation of cabinet
appointments upon nomination by the Prime Minister and the power of
dissolution of the cabinet by a vote of non-confidence. The Assembly
fought defiantly but against overwhelming odds. Rhee's election
seemed now virtually assured. There was no person in the Korean
"^The Voice of Korea . June 30, 1952, p. 591.
^Ibid.. p. 595.
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political arena who could match Rhee's charisma and his massive
organization. The election date was set for August 5. and by a
government decree, the campaign period was restricted to just nine
days before the election.
The extraparliamentary Liberal Party nominated Rhee in its
convention on July 19 despite the latter's "refusal" to run in
the presidential election. Yi B^m-s^k. the party's Vice Chairman.
who nelped Rhee to weather the storm of the so-called "Pusan
Political Crisis" in May and June, was nominated as the vice
presidential candidate. Rhee's designs on the Jokch'gng members
of the party soon became apparent. By refusing to give support to
his party's vice-presidential nominee, he hoped to hurt the chances
of Yi, who, two days before the balloting day, complained of police
interference in his campaign. Rhee's campaign statements and actions
indicated that he favored Ham T'ae-yong, another octogenerian as
his Vice President. In the midst of war, Rhee and his favorite
running mate swept the elections.
The popularly elected President now urged his party to draft
the members of the Shinrahoe
, formerly of the parliamentary Liberal
Party who opposed the constitutional amendment, into his party.
The question of drafting Chang T'aek-sang, the former Prime Minister,
fed additional powderkeg to the already uneasy relationship between
the Jokch'ong and Kukminhoe factions of the Liberal Party. The
former faction saw Chang's entry into the party as a potential
threat to its hegemony in the party because Chang could certainly
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match Yi B^m-sSk's stature. The latter faction wanted him for the
obverse reasons.
Yi Ho rf the Kukitiinhoe convened a meeting of the Korean Social
Organizations to criticize the Jokch'ong's position on Chang's
entry into the party. The meeting resolved to dismiss the Jokch'ong
Chairman of the LP's Disciplinary Committee who had announced
earlier that Chang's entry into the party would be unwise. While
Rhee watched the power struggle from the altar, the factional
disputes were brought out into the open. The assault on the
Kukminhoe and other social organizations ancillary to the Liberal
Party was finally undertaken by the Jokch'ong faction of the party.
On May 10. 1953. during the party's second annual convention, the
latter maneuvered to dominate the central and provincial party
hierarchy by purging all anti-Jokch'ong members. This maneuver
by the youth group members coincided with the statement made by
the anti-Jokch'ong members that the Jokch'ong was engaged in "anti-
party activities by reorganizing the party under its hegemony. "^^
Furthermore, the Jokch'ong faction was successful in maneuvering the
party convention to adopt a resolution that Chang T'aek-sang's
entry into the party would be harmful to the party. Chang announced
on May 18 that he was going to sever his relations with the Liberal
Party.
Alarmed at Jokch'ong advances. Rhee proceeded to instruct the
reorganization of the party. The most important of these instructions
74The Dong-A Ilbo. May 18, 1953. p. 1.
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was his order to disband the Central Executive Committee and the
Central Inspection Committee, which was dominated by the Jokch'Sng
faction, and replace them by a single Central Executive Committee.
Another innovation was the elimination of the post of Vice Chairman
(held by Yi Bom-sok at the time). Finally, the party's Central
Executive Committee was to be composed of three members each from
the five ancillary organizations of the party(the Kukminhoe
. the
Korean Youth Corps, the Korean Women's Association, the Korean
Farmers' Association and the Korean Labor Association). These
instructions could not be enforced immediately, however. Under the
pretext of implementing Rhee's instructions, the Jokch'ong faction
called another national convention of the party on August 20. The
extent to which Rhee's instructions were circumvented was evident
when the convention resolved to take away the party's Secretary-
General's post from Yi Ho of Kukminhoe
. The maneuvering by the
Jokch'ong faction continued. When the Central Executive Committee
members were announced, most of them turned out to be Jokch'ong
sympathizers from the ancillary organizations.
Rhee retaliated with his statement on September 12 which
instructed all youth organizations to disband immediately. It was
evident to all that Rhee's target was the Jokch'ong: "^^
The Jokch'ong faction has been bent on expanding
its power ever since our Liberal Pa..'ty was established.
7*5
^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo
.
September 12, 1953, p. 1.
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This runs counter to my idea of administering theparty. Its factional activities are not onlyharmful to the party's unity but it also threatensthe spirit of people's unity. Although it may
take some time to purge these elements, they mustbe eliminated. From now on the party must be
administered according to my stated intentions.
Rhee proceeded to act. He dismissed two of his cabinet members
who were known to have warm relations with the faction in question.
Within the party a Committee for the Elimination of the Jokch'^ng
Faction was organized^ the provincial party chairman met to declare
null and void the decisions of the August 20 party convention; and
all party leaders finally submitted their resignations. The
emasculation of Yi Bom-sok, Rhee's friend and supporter during the
American military occupation, his first Prime Minister, and an
invaluable right-hand man during the political crisis in Pusan, was
now complete.
On October 1?, the party elected a fifteen member Central
Committee according to the instructions given by Rhee in previous
May to organize it on the basis of three representatives each from
the five ancillary social organizations of the party. '''^ Not entirely
decided
satisfied with the selection, Rhee on November 2 to appoint a
nine member committee which was given the task of reorganizing the
party. The committee was headed by Yi Ki-bung, one-time Rhee's
Chief-Secretary and Defense Secretary, who later became his
running mate. By November 30, 1953 1 the reorganization of the party
Quoted in Han T*ae-su, Hankuk Chongdangsa(A History of
Korean Political Parties), p. 197.
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according to Rhee's wishes was realized. Significant in the
reorganization was the three-member Executive Committee^which was
given the power to control the party through Yi Ki-bung^who was
appointed to that Committee( other members were Yi Kap-song and
Bae Un-hi). This replacement of the previously existing Central
Committee with the three-member Executive Committee had the effect
of streamlining the party hierarchy, and making Rhee's control of
the party possible by placing his right-hand man second in command.
While the Liberal Party was going through the pains of reorgani-
zation, the Democratic National Party was similarly engaged in
readjusting its party organization. On November 28, I953, the party
abandoned the collective leadership structure in favor of a single
leader under Shin Ik-hi, the Speaker of the Kati^onal Assembly. The
multiple Vice Chai rmanshlTsSwent to Choi Tu-son, Kim To-yon,
Kim Song-su, Paik Nam-un, Cho Byong-ok and So Sang-il, Having no
grassroot support, the party organization was restricted entirely
to the Assembly notables. By the end of 1953, its membership in
the Assembly was reduced to 20.
As the two parties prepared for the third general election,
another constitutional amendment issue loomed large on the political
scene. The Liberal Party decided to adopt a nomination procedure
for legislators for the first timejand the winning of the nomination
was made contingent upon the support of the constitutional amendment,
the most important provision of which was to remove the constitutional
70
barrier forbidding
.ore than two consecutive terns for the incumbent
President.77 ^^^^^^^ nomination was rather complex.
In each of the 203 electoral districts.
. nominating convention was
held. The candidates selected by the convention were screened by
the provincial and central party headquajers. Rhee. as Chairman of
the party, finally "approved" the Assembly nominee.
In the general election held on Kay 10, 195^. the LP won an
overwhelming victory. The party nominee won 99 seats in the National
Assembly and there were several others who ran under the LF banner,
but who failed to receive the party nomination. Together, it had
by far the largest number of seats with Ilk. The DNP. which failed
to bring together all opposition forces returned only fifteen.
The number of independents elected to the Assembly was drastically
reduced in this election to 68 By the unusually high number
of statements (thirteen) he made with regards to this election, Rhee
seemed deeply interested in this election. He appealed to the
voters to send as their representatives « personswho would favor
the constitutional amendment. The Liberal Party victory which gave
77Other provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment
included, among others, a provision sanctioning national referandum
"concerning important matters pertaining to a national crisis which
might limit the sovereignty of Korea or cause a change in her
territory"^ a provision to elect half of the members of the House
of Councillors every three years and give that body the confirmation
power over the appointment of the Chief Justice and other government
officials; a provision to authorize non-confidence votes by the
House of Representatives against individual ministers; a provision
to abolish the office of Prime Minister and have the President
preside over the State Council. See nan T*ae-su, Hankuk Chongdangsa
(A History of Korean Political Parties), pp. 139-1^«
^
^okdae Kukhoewiwon Son 'go Sanghwang(The Status of the past
National Assembly Elections), pp. 251-252.
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it Ilk seats was not sufficient to pass the amendment bill. The
party was successful, however, in attracting many independent
legislators, increasing their assembly strength to I30 by the end
of June.
Public exchanges of arguments between Rhee and the leaders of
the DNP were indicative of what was to come. On October 22. four
days after the amendment bill was introduced to the National Assembly,
Rhee stated that any person opposed to the amendment bill was
tantamount to committing a "treasonous act against the national
79policy." Vice Chairman Cho Byong-ok of the DNP retorted by saying
that:
Within the context of democracy in which we are
a part, we are safeguarded in the freedom of speech.
The basic tenets of democracy afford any one of us the
right to speak against the proposed amendment, if we
so desire. A person cannot be labelled patriotic if
he favors the amendment and treasonous if he opposses
xt
.
The amendment bill was put to a vote on November 27. Having
received 135 votes in favor. Vice Speaker Choe Sun-ju, presiding
over the session, declared that the bill failed as the required
number was two-thirds of the Assembly membership^ or I36 votes.
Rhee did not accept the defeat. On the following day, Yi Jae-hak,
the majority leader of the Assembly, objected to the arithmetic used
by the presiding officer on the previous day: He argued:
79
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Cho Byong-ok, Mi.ju.juiwa Na( Democracy and I: Memoirs) (Seoul:
Yongshin Munhwasa, 1959), pp. 119-120.
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A,.+^ T
constitutional amendment as stipulated inArticle 98. Paragraph ^ can be effected by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly. This means that the
accurate number comes out to 135-333 Sincepersons cannot be divided into digits, the number
should be rounded to 135 which is the nearest whole
number. The two-thirds required by the Constitution
means therefore, not that it should be more than
135, but 135 or more.
When Vice Speaker Choe returned to the Assembly floor to "apologize"
for the arithmetic mistake he made two days earlier, the floor
became a fist-wielding pandemonium. With 60 members who voted
against the amendment boycotting the session, Choe declared the
amendment bill passed. Another one of Rhee's recurrent constitutional
maneuvers had succeeded.
The steam-roller tactic by the ruling party alienated many
legislators including those members of the Liberal Party who^voted
for it. On December 6, the first member to bolt the Liberal Party
criticized the irregular procedure employed and "the Liberal Party's
failure in respecting genuine party politics" as well as "its blind
submission to the administration's demands." Three days later
twelve more legislators left the party en masse. Due to this exodus,
the LP's Assembly membership was reduced to 123. The controversial
passage of the amendment bill had the effect of completely bifurcating
the Assemblymen. This bifurcation was an entirely new political
phenomenon up to that time. In struggling against the ruling party's
steam-roller tactics on the floor, solideirity was achieved among the
82
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opposition forces. On December 30. these opposition groups came
together to form a new negotiating group within the Assembly under
the banner o^ Commrades
•
Association for Safeguarding the Constitution
(CASC) with a membership of 60. For the first time in its five year
history, the Assembly was now made up predominantly of two negotiating
groups. The formation of CASC was described in political circles
as a healthy harbinger of: a "two party system." While introducing
censure motions against the Speaker and the Vice Speaker of the
Assembly for the "illegal" proceedings, the CASC expedited the plan
to organize a "pan-national" political party.
There were initial roadblocks. The principal disagreement
among the l8-men founding committee was the extent to which the
newly created party should accept progressive politicians as its
members. The question of admitting Cho Bong-am as a member delayed
the founding of the party. Cho, a former Communist and, then, the
leader of the Progressive Party, was considered by some of the
members of the committee as dangerous. But, finally on September
19, 1955. a new party under the name of the Democratic Party(DP)
was born. Despite the stated intention to draft all prominent
politicians, such well-known political figures as Cho Bong-am,
Yi Bom-sSk and Chang T'aek-sang were conspicuously missing from
the party list. The newly created party was basically a union of
three groups. The DNP was, of course, the core of the new party
movement; the Liberal Party defectors such as Min Kwan-sik, Hyon
Sok-ho and Yi T'ae-yong, formed another grouping; Chang Kyon and
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Chung Il.hyo^g, the former
.embers of the H^ingsadan. an independence
club organized by men of north Korea with Christian background led
their followers into the new party. ^3 v^^en the new slate of officers
was announced, most of them were former leaders of the DNP. The
five-member Executive Committee elected by the Central Committee w.s
composed of Shin Ik-hi. Cho Byong-ok. Paik Nam-un. Kwak Sang-hun
and Char.g MySn. Kwak was the organizer of the CASC; Chang, a former
Hungsadan member who was instrumental in bringing in the Liberal
Party defectors into the new party,was a valuable addition in
enhancing the prestige of the new party. As will be discussed 1-^ ter,
' however, the new structure had in itself the seeds of
discord.
When the two parties collided in the 1956 presidential
election, the opposition forces appeared to provide a stiff
competition to Rhee and the Liberal Party for the first time in
the short history of the Republic. Rhee, citing reasons of health
and his belief in "the democratic constitutional dictum of limiting
Presidential terms as practised abroad."^ announced that he would
not run in this election. "Popular will," however, managed to
the
erupt again and Rhee once again accepted /candidacy
. He chose
Yi Ki-bung as his running mate. The Democratic Party nominated
Shin Ik-hi and Chang Myon as their presidential and vice presidential
^Mun Chang-ju, Hankuk Chongch ' iron ( Korean Politics),
pp. 309-310.
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candidates respectively. Their campaign strategy was to attack
Rhee's dictatorship, m the largest campaign rally in the history
ofJCorean elections. Shin told the crowd that ;jLernment of Korea
is^one^ dictatorial rule." because Rhee regLed the Constitution
and the laws "as his own."^^ ^^^^ Democratic Party was
sealed when its presidential candidate died of cerebral hemorrage
on a train on May 5.
The results of the election showed that Rhee's popularity had
waned considerably. Despite Shin's death. Rhee was able to garner
slightly more than five million votes out of nine-and-a-half million
voters. Cho Bong-am of the Progressive Party, a minor party candidate
won more than two million votes ; another two million votes were ruled
void. There was no question for whom this unusually high number of
invalidated votes were intended. Another surprising result was the
election of Chang Myon as Vice President. It was expected that
Yi Ki-bung would be an easy winner with Rhee's support and the benefit
of administrative power.
The two years following the 1956 Presidential Election were a
relatively calm period when the ruling and opposition parties seemed
to be finding the ways of accommodation. That the two parties were
able to negotiate an election law revision prior to the I938 general
election in the prevailing mood of compromise is a case in point.
The law thus obtained contributed to a rather quiet and fair election
®^The Dong-A Ilbo
.
May 2, 1956, p. 1.
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in 1958.86
Political crisis enabled the r.a;or
parties to look inward. As for the Liberal Party, factional
tendencies
.ere Kent at mini.™ by Hhee-. presence at the heL..
But the seeds of discord were oresent ever since the 1954 general
election. By the ti™e of the 1954 election and the reorganization
thereafter, most of the Liberal Party's leadership positions went
to former bureaucrats- such persons as Yi Ki-bung. Chang KySng-kSn.
Yi Jae-hak and Kan Ki-sSk. Op,^sing these bureaucratic Politicians
were the lar.e contin.-ents of ibsenbly^en who were leaders of the
LP's ancillary or^-anizations such as the Kukr.inhoe
. the Youth Corps,
the farmers' and lat»rers' organizations. This .roup was led by such
nersons as Cho KyJn,-ku. Yu Ji-won and Ki-ch'Sl. ^s early as
1956, this anti-naincurrent faction demanded a restructuring of the
party, kfhen their demand for a collective leadership structure
went anheeded, some of the members of this faction bolted the party.
The DP was also engaged in a similar fracas over its leadership.
The "old" faction, led by Cho BySne-ok and his former DtiF oollestues
collided with Chang l-iySn's "new" faction {so nair.ed because of their
recent exodus into the party) over the issue of alleged fraudulent
voting maneuvers in the Aurust 1956 Democratic Party Convention
held at Kwan-ju. This was indicative o.f what was to come later
in the presidential nominating convention in November, 1959.
86 , ^Kim Chon.e-hun, Hankuk Chonrdan?sa (A History of Korean
Political Parties), pd. 68-97.
'87
For details, see The Voice of Korea. August 29. 1958.
p. 929.
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The nation went to the polls on May 2. I958 to elect members
of the Fourth National Assembly. The election took place in a
relative calm and reconciliatory atmosphere between the two parties.
The Liberal Party won 126 seats, five fewer than what it held prior
to the election. The DP. on the other hand, added 33 to its strength,
thus having altogether 79 members in the new Assembly. The indepen-
dents elected 2?.^^ The voting pattern of this election reaffirmed
that of Che 1956 presidential election in that the LP was strong in
rural districts whereas the DP's electoral strength lay in the
cities. The issue of Rhee's dictatorship continued to win the
support of the urban dwellers for the opposition party. It now
seemed possible that in due time the opposition party might be able
to wrest power away from the Liberal Party through the ballot boxes.
The reconciliatory gestures of the government during the I958
general election took another turn when the government submitted a
National Security Law Revision bill in November of that year. The
high-handed tactics the ruling party used to secure the passage of
the bill reaffirmed the general impression of the opposition
politicians and the public that the reconciliatory posture of the
government and ruling party was only temporary. That this law was
intended only for the suppression of the government's political
opponents is subject to speculation. These charges were of course
88
CEMC, Yokdae Kukhoewiwon Son 'go San,?hwang( The Status of the
past National Assembly Elections), pp. 32?-328.
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denied by the^Liberal Party foliticianaS? and also by the sponsors
of the bin.90 This bill, introduo.1 on November 18. 1958,inoluded
far reaching provisions.91 Fresh in the .e^ry of those who opposed
the bill was the fate of the Progressive Party and its leader
Cho Bong-am^less than a year earlier when the party had its license
taken away by the government and. Cho. one-time presidential candidate,
received the death sentence under the existing National Security Law.
After forming a Struggle Committee against the Revision of the
National Security Law, the Democrats and others labelled it "the
Liberal Party's strategy to prolong its rule."^^
The Liberal Party railroaded the bill out of the Legislation
and Judiciary Committee on December 19 without the presence of its
six Democratic Party members. Angry and stunned, the Democrats
89See Yi Jae'hak's recollections in Sasilui jSnpurul Kisulhanda(Memoirs), pp. 15^-155.
90
F^or comments by the drafter of the bill, 0 Je-do, see.
Kim Chong-hun, Hankuk Chongdangsa(A History of Korean Political
Parties), pp. 99-100.
91
The provisions of the bill included, among other things:
capital punishment or life imprisonment for these who engage in
espionage or release state secrets; ten-year maximum sentence for
those who collect information on political, economic, cultural, or
military matters with the intention of benefiting the enemy; five-
year maximum sentence for those who disturb the people and aid the
enemy by openly relating or diseminating false information or
distorted facts with the knowledge that they are false or purposely
distorted; ten-year maximum sentence for the defamation of President,
Speaker of the National Assembly and thf Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court. For details and comments, see Chong T'ae-sop, "Kukka Poanpop"
(National Security Law). Sasangge
. January, 1959, pp. 81-91.
^^See ibid., p. 82.
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countered with a sitdown strike to prevent the passage of the bill
on the main floor. Vice President Chang, an odd partner and
completely ignored under Rhee's shadow, visited the strikers on
December 21 for a round of encouragement. On the following day.
the State Council condemned Chang's action as intensifying
"political
strife" and paralyzing "the functions of the administration." The
Vice President's action, the State Council continued, "had greatly
undermined the authority of the Assembly, which stands out as a
symbol of democracy. "^-^
The Democrats' siege of the Assembly floor continued until the
evening of December 24. On that Christmas eve some three hundred
"security guards" entered the floor to bodily clear the hall.^
On the following day, in the absence of opposition legislators, the
Liberal Party Assemblymen passed the revision bill in thirteen
minutes. Throughout the day, the Liberals proceeded to pass twenty-
two bills to break a legislative record. Among the bills so rushed
through were such important ones as the Local Autonomy Law bill, the
House of Councillors Election bill, and the budget for 1959. On
93Quoted in The Hankuk Ilbo
. December 22, 1958. p. 1.
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Yi Jae'hak reports in his memoirs that the Liberal Party's
Executive Committee decided to use this tactic. "What was at
stake." Yi reminisced, was the "attitude of the opposition in the
National Assembly." "The Party'sfLP's^ decision was to change it."
See his memoirs in Sasilui Jonpurul Xisulhanda(All Truths Are
Told: Memoirs), pp. 154-155.
95This law made appointive by the central government all
officers to the lowest level of provincial administration.
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December 26. Vice President Chang made a prophetic public re.ark:96
Ko matter what excuse he made and no matter whnbegs excuse for it. the Liberals' deeds L^^ot be
tfae future, public unease will grow day by day andthe dxgnity of the Constitution^and the pLoles^
reliance on the government will be severely undermined.
^"5^
°f People.'^correSSS«^t be made at once. In order to make c^rrection^!tne House must convene soon so that the ruling and
discuss again the passed billswith the objective of correcting abnormal and
undemocratic provisions.
As hostility between the two parties was reaching its . new
peak, the political atmosphere for the forthcoming presidential
election was ominous. President Rhee once again advocated a
constitutional amendment for adopting a single-ticket system to
eliminate the "abnormality" of having"^President and Vice President
from two different political parties. ^'^ Both the LP and the DP
alike faced difficult problems. With Rhee's old age(&!+), the
qiiestion of succession loomed large within the Liberal Party. As
for the Denracrats, heartened by the advances they made in the I958
General Election, were split badly on the selection of the party's
presidential candidate.
The ranks of the Liberal Party were split between the
intransigents" and "moderates" as the party began preparations
for the election. The former group insisted that the party should
9^
^Qiaoted in The Kankuk Ilbo
. December 27, I958, p. 1.
97In fact, Rhee began his campaign much earlier. August 13,
1959 1 lie explained to the effect that the presidential system
required a single-ticket system.
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take a stance against the Be^cratlc Party. t„th in legislative
Uctics and electoral campaigns; the moderates called for .ore
accommodating gestures vis-a-vis the opposition party. IVhen
ri Ki-bung. Speaker of the House and Chairman of the party's
Executive Con^ittee. announced the party line on the occasion of
the Ninth National Convention of the Liberal Party, the intransigents
appeared to have gained an upper hand. Among other things, he
enphasized elimination of factional feuds within the party: party
members' strict acceptance of party policy and platform; resolute
implementation of party platform; and termination of reconciliatory
and compromising gestures toward the opposition party.'^ ahee
hlmselX did not hesitate to accept the nomination of the party,
unlike in 1952 and 1956. Ti Ki-bung, again became Rhee's rmming
mate by a unanimous vote of the convention.
The Denocrats, on the other hand, had an agonizing selection
procedure for their presidential and vice-presidential candidates.
AT« X . . i , "t^® questionAlso entering into the picture was. whether the second spot in the
Ucket ought to be a candidate for a prime ministership's or for the
vice-presidency in view of the fact that a constitutional amendment
provided for a switch to a cabinet system and would abolish the
vice-presidency.^^ Long before the convention, the party virtually
98
Tth} Eankuk Ilbo, June 30, 1959, p. 1.
99That this consideration emerged indicated the extent to
which the Deinocrats were hopeful of the victory in the forthcoming
election.
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split in two «ith almost equal strength- the "intransigents"
supporting Chang My5n and^^'Wderates" Cho By^ng-ok. These two men
were virtually equal in stature. The intransigents argued that
Chang, as Shin's successful vice presidential candidate in 1956. was
a logical and proven choice for the presidency. Cho's supporters,
more deeply rooted in the Democratic Party than Chang's, as the
latter joined the party only after the 1954 constitutional crisis,
insisted that Cho had a far more impressive record as an anti-Japanese
and anti-Liberal, and that he was far more popular among the electorate.
Eaving failed to settle the question of no^mnation informally,
both factions agreed to be bound by the decision of the November
convention. Both factions exchanged accusations of illegal activities
in manipulating the selection of provincial party delegates to the
national convention. On November 26, the party delegates elected
Cho as the presidential candidate by a slim margin of three votes
(km to 481). and on the following day. in reversal. Chang won the
Chairmanship of the Supreme Committee by 70 votes. This marked the
beginning of the Democratic tradition of separating its presidential
candidate and the party head. The strength of both factions was
reflected in the election of the six-member Supreme Committee.
Chang Kyon, Kwak Sang-hun. Pak Sun-ch'on of the "new" faction
intransigents and Cho Byong-ok. Paik Nam-hun and Yun Po-son of the
"old" faction moderates were elected to this committee. "'"^^ As a
For events surrounding the DP national convention, see
Autobiography of Kim To-yon, an "old" faction leader of the
Democratic Party, in Naui Insaeng; Faekso (Autobiography)
.
(Seoul:
Sangsan Hoegorok Ch'ulpan Tongjijoe. 196?). pp. 325-331.
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prelude to the fateful election in March. I96O. the administration
introduced another constitutional amendment bill for a single-ticket
system on which Rhee had pontificated on several occasions. After
the bill had been defeated, the Liberal Party took a retaliatory
measure by having the government announce that the election was
going to be held in March, instead of May as it originally had been
scheduled. This was a tremendous blow to the Democrats, as their
presidential candidate was in the United States for a surgical
operation. While the Democrats struggled to postpone the election,
it was reported that candidate Cho had died at a hospital in the
United States. It was a fateful repeat of I956. The attention was
now focussed on the choice of Vice-President: the likelihood of
succession to the year old President was in the consideration of
both parties.
As it was revealed later, the Liberal Party planned to rig
the election to ensure the election of its vice-presidential
candidate, Yi Ki-bung, who was defeated by his Democratic rival by
200,000 votes four years earlier. When the results of the election
vere announced, Rhee won by more than 6,^00,000 votes. It was
then charged and later admitted by the Liberal Party leaders"^^^
that the party instructed the Interior Ministry to carry out its
101
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See Hankuk Kyokmyong Chaeo'ansafA History of Revolutionary
Trials in Korea). (Seoul: Tong'a Sojokhoesa, 1963). This is a
complilation of court records in the early phase of the military
junta .
order to stuff the ballot boxes, terrorize the Democratic Party
members, use oolice power to ensure "correct" voting and other
methods.^^^
A train of events erupted one after another which eventually
led to the demise of Rhee's twelve year rule; demonstrations against
election rigging on Karch I5 which resulted in the death of several
students; a series of student demonstrations in all major cities of
Korea in March and April, demanding another election as the Democrats
had earlier demanded; /student march on the presidential palace on
April 19 which resulted in the firing by the police that led tc the
, thedeath of more than 100 students and/wounding of many others; the
proclanation of martial law on the same day^^^^ ^^^ommander remained
the
neutraj.j the resignation of/Rhee cabinet on April
21; an important statement by the United States Secretary of State
Christian Herter that the present disorder was a result of oppressive
policies in the election and a disregard for the principles of
an
democracy; /announcement by Rhee on April 2^ that he had severed
an
his relationship with the Liberal Party; /announcement on the 26th
that Ti Ki-bung was dismissed from all public positionshe had held
and, that if it was the people's wish, Rhee himself would offer his
own resignation; the unanimous resolution by the National Assembly,
103
Those were the charges made by the Democratic Party and
reported two weeks before the election in The Dong-A Ilbo, Karch 3.I960, p. 1. See also Sin Sang-ch'o, "Kongmyong Son'goyo Annyonghi"
(Fairwell to Fare Election), Sasangge
. April, I96O, pp. 221-22?^
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the Liberals included, which requested Rhee to resign.^^ if there
vas one genuine expression of^"public will" of which Rhee justified
many of his political decisions, the AprU 19 "Revolution" was
precisely that.^^^ Finally on April 2?. Rhee succumbed to the
Wvitable. In an one-sentence announcement issued through the
Office of Public Information, he said. "I. Syngman Rhee. honoring
the resolution of the National Assembly, resign as President ar^d
wish to devote the rest of my life to the nation and the people
as a private citizen. ""^^^
During the short twelve years of Rhee's political domnance,
the rough roads treaded by political parties were best indicated by
the scores of political parties that emerged and disappeared in the
nation-building era. In terms of the development of political
parties, the early years of the republic up to the time of the
Kc^ean: War were marked by factionalism of top political leaders.
For a detailed treatment of the events that led to thedownfall of Rhee regime, see Eugene Kim and Ke-soo Kim, "April
I960 Korean Student Movement," Western Political Quarterly. Vol. VII(March, 196^). pp. 83-92.
^ ^*
^^^The college students' statements on this day, issued by
"the Students' Association of Seoul National University. read in
part: Our wisdom and intelligence knows that this hopeless situation
in this nation is the result of the despotic rule disguised in
democracy and liberty. History of democracy is the history of
struggle for freedom. We know that all forms of despotic rule is
nothing but a 'paper tiger'. Our basic right to vote has been
deprived of by the officials who are supposed to uphold democracy
and serve the people as public servants. The freedom of speech,
assembly, association and belief are in danger of extinction by the
ignorant forces of despotic rules." Quoted in Lee Joung-sik, "Some
Characteristics of Korean Political Culture,"
, p. 73.
*^°^Ihe Dong-A Ilbo, Special Edition, April 2?, I96O, p. 1.
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It was soon made evident to Rhee and his supporters, however, that
modern politics needed organization- a political party. Regardless
Of the „Uve for the creation of the Liberal Party, a new party
vaa org«,ized to answer the needs of the ruling elite. Organization
Of the pro-^vernnent forces into a relatively cohesive group, on
the other hand, had the effect of bringing together the government's
foes as well, henoe the polarization of the political arena, trom
.t least the I956 general election on to the time of the downfall
Of. Liberal Party regime by the April I9 Student Uprising, a semblance
of a two party system both in form and substance was maintained.
Parties had gained legitimacy, regardless of whether they were
performing their proper roles for the political system.
The notable characteristic of the party development in the
period was the role the political crisis played in the birth,
maintenance and splintering of parties. Rhee's continuing attempt
to perpetuate his power through constitutional maneuvers and the
accompanying attempt to check such moves tended to stabilize the
political alignments into two large groupings. At the same time,
the institutionalization of parties was adversely affected by the
fact that within each party it was mainly personalities rather than
policy commitment that held the membership together. When Rhee was
toppled, this basis of cohesion also disappeared. The geneology
of the Korean parties from 1945 to I96O may be described by the
following diagram (Diagram 1).
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The Second Republic and Attempts at
Democracy, I96O-I96I
The last governmental decision made by the outgoing President
was to appoint his Foreign Minister and good friend h5 Chong to head
the caretaker government
. The Democrats, having decided not to
participate in the interim Government, were now almost assure of
power at a later date, but there was the immediate necessity tc
fill the political vacuum created by Rhee's downfall. The immediate
issue facing He's government was the question of dissolving the
Assembly. It was decided to keep it as a "penitent- National Assembly
and as a "committee for coping with current political situation."
In the 113 days of the interim period, the Ho government carried out
Its tasks with vigilance and in strict political neutrality. Among
its acMevements were the orderly adoption of a constitutional
amendment which established > a cabinet system, the neutralization
of police, and the holding in July 29 of a new parliamentary election.
Since the students continued to take to the streets to give vent to
their frustrations and demands^ and the newspapers urged speedy
trials of those who were connected with the March 15 election rigging,
the task of the interim regime was to maintain public order and ensure
fairness in the selection of representatives who would organize a
new government. Ho, himself, stated that his difficulty was "to
bring about revolutionary political reforms through unrevolutionary
This succession procedure was prescribed in the Constitution,
Article 55.
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«»=r,« «108means • On June 15. the Second Republic was born with the
passage and promulgation of the Constitution^^ creating a
parliamentary cabinet system. A new election was set for July 29
for the new House of Representatives and the House of Councillors,
Any other system would have been inconceivable. A system of cabinet
responsibility had been regarded by the Democrats as a consulate
Standard of a democratic system.
While the careUker government was preparing for the transition,
the tv«. major parties at the time- the Liberals and Democrats-
began preparations for the July 29 elections. The Liberal Party
disintegrated rapidly. Only men still identifying with the Liberal
Party were Liberal members of the penitent Assembly. Among the
Liberals, two alternatives were being debated: whether they should
purge the ranks and reorganize the party or whether they should
dissolve the party altogether and organize a new one in cooperation
D 4
"Imchong Paekil"(One Hundred Days of InterimRegime). Chung 'ang
. July 1969. pp. 8^-86,
109
*u
^'^^ ^^^^ provisions of the new constitution were as follows-the President, as the Chief of State, was not made a head of the
administration: he was to be indirectly elected by the House of
Representatives for a five year term; the Prime Minister headed the
Jjtate Council m which all decision-making power was vested; in the
event of a non-confidence resolution by the lower house, the cabinet
might decide to resign en bloc or it might dissolve the House of
Representatives within 10 days. The formal powers and functions of
the upper house, the House of Councillors, were narrowly prescribed,
with the lower house having the authority to ' override the upper house's
objection to any of its bills by simply passing it once more. Local
autonomy was provided by Article 97, Para. 2 which stated that "at
least mayors and chiefs of towns and townships are to be directly
elected by the inhabitants concerned.
"
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with non-Liberal politicians. On June 1. 102 Liberals in the
Kational Assembly broke with their negotiation group, and its leader.
Cho K^ng-ky.. favored holding a convention and changing the party's
nane vith a view to political survival. Forty-one of the 102
seceders broke formally with the Liberal Party on June 14 and
registered with the Assembly Secretariat next day as the Constitutional
Politics Society.
The Democrats split badly at the prospect of holding power.
The split was along the line of "old" and "new" factions of the
party. At the threshold of power, the factional strife paralyzed
the party into impotence. As one of the former leaders of the party
reminisced regretfully, "failure to resolve this conflict" amounted
to "a betrayal of popular expectation. "^^^ By holding a nominating
convention on June 25. the Democrats began their preparation for the
new government. Each faction of the party supported its own adherents
vith campaign funds and implemented separate campaign strategies.
The Democrats won a landslide victory with I70 seats out of 231;
next came the independents with 5^.
It was the "old" faction of that party which advocated the
split of the party. During the campaign, Yu Chin-san, a controversial
spokesman of the old guard, publicly stated that "it will mean another
dictatorship if only a single conservative party is allowed to wield
^°Yun Po-son in Sasilui Jonpurul Kisulhanda . (All Truths are
Told: Memoirs), p. 301. .
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an absolute majority within the House of Representatives. "^^l
This trial balloon drew i^nediate warning from Chang, the nominal
head of the party and the recognized leader of the new faction.
Although such a split was not desirable at the time. Chang predicted
that "another conservative opposition will grow up in time.^^^^
However, a new party movement by the old faction seemed to be
crystallizing after the Democrats' overwhelming victory in the
election. On August if. the old guard members of the party's
Supreme Committee issued a statement explaining the desirability of
the split. They argued that under the cabinet responsibility system,
more than two parties are desirable and that the Democratic Party,
which had "overgrown" to a more than two-thirds majority in the
Assembly, "should be divided or run the risk of becoming a one party
autocracy. The old faction representatives boycotted the party
caucus two days later, and. in a symbolic gesture, visited the
graves of their former mentors. Kim 3ong-su. Shin Ik-hi and Cho
Byong-ok to pay their respects.
Sharing the spoils of power under these unusual circumstances
vas an agonizing process. Disagreement emerged first on the question
of naming the next President and a Prime Minister, with the new
^^The Dong-A Ilbo. July 11. I96O, p. 1.
112
Ibid.. July 14. i960, p. 1. For a discussion of the split
of the Democratic Party, see the newspaper debate between Yu Chin-san
and Chu Yo-han in The Hankuk Ilbo
.
July 12. I96O. p. 1.
*^The Dong~A Ilbo
.
August 4. I96O, p. 1.
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faction insisting that the more ix,werful position of Prime Minister
should be occupied by the leader of the party holding the majority
of seats :.n the House of Representatives. This would ensure Chang's
election as Prime Minister. The old faction members, however,
maintained that the party had a "collective leadership structure."
that Chang, as the Chairman of the Supreme Committee, was merely
presiding officer, and. therefore, the party had no single official
head. Hence, they argued that the post of Prime Minister should go
to the head of whichever party faction had the most seats in the
lower house. These two viewpoints collided without the prospect of their
ever being resolved.
The task of keeping the party together was left to Kwak Sang-hun.
a moderate "new" faction Speaker of the Penitent National Assembly.
He announced on July 11 that "it is not the Democrats, but others
vho siK)uld be interested in or care about building up another con-
servative party than the Democratic Party. "^^^ A few days after the
election, he stated that "the democratic landslide victory will not
be in danger of deteriorating into a dictatorship, but instead will
be a great help in implementing the party's promises to the people."
and that the advocates of the split "will betray the people who chose
them to realize the party program. "''^^ On August 9 and 10. Kwak
sponsored a three-men "summit" conferences (Chang of the new faction.
Tun Po-son of the old faction and Kwak himself) in an attempt to
^ Ibid .
.
July 11, I960, p. 1.
115
-
^Ibid .. August 1, I960, p. 1.
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brin^ about a oompro-nise. but this and other efforts turned out
to be unproductive.
In the whirlpool of power struggle, the joint session of the
legislature overwhelrrdngly elected Yun Fo-s^n as President on
August 12. One of the constitutional prerogatives which he was
to exercise was the non^ination of a Prime Minister to the House of
Representatives for its approval. On August 16. President Yun in
a surprise rx^ve nominated Kim To-yon of the old faction for the
post. Kim was removed from the Supreme Cominittee in the party's
1959 national convention and replaced by Yun himself. In nominating
him for the TX)st, Yun was bypassin.: Chang Ky^n. who had long made
it clear that he felt entitled to that post as the head of the
Democratic Party. The House, however, rejected Yun's nominee on
the following day by a narrow margin of 111 for and 112 against.
President Yun was now left with one more choice to make. If his
choice was again vetoed, the House would elect a Prime Minister by
116^ , . ^.Kwc.k, in his memoirs, accuses Yun of breaching? oolitical
ethics by nominating Kim despite the previous understandin^r
reached by the too leaders of the party to elect a new faction
member as }rim.e Minister. See Sasilili JonourSl Kisulhaada (AllTruths are Told: Memoirs), p. 1^3. Yun, on the Zth^Fh^, had
written that he simply thou-ht Kim had m.ore votes than Chan'^ at
.^.^f"!: — •» 302-304. Kim To-y6n, on the other hand,stated that he had "exoected" Yun's nomination. See his recollectionsin !aui Insa°npr
~aekso (p:v Life), dd. 36?-368.
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Imi-.ediately after the July 29 election, the strenjrth of
the new faction in the House was 83; figure for the old faction was
84-
9^
itself, on August 18. Yu. Wd to the inevitable by nominating
Chang who von the approval of the House again by a sli.
.argin. 117
to 107.
The burden now shifted to the newly elected f^i^e Minister to
announce his cabinet. Ke had indicated earlier that he would consider
at least five old-guard members to his cabinet provided that the
latter would not register as a separate negotiation group in the
House, a consequence which would be tantamount to a "de facto party
split." The "old" faction welcomed the idea of having five members
but insisted that Chang accept the prospect of a separate negotiating
body and also announced its intention to withdraw its five participating
cabinet appointees at any time. These jx^sitions could not be reconciled
and the negotiations broke down on August 22. "^"^^
When the fourteen-men cabinet was announced on August 23. it
consisted of only one old faction member and two independents, the
rest being new faction members. Immediate criticism was heard
not only from the old faction but also from some elements of the
new faction which claimed that they had been betrayed despite the
key role they played in the election of Chang. Chang succumbed to
the mounting criticism on August 24, when he stated: "These appoint-
ments are more or less temporary. I am prepared to reshuffle my
118^. ^Tne Dong-A Ilbo, August 22. I960, p. 1.
Tiie younger elements of the new faction led by Yi Ch'ol-sung
have in fact been very critical of Chang. They have maintained a
circle composed of younger new faction members for most of the
nine-Bx>nth Democratic rule.
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cabinet whenever it is needed to bring about political stability^^O
The old faction retaliated. Led by Kizn To-yo^n. the old guard
members attacked Chang in a newspaper advertisement for "thinking
more about his personal friends than about the nation." On August
31. MiiLludans Wa Ton^
.
1ihoe(The Society of Old Faction Commrades
Association of the Democratic Party) with 86 members in the House
of Representatives registered with the House Secretariat. A statement
issued by this group said that the split was necessary due to the
differences in "political thinking." and insisted that the "old"
faction was democratic in organization while the new faction was
high-handed and fascist, and that the old faction put the nation
first and political power second while the new faction placed its
thirst for political power above the state.^^ The formation of the
old faction negotiating group was followed almost immediately by the
registration of another negotiation group, Min.iung Hoe(The Peoples
Club)
.
Composed of ^8 independents
. this club was a union of four
distinct groups: a pro-new faction group led by li Jae-hyong; a
pro-old faction group led by So Kin-ho; a reformist group headed by
Yun Kil-jung; and independents like Chang T'aek-sang, Kim Jun-yon
and Yun Jae-kun.
Chang's attempt to keep the party together through reorganization
of his cabinet was to no avail. On September 22, the old faction
120
The Dong-A Ilbo
.
August 2^, I960, p. 1.
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The Dong-A Ilbo
.
August 31, I960, p. 1,
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members, caucus resolved to fonn a new party. On the following day.
the new faction members with the strength of 95 legislators finally
registered, as a separate group with th. name Hinjudan^C the Democratic
P^ty). On September 24. the old faction registered as ^Mnmindang
(The New Democratic Party). The founding declaration of the party
created by the old faction attacked Chang's regime for "burying in
oblivion the tasks of the revolutionary regime" and "betraying the
people's expectation by inheriting the evils and the corruption of
the old regime." If these practices were allowed to continue, this
declaration said, "the nation's future portends crisis.
While factional strife among the Democrats was ruining their
party, the nation was in a state of chaos. The chaos was not due
only- to the deadlock of government. The legitimacy of the Democratic
rule, from the beginning, was on shaky grounds because the downfall
of the Rhee regime was owed to the students. The students continued
to take to the streets any grievances they had and the regime demurred
on taking a strong action against the student excesses. During the
nine-month rule of the Democrats, there were some 1.200 demonstrations
reported in various cities and this meant that, on the average, there
were four demonstrations on each day of the Democratic rule."'^-^ A
common joke current at the time was that "the sun rises with
122
Central Election Management Committee, Hankuk Chongdangsa
(A History of Korean Political Parties;, p. 69.
123
Pak Mun-ok. Hankuk ChonfnJuron(A Study of Korean Government)
.
p.. 400..
•
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demonstrations and sets with demonstrations." There was no question
that the students were the most effioaoious group during these
months. The prevailing concern was no longer that of police
suppression of the Rhee regime, "but one of freely voiced fears as
to whether the popular forces unleashed by the revolution can
suocessfuUy be kept in check. "125 ^^^^.^^^ ^^.^^ ^^^^^
to maintain order without the politicians' sanctions and the policemen
themselves were involved in demonstrations for higher wages and
salaries.
In domestic politics, the Democrats in a state of deadlock
could not effectively implement policies to solve a host of urgent
problems. The Democrats seemed to be in constant bickering over
the power that escaped them for many years, and once the "incorruptible"
Democrats let corruption flourish and the profiteers were left
unpunished. Various factions accused others of scandalous profiteering
12^
The nature of the demands of the demonstrating students
was varied. Among others, they demanded resignation of their
principals ^-^^-negotiations with the North Korean counterpart on
the question of unification on the basis of neutralization. The
most widely reported and condemned was the demonstration by the
students who were wounded in the April 19 march on the Presidential
Residence. The students, while demanding severe punishment for
those responsible for the March 15 election rigging, stormed the
Assembly haill and occupied its rostrUm.
Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee(Rutland. Vt.:
C.E. Tuttle Co., I960), p. 31^.
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activities.^6 ^^^^
^^^^^ ^^^^^ reshuffling
of cabinets which occurred five times during the nine-month period.
The people's conception of the pe>-fonnance of the regime also
deteriorated. There was no question but that with the demise of th.
Rhee regime, it was expected that the anomalies and paradoxes that
had characterized the old regime would disappear overnight with
the coding of the Democratic regime.
.
A public opinion poU
taken by the Hankuk Ilbo immediately after the Chang cabinet was
organized,yielded the following results. When asked whether they
supported the Chang regime, the responses had been: 34.8 percent
"support"; 39.4 percent "will wait and see"; 11.2 percent "oppose".
Some rive months later the resix)ndents were asked whether they
thought Chang's performance was satisfactory. Only 3.1 percent
thought so; 34.3 percent saw "no improvement"; 42.8 percent, "will
wait and see"; ISA percent, "don't know.""'^''
TSie Second Republic of the Democrats was one of open polity
in which genuine forces of democracy seemed to operate. Freed from
the autocratic rule of Rhee. the nation experimented with democracy
126^,
The most spectacular scandal occurred in February. 1961.Labelled "Tungsten Affair." a high ranking old faction member ofthe AJsembly was charged by a new faction member that the formerhad taken a million dollar bribe for arranging a consignment sale
contract for 4.000 tons of tungsten between a Japanese firm and
the Korea Tungsten Company. For details, see Hankuk Hyokmy^ng
Chaep'ansa(The History of Revolutionary Trials in Korea), Vol. 1
pp. 230~242. *
127 u •This newspaper poll did not indicate whether the respondents
were the sane individuals in both polls. See The Hankuk Ilbo
.
January 15, 1961, p. 1,
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including freedom of the ores-s Ar,H ti,. < jlin p es and the freedom of political activities,
But this experiment ,ave free rein to forces that had been kept in
Check during the fthee regime. The nation's leadership defaulted
with the neKly obtained folitical ^„er by engaging i„ endless
factional maneuvers to keep ^„er. Political power, which long
escaped the Democrats. v«s now theirs, but they were not ready to
exercise it."^®
The Third Republic: The Trials and Hopes
of Party Politics, I96I-I969
Of the Second R:o::?Sc"o'r"thfr^fio^^ara^^ S^f ''f ''tfor the performance of his .olZlT Zi^M^U'lZ slTenga^red in the bloody struggle against the Liberal fJu tte th,nthat promised to the people was the absolute 'ulrantee of frl^t ^and removal of tyranny. Thus we re^x-fi-^J g a t reedom
to px^wer.... Eve^thoJ^h t'h^^so: e rwL^^ r^^^^^ Z^Zl
^-°-^-tions. the DP^,overn.ent couirno^violat^'^its own pledge of freedom that it made before coming ?o plwerWe could not betray the people under the pretext of a ti^^ o?*;;;osOf course, we could have declared a state of emergency^ somedubious pretext. But we believed in a 'true dem^cra?L order
^nf.^H jT^^^^^'.^^^h^^ than in a 'superficial order imposed by
f?2ld^^^r?L!*^d-; >n '"^^ -limitedbeen longing for' was the credo of the DP
fHrJ^^f^V
^^i^^,;^ f the people by time, instead of by
w^^^ fio
^""^^ ^" ^^'^ °^ increasing chaos, m the meantime,we ere also preparing some plans for stern measures to preventdegeneration of this social disorder reaching a certain point
where it might endanger essential maintenance of national securityand welfare." Sasilui Jonnurul Kisulhanda (All Truths Are Told-Memoirs), pp. 390-391. Translated and quoted in iC.b. Kim ojd. cit..
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In 1955. Shannon McCune made a prophetic observation of the
Korean political scene
A relatively unknown but potentially powerful
course l/Tui:;r^A'?i'o.rclll^Ce
zeroise a decisive Influence. In cart beSSe of
^rmy ana its tradition of civilian control... ( )it aRcears that the army leaders wUl no? IAanti-democratic force. ue an
McCune's first observation turned out to be amazingly accurate,
During the critical moments of the students' assault on Rhee and
his regime the Martial Law Commander and his troops remained
neutral and this helped to expedite the collapse of the regime.
tioCune was somewhat wide of the mark, however, on his second point.
A group of young Turks in the Korean Army led by General Park
successfully staged a bloodless coup in the early morning of
Kay 16. 196I. This was completed with some 3,500 men and 250
officers within a 600.000-men army. Seoul was captured in a
matter of hours, and the Military Revolutionary Council announced
129
rins+o^
Shannon KcCune, "The United States and Korea" in The|||tes ang the Far East. 1st. ed..(New York: Prenti^nan, ±956;, p. 93.
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six pledges to the nation.^^°
Four days after the coup, the official explanation of the
ccmp was provided r"'--^-^
""^^^ because they just^ not bear witnessing the country fallLg Into
Sev^. Communist domination. fhS,
^^rl^ n ^" ^° ^^^^^ homeland andonr people from the Communist totalitarianism,b^^g a new future for the establis^ent of agenuine democracy in the Republic of Korea.
On May I9. the Revolutionary Council transformed itself into
the 40^en Supreme Council for l^ational Reconstruction(SCm);and
by legislating the "Law Regarding Extraordinary Measures for
130
nninf /^^^f^ ""^r^ "^^^ Anti-communism will be the cardinal
S^^nt i^^'^.^'j"? anti-CoHMunist
^o^f^r • ''^''^ ^^^^ "^o^e than a matter of
m ?h^^m ^ '"ere slogan, will be rearranged and strengthened.
i^l/S ?^1t^ ""^^ be observed and international agreements
n -i^cf J^^'^^^ carried out. The friendly ties with theUnited States and other free world nations will be further
strengthened. (3) All corruption and past evil practices inthis country will be wiped out and fresh and clean morality
will be pursued in order to redress the degenerated national
morality and spirit. (^) The plight of the national life which
xs on the brink of despair and starvation will be quickly
ameliorated and all-out efforts will be made for the recontruction
of a self-reliant national economy. (5) In order to implement
the long cJierished national desire to reunify the divided land,
all out efforts will be centered on making the nation capable of
coping witli communism. (6) As soon as such talks are accomplished,
we will ready ourselves to turn over the reigns of power to new
and conscientious TX)liticians and return to our original duties."Quoted in. Park Chung-Kee, "what Has Made the Military Revolution
Successful, "Koreana Quarterly
. Vol. II, Ko, l(Summer. I96I),
I^r I8-I9.
^-^"S'he Secretariat, Supreme Council for National Reconstruction,
Kilitary Revolution in Xorea(Seoul: The SCMR, I96I), p. 12.
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National Reconstruction." it appropriated all executive, legislative
and judicial powers unto itself. Along with SCM. the Cabinet and
the CentrPl Intelligence Agency(CIA) w^re established on the same
day. The SCm moved swiftly to carry out its pledges. In reorgani-
zation of the administration and replacement of lower-level
bureaucrats, in apprehending and punishing gangsters and pro-
Communist suspects, and in announcing the five year economic plan,
the military government moved with swiftness and determination, and
these policies were beginning to earn the support of the people.
It was in the arena of politics'^ which the military government had
to undergo a series of difficulties.
In accordance with its pledge, the SCJIR disbanded all political
parties(15) and social organi2ation(233) as a first step. On August
12, 1961. General Park confirmed the position of the coup leaders
that the military rule would be terminated by the summer of I963,
and the governmental power would be turned over\ civilian administration.
With this target and blueprint, the .junta government enacted a
retroactive "Political Activities Purification Law""*-^^ in March, I962
to pave legal grounds for banning "undesirable" former politicians
from taking part in political activities until August. I968.
132
^ For the complete text of the Political Activities
Purification Law, see "Law for the Purification of Political
Activities" in Korean Affairs
. Vol. I, No. 2(May/june 1962),
pp. 219-225. General Park's statement concerning this law is
found in Korean Affairs Vol. I, Mo. 2(Kay/june, I962), p. 21?.
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This law blacklisted more than 4,000 persons 4. i ^, including Liberal
»nd Democratic politicians.
The r.ext step in the transition t. the civUian rule was the
^option of a new Constitution. On July U, 1962, a drafting
committee was organized and after holding public hearings from
August 23 to 30, a draft constitution was put to a national
on December 17.^34
^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^ overwhelming
78.8 percent support from the people, it was promulgated on
December 26.135
, ^ ^^^.^^^ le.iti.,,,,
to become useful later. It was a return to the presidential
system, and one significant innovation was the inclusion of an article
on political parties.136 p^„^,^,^^ ^^.^.^^ ^^.^^
Some two-thirds of the blacklisted persons aoolied fnr .nH
!ss|'~ as8*.ffi--
Article 7 reads: "The extablishment of political oarties sh;,Tlbe free and the plural system shall be guaranteS/ (ifoSnxzationand activities of a political party shall be democratic ani poliUc^parties shall have necessary organizational arrangements to Sable Sepeople to participate in the formation of public will. (3) FolitLalparties shall enjoy the protection of the state. However
, if thepurposes or activities of political party are contrary to the basicdemocratic order the Executive shall bring an action against it inthe Suprens Court for its dissolution o.nd the political party shall bedissolved :ui accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court." Ibid..
Art:^cle 6^(paragraph 3) and Article 36(paragraph 3) ruled^independent candidacies for txDth the presidential and National Assembly
elections. Article 38 further states: "a person shall loose his
membership in the National Assembly when he leaves or changes his
party, or when his party is dissolved." Ibid ., p. 13.
elaborated in the Political Party Law which passed the SCm on
December 31. 1962. The first comprehensive law on political parties
in Korea, it defined a political party as "a voluntary organization..,
which participates in the formulation of political views of the
people by promoting a responsible political assertion or policy
and by nominating or supporting a candidate in an election for
public Office." The law required that a party should have district
chapters in more than one-third of the total electoral districts
^or the National Assembly^and each district Chapter was to be composed
of at least 80 members. without fulfilling these and other
requirements, a political party could not register with the Central
Election Management Committee(CEKC)
. which was created to oversee
all activities related with political parties and elections. This
law further stipulated that parties could enjoy freedom of activities
within the scope of the Constitution and laws; a party could not be
financed by foreign governments, groups, individuals or by state
or public organizations; a party must make public its income and
expenditures once a year. The intention for the political party law
was clear. As Colonel Kil Jae-ho. the Chairman of the Legislative-
Judiciary Committee of the SCM stated, the "requirements for
the formation of a party aim at preventing the emergence of
137
Article 25 through 27, ibid., pp. 182-183. The amended
version(January, I969) increased the number to one-half of the
election districts, and 100 members. The Korean Republic
.
December 20, I962, p. 1.
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aplinter and progressive parties, and to establish a bipartisan
system, "^^^
While these legislative measures were undertaken, General
Park announced that all of SCNR
.embers would participate in the
Civilian government by running as civilians in the general election
slated for May. The announcement was followed by a heated debate
among the members of SCM as to whether they should run in the
forthcoming general election in uniform or retire from active
military duty and run as civilians. A group of Supreme Councillors
insisted that there was no need to shed the uniform as long as they
serve as the nation's legislators. They insisted that military
officers were entitled to run in general elections and retain their
military status. This reasoning was overriden by the majority of
Supreme Council members who feared that candidacy in military
uniform would set a "bad precedent" for future elections. The
Supreme Council revised its own law to include reservists among
its members. This revision enabled the Supreme Councillors to
shed their uniform in order to run in the forthcoming election,
while retaining their seats in the Council.
13s
The Korean Republic
. December 20, I962, p. 1. It isinteresting to note that Yun Po-son, former President, remarked afew days later that such a law would be unnecessary. He said;
"I understand the government is worried, over the possible emergence
of too many splinter parties... I do not think a law is necessary
to check the minority parties because, in the past even without
such a law, small parties eventually merged into two major parties."
See The Korean Republic
. December 22, 1962, p. 1. Yun. however,
supported the government's move to suppress the "left-wing"
political parties.
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The year I963 began with concrete steps to turn over f.wer
fro. the nalitary government to a civilian one. Cn February 18
General Park again reiterated his pled,e of
"non-participation L
a yet to be established civilian government. "^39 On the same day
he Urted the ban on political activities for parties and social
organizations and for some 3.000 persons.
That the junta council was badly split over this transitional
Phase was evident by a series of events whose details remain unclear
up to the present time. Kim Jong-p'il. the mastermind of the coup. .
and the organizer of the Democratic Republican Party(DRF) suddenly
resigned as Chairman of the party and several members of the
"maincurrent" members of the SCI^^resigned. The plot for a military
counter-coup by Marine Commandant Kim Tong-ha was discovered on
March 11 and the difficulties surrounding the DRP reportedly help^
to convince Park to reverse his decision to return to military
uniform. His statement on March 16 stated that he would prolong
the period of military rule for four more years in order to "establish
139
^'f^^
his decision conditional upon acceptance of thefollowing by the civilian politicians. (1) The newly electedgovernment should prove to uphold the soirit of April 19 andMay 16 revolutions; (2) The recognition of the justice of May 16
revolution and no reprisals against the military officers; (3) The
/^J^^fi??'*^
appointed by the military government were to be retained;Able reserve soldiers should be given preference for party
positions wherever practicable. (5) All political parties should
eliminate all traces of past evil and corruot politics; and
(6; The neif civilian government should support the Korea-Japan
talks. See. Mun Chang-ju. Hankuk Chongch'iron(A Study of Korean
Politics), p. 346.
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a polity that would never invite another revolution. He would
put the question of extension before a national refera„du„. hut all
political activities would be suspended once more.
the Civilian politicians, united in opposition to the extension
demonstrated against the military government on Karch 20. American
pressure was also reoorted to be exerted on Fark.^'^l Cn April 8.
Park a".nounc.d that the referandum on the question of whether to'
extend the military rule or to hold a general election would be
postpo-ed until September. On July 27, Park '^^^^^^'i
face of these pressures and announced the final tij.,e-table and
election dates. In accepting the DA?'s presidential nomination on
August 30. Park resolved to "continue and acconplish the task of the
revolution for which he feels great reponsibility.-l'*^ Among the
group of officers who were determine! to participate in the forthcoming
civilian government was a group of young officers led by Kim Jong-p'il
For the conplete text of his statement, see ibid., pnHenderson writes that this reversal was made ui^der stJ^:
'
pressure
The Pn'nt""""" S""^ KendersonrXorSro.Lo ics of Vortex
. o. 186.
P^Tx. ,
Ch'an--ju, Hankuk Chon£ch4ron(A Study of Korean
ur^ed'th^."; ^ ; •f^"'^
President Kennedy, in an interview,g d the return to civilian rule. On April 2, Kennedy's letter toPark uT-?ed the sane. There were also unofficial renorts that theU.S. would review its oolicy toward Korea should General hark extend
military rxile.
1^2.
, , .
_^
,
^
>^uoted m Central Election Kana^ement Committee, Taehaminkuk5on gosalA history of Korean Elections), p. 38.
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and ^ „e.bers of the eighth class of the Korean Mlita., Acade^.
Although the De^cratic Republican Party was omcially organized
in February.. I963. the organizing
.or. began in the strictest secrecy
as early as January, 1962. only six
.onths after the coup and a year
before Political activities were permitted. ^'^3
That. CIA headed by Ki^ Jong-p-il funded and organized the DRP
was an open secret. Certain key CIA former mUitary officers were
in Charge of the new party project; they recruited university professors
to help the™. The procedure for the establishment of the party
could only be speculated, and the so-called "Kim Jong-p-ii Plan" to
organize a new party, which would transcend the military label, and
provide the mechanism through which the military could participate
in civilian politics, had become the blueprint for the new party.
The organizing cor^ittee had taken a form of a study group composed
of CIA miUtary officers and young political scientists. That the
scholars participated in the organizing committee became evident when
the party was officially established. Kim is said to have asked these
political scientists to study the pathology of former Korean parties
'
v v-"* ^°^^0"nd information on the organization of the DRP.bee Kin Yong-su, "Minju Konp:whadang Sajon Jojik"(The AdvanceOrganization of the Democratic Republican Party), Shindong'a
.
/Su^S^"*: 168-187. and Kang In-sop. "Yuksa P'alkisaeng"(The Eighth Graduating class of the Korean Military Academy)
Shindong'a
,
September. 1964. pp. I7O-I98. For another interesting
account o." the activities by the organizer of the new political
Recollections of Kim Jae-ch'un, the former CIA Director,in ^Jaul H:/Dkmyong Jonfu"(Recollection to the Days of Revolution).
Chung'ang. May, I969, p. 118.
*
See Henderson, Korea ; The Politics of Vortex
, pp. 30^305
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ana develop a plan which «ul. transcend the™. The brain-trust around
Ki. conde^ed the former Korean parties as having the following
pathologic: the constituency organization had not been a party
organization, but largely a personal organization centered around
the National Asse.bly»an; the provincial party organization with its
veak administrative capabilities had not contributed
.uch to the
constituency organization; the party national headquarters was dominated
by the national Assemblymen, and there were no controlling organization^
over these legislators. The functions of the party had been executed
through personal relations rather than on an institutional basis.^'^^
On the basis of this analysis, the organizers began to lay the
framework for a new party. An important innovation was to divide
the organization of the party into representative, executive and policy
organs. As a representative organ, the national party headquarters
was to have a central coimittee: the provincial or city party head-
quarters, a provincial or city co«ittee; the constituency party, a
constituency co,™ittee. As an executive organ, the party headquarters
at all levels were to be staffed with paid party members to perform
the executive functions of the party. The legislators and the party
functionaries of the party were to jointly perform the staffing function
of the party. The crux of this organizational set up was to prevent
the doDunation of the constituency party organization by the legislators.
n»D ^
Chc.e Tan-yong. "Kongwhadangkwa Kim Jong-p'il Puraen "(TheUriP and Kim Jong-p'il Flan), Sasangge, March,1963, pp. 80-85.
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It also reoo^ended an independent f»licy-.aking organ vathin the
central party headquarters . "^^^
This blueprint for a new political party was apparently
.ade
known to the members of the SCtS, who had been kept in the dark up
to that tir.e. Having political ambitions of their own. they began
to oppose the organizational framework of the party. Their opposition
was based on the reasoning that the proposed framework would r>ake
it possible for the party functionaries to dominate the true represen-
tatives Of the people. Furthermore, they argued, a maintenance of
a constituency party secretariat would be a costly and unnecessary
innovation between elections.
Amid these differences, the new party announced the formation
of an inauguration committee which met on January 18. In order to
transcend the military label the inauguration committee included
civilians from various walks of life. Also included were five SCMl
members and ten other reserve officers. The party officially came
into being on February 26. I963. The discord was already coming out
in the open. General Song Yo-ch'an, former Premier and Park's senior
in the army, charged on January 8. 1963 that it was a betrayal of
public trust for the SCNR members to shed military uniforms and enter
into politics. Similiar charges by other SCKR followed suit. As
early as January 21. Kim Tong-ha. a SCm member and a sponsoring
member of the party, declared that the DRP "centered around Kim Jong-p'il,
146
Ibid ., pp. 81-82.
Ill
is not goin^ to the path that a public party in a democratic society
Should go,» and
-because I cannot correct the wrongs evident in the
party. I am resigning from aU j^sitions.-^^^ The Supreme Council,
during two days of deliberation on Kim Tong-ha's resignation, reportedly
decided that Km Jong-p'il had shown bad judgement and "improper
attitude" and demanded that the party's functionary secretariat system
at the constituency level be disbanded. The Supreme Council members
seemed to have won the first round when Kim Jong-p'il announced his
"intention" to resign from the party. In February, he left the country
for a trip around the world. As he put it at the time, his decision
to go abroad was reached "partly by myself and partly by others.-
As the situation deteriorated. Park intervened to calm the storm. On
January 2?. the SCM members retracted their earlier demand for
Kim Jong-p»il's resignation, and Park separated the party and the
SCKR ty removing those who had connections with the party. The DRP
organizers in return asked Kim Tong-ha to retract his resignation from
the party's inauguration committee.^^® Now a new party was born, and
this was to provide the military officers a bridge to power in the
forthcoming civilian government. The founding declaration stated;
147
'^Ibid., p. 80.
In addition to this discord, there seemed to have been a
much more fundajnental kind of differences. Song Yo-ch'an, the first
head of Cabinet of the .junta government, demanded, for example, on
January 24, I963 that Park should reverse his intention to participate
in the civilian government. On February 14, Yu '-^on-sik, a former
SCKR member, demanded that the military should stay clear of the
civilian government yet to be established. See Kun Ch'ang-ju,
Hankuk Chonech'iron(A Study of Korean Politics), p. 345.
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^..e are unlike the past political parties in that we are a 'working,
political party rather than merely a 'speaking- political party. "^^9
The DRF ran into immediate diffic^olties
. General Park's oath-
taking ceremony, at which he declared his non-candidacy, clouded the
future of the party. Soon thereafter. General Park urged formation
of a pan-national party that would include all political forces
subscribing to the ideals of the military revolution. General Ki.
Chae-ch'un. then the director of CIA. immediately started to organize
a new party, which later became the Liberal Democratic Party(IDP).
He was able to recruit various groups and individuals from existing
parties and from the DRP itself. General Park's momentary decision
in favor of a pan-national party threatened the DRP. but in May. I963,
Park ordered the merger of the two parties by using a slightly modified
version of the existing DRP structure and by equitably distributing
party posts between the two partisan groupSin the merged party. This
merger order brought another influx of anti-Kim Jong-p'il politicians
into the party. Although the negotiations for the merger proved
unsuccessful because the LDP demanded the dissolution of the DRP's
secretariat organizations, this had the effect of complicating the
facticnal picture of the future ruling party.
1^9Quoted in Haebang Yisipyinvon ii ( Twenty-twn years sinceliberation), p. 671.
'"^^The need for such political party is publicly exoressed by
Yi Hu-rak's, later Park's Chief Secretary and then the Spokesman for
the SCm, See Yi Hu-rak. "Why is a Pan-national Party Necessary?,"
Koreana Quarterly
. Vol. V, I^o. 2(Summer. I963), pp. 11-16.
The bulk of the LDP members chose to remain in within their
party when the merger negotiations proved unsuccessful; it later
turned against Park and joined the ranks of opposition forces.
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By the ti.e General Parle shed his military unifor. and accepted
the presidential nomination or the DEP. on August 30, 1963. factional
alignments in the DRP were fluid due to the influx of hetereogenous
groups into the party. Broadly speaking, however, there seemed to
have been
.ain groupings. The "mainstream faction," so dubbed
^ the mass media at the time, consisted of those party members who
had participated in the creation of the party and those who haa
commanded the control of the secretariat structure of the party.
These were individuals that gathered around Kim Jong-p'U. despite
his absence in Korea at the ti:ne. arri those who weathered the storm
and challenge from the Liberal Democratic Party during April and May
of 1963. The "non-mainstream" faction consisted of all others who
were not members of the inner circle and who joined the party at lat^
stages. These were those SCKR members who were opposed to Kim Jong-p'il
and his plan for the DRP; those leaders of the LDP who were pro-Park
and former members of the defunct Liberal Party and other parties,
who all joined the DRP in time for the I963 elections.
The civilian politicians hurriedly realigned their forces to
challenge the rule by the former men in uniform in the civilian
government, after the lifting of ,ban on political activities on
January 1, 1963. Their political activities were those of the "old"
politicians in merging and dispersing. The group that seemed to show
the most v::ability was composed of those men who belonged to the "old"
faction of the Democratic Party, which, toward the end of the Second
RepubXicspUt With the new faction to To™ the New Be^oc.atio Part.
Sucoe..ful in recruiting so.e elements of the new faction of the
De.oc.at. and Liberal Party, a new par ty- the Civil Rule Party-
was launched on Kav l'^ anrf y.,„i'.ay 1-^. d Yun Po-son. former President, became the
atandbearer of the party in the forthcoming election. This group
included other important names such as Kim To-yon. ru Chin-san. and
Kim Eyong-no.
Ihe old Democratic Party under Chang KySn was revived under the
same name and elected Madame Pak 3un-ch'5n as its Chairman, but lost
many of its former adherents to Yun and other parties that were
emerging. A similar disintegration followed a»ng the former adherents
of President Rhee. Yi B5m-s5k, the former Liberal and the head of
the CKtroversial National Youth Corps^ seemed at first to rally Rhee's
cohorts, but a majority of his former coUeagues found refuge in the
DRP. the Ho ChSng's New Politics Party or the Liberal Democratic Party,
which had the support of the anti-Kim Jong-p'il faction in the DRP.152
15?
hv .<^iTr ^ f^^^^^"^ development of organization of new parties
U siSv^ Ch'ang-ju. Kankuk Chp-ngch-ironStudy or Korean Politics), pp. 367-385.
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In all, so^e twelve political parties registered with the
Central Election Management Co^nittee. ^53
^^^^ ^^^^
the beginning that the real contest was between Yun and Park with
ChaJng a distant third. An attempt was made to unite the forces
of Yun. H« and Yi B6m-sSk under the umbrella of the Party of the
People(Kukminuidan. ), but without success. Given only thirty days
to campaign, seven opposition politicians registered as presidential
candidates. The perennial inability to unite hampered these men once
again at the crucial moment and they were no match against the DRF
were a coaUtion o?'nT^'°"vf •
^"^^ P^^^^^^ ^^e time
lelst on fh^ 1 ^ u fl^^^c^^^s in different combinations ata t e leaaership level. The following table comtDiled bv thpte^gzang Shipii( November 1. 1963) shows the foJ^er Se£a^cesof the new party leadership. =^egiance
^ ^
CRP DP Kukminuidang LDP drPFormer members of: (%) (%) (^)
^
NDP 67.7 91A - 3^ 2
^-5
- 18 15.8 2
- 19 12.6 8
Unification
Party
. . , 6.3 -
Independents 12.8 - 45 5,3 iq
KUitary
- .
. 5^3 3^
Newcomers 6.5 8.6 16 I8.7 50
ethers 2 - 2
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Which had prepared for the election on October I5 for so.e two years.
It was not until October 8, a week before the election day. that the
opposition candidates were able to present to the electorate a united
front against candidate Park. With h5 Chong and Song Hyo-ch.an^^^
withdrawing their names from the presidential race for the sake of
opoosition imity, the contest was between Park and Yvn ro-sJTn, the
presidential candidate of the Civil Rule Party(The CRF- Kinchon.^dan.k
In a campaign marred by mutual exchanges of mud-slinging and
attacks on personalities .^55 the DRF candidate barely won the crucial
election by a mere 150,000 votes, winning l,? Percent of the votes
cast. That the organization of the DR? was strong in the rural areas
was made evident when Park won 59 percent of the rural votes, whereas
Yirn gained only ^1 percent. The urban voters, however, gave their
overwhelming support to the opposition candidate. Distasteful kunin
chongch'i
,
"rule by men in uniform," seemed to have been a motive
for the urbanites to sway onesidedly against Park. As compared with
154General Song, who had been the military government's first
Premier, and a severe critic of the .junta for its decision toparticimte in civilian politics as a betrayal of the revolutionary
pledpre. was arrested by the CIA on August 11 on the charf^es of
executing a subordinate officer durLng the Korean .jar and of allegedly
ordering troops to fire on students during the adtH Student uprising
as the Martial Law Commander. Ke briefly cajioaigned from a orison
cell in Seoul.
^^^Fark rediculed Yun Po-son's democratic rule as "disguised
democracy" and assetited that his formuj.a was liberal democracy based
on nationalism. This prompted Yun to question the very loyalty of
Park to the nation, div«fging the court martial record of Park in
19^9 on cl-^rges of organizing a Gominunist Party in the South Korean
Army. Park was reinstated at the outbreak of the Korean *var with a
suspension of the sentence. See Pak Son^-hwan, r 'ado nun :.aeildo
Ch'indaC Waves //ill Come Also Tomorrow) (Seoul: Tong'a Gh'ulo'ansa.
1965). pp. I85-I99.
11?
Yun's 63^percent of the urban vote. Park was able to garner only 27
percent.^^ In the .Yational Assembly elections held on November 26.
the DRP once a.eain demonstrated its organizational strength by
returnin'T 110 out of 17S renrpcspn+^ + i^r^o uj.xo representatives. £-if-;hty-eight of the
candidates nominated by the oarty were elected directly with an
additional 22 seats on a proportional representation scheme, incorporated
into the Constitution of the Third Republic, thus ensuring a working
majority in the Assembly. The defeat at the ballot-boxes was not
accepted by Yun and his ooposition ooliticians. They attacked what
they called "premeditated election rigging." with Yun declarinr, "I
won the election in voting but lost in vote coui^ting." The defeated
candidate filed two seoarate law suits with the highest court in a
move to invalidate Park's election. "'^'^
The Sixth National Assembly convened on December 1? to inaugurate
Park as first President of the Third Republic and to launch a civilian
government after two years-and-seven months' military interim. In
his State of the Nation Kessa^e in early 196^^. President Park, in a
reconciliatory manner, appealed for the opposition's cooperation,
while vowing to do his part to "modify governinent policies in the
light of sound alternative program of the opposition parties . "'"^^
156
For an analysis of the I963 presidential election, see
C.I. Eugene Kiin, "Sirnificance of the 1963 Korean Election."
A§ian Sur^e^^ Vol. IV. tio. 3(Karch. 1964). pp. 765-773- oee also
Kim Kyong-whai, "The Presidential Election in Korea. I963" Korean
Affairs Vol. 11(1963). op. 372-378.
157
^'See The Choson Ilbo
.
Kovember 14. I963, d. 1.
The Kyonr^Viyang ohinmun
,
January 10, 1964, p. 1.
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No such cooperation was forthcoming fro. the opposition parties.
The CRP.s Yun and DP's Madame Pak Sun-ch'Sn. in the polic, speeches
Of their respective parties, opened fire on what they called a
-proforma" civilian rule. Yun even went so far as to advocate
the over-throw of the present government by force.^^^
In the political situation where the very legitimacy of Park's
civilian government was seriously questioned by the opposition
politicians and the substantial portion of the electorate, it needed
only a catalyst to drive the nation into a political crisis. Such
catalyst was provided on the occasion of the ratification of the
Korea^apan Normalization Treaty, most of which was negotiated during
the military interim.^^° The long, intense political struggle from
March 196^ to the time of ratification on September I965 drove the
nation into utter political chaos. The campaign against the normal-
ization with Japan began on March 6. with the organization of the
Pan-National Struggle Committee against Humiliating Diplomacy with
Japan(henceforth known as the Struggle Committee). Originated in
the Kational Assembly by the leaders of opposition parties, this
159For Yun's statement, see The Dong-A Ilbo
. January 14, 1964.
Madame Park's statement is found in The Hankuk Ilbo
.
January 16. 1964.Both of these statements are partially translated in K. B. Kim,
0£. cit., p. 123.
For the historical background, the roots of opposition, the
content aiid the politics ofrapprothemejit of this treaty, see
Chulsu Kin, Korean-Jar^anese Reiations
. 1951-1965 : A Study in the
Politics of RancrocheiT:ent ( unpublished K.A. thesis, the University
of Massachusetts
, 196?) . See also K. B. Kim, pp. cit., especially.
Chapters II-V.
U9
Struggle Co^ittee included representatives from various social
organizations as well as political parties. The Struggle Co^ittee
made a spoech-making tour of ™ajor cities from March I5 -.0 21.
Despite the snowballing of the opf»sition forces. President Park
reiterated his determination to conclude the negotiations. On March
23. Ki« Jong-p'il and the Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira agreed in
Tokyo to conclude the talks by early Kay of that year. This prompted
some 5.000 students from the major universities in Seoul to take to
streets to protest the "humiliating diplomacy" with Japan. Recon-
ciliatory gestures by President Park who called the student demon-
strations "a patriotic act" restored the political calm temporarily
and had the students returning to their campuses throughout the
country. Some 80.000 students by then had participated in street
demonstrations.
In his determination to conclude the talks at all cost. President
Park reorganized the cabinet under Premier Chung Il-kwon, who
immediately announced his determination to conclude the negotiations
by the end of the year. Demonstrations erupted again in Kay and June
climaxed by the bloody struggles between students and the police on
June 3. On that day martial law was decreed in the area of Seoul;
all colleges and universities were forced to close their doors for
the remainder of the semester; assembly was prohibited; and the press
was censored. For nearly two months, Seoul was under the control
of the military. In the National Assembly the opposition forces
gave birth to a movement to unite them for more effectively opposing
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the ratmcation or the treaty. Three op^sUlon parti., the CHP. the
DP and^LDP. under the leadership of appointed a t„e„t.-one
»e»ber co.^ttee to ™a.e plans for a
.:ified op.sition part..
.ada.e
Pak-s Democratic Party
.e.bers(„ith 13 members), however, refused to
P«-ticipate in the proposed new party due to differences on the
organisation of the new partes leadership. The new party was organised
under the banner of the existing Civil Rule Party in late November.
Now a movement to unite the two major opposition parties, the CRP
and the DP. was launched in the beginning of the new year(1965).
The efforts at unification proved difficult. The negotiators
from both parties failed to agree on some basic points, the most
important of which were the designation of the name of the proposed
party and how the leadership of the party was to be organized. After
five nonths of futile negotiations, the two parties agreed, under
pressure from the rank and file of both parties, to unite under the
^
in accordance with
name of the Mass Party and^the principle of collective leadership.
When the new Kass Party(MP) was convened on June 1^^ to select its
leaders, it appeared that the former CRP elements suffered a setback.
Madame Pak was elected as the head of the three-member Supreme Council.
unexpectedly defeating Yun.^^^ In a face-saving move, however, Yun
had
was made "Advisor,- after he^ refused a seat in the Supreme Council.
The other two members were the durable Ho ChSng and So Min-ho. In
h'or account of this unification, see So Im-tuk, "Hankuk
Yadangui Kebowa Saengri"(The Geneology and Characteristics of
Opposition Parties in Korea), Sedae, June, I971, pp. 106-108.
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the election or the t«elve-.e.be. Leadership Co>.oil. Xun's
.roup
«s able to have only three of its followers Join in this powerful
co^ittee. Bespite its having been the largest opposition bloc in
the National Assembly before the unification
.ove. Tun's group suffered
a decisive defeat at the hands of Madame PaK-s fo»er Democratic Party
members who were in alliance with the Yu Chin-san elements of the
CRP, whose growing hostility toward Tun since the 1963 presidential
election cade them turn against their former colleagues. As
its predecessor opposition parties had been, the MP was a. uneasy
alliance of opposition politioans and factions.
When the politicians stumbled in the National Assembly to form
a united front against the ruling party, the various groups outside
the National Assembly began a series of demonstrations under the
guidance of the Struggle Committee. Massive rallies continued from
February through June when the hard-pressed government ordered an
early summer vacation for colleges and universities and some high
schools which had taken the lead in the demonstrations. On June 22.
the treaty was signed in Tokyo, ending the twenty years of technical
hostilities and some fourteen years of negotiations.
The Straggle Committee immediately declared it null and void
and publicly pledged its detennination to struggle against ratification
of the "treacherous treaty." and the "sell-out of the nation." Amid
massive popular protest and scenes of violence between the ruling
—For detail of Yun-Tu relationship and roots of hostility,
see Tlie Choson Ilbo
. July 15. 1971. p. 4.
•"
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and opposition party members of the National Assembly.163
ratification bill was placed on the agenda of the Assembly on July
14. Because of fear of a head-on collision, the session of the
National Assembly was scuttled only a week later, m a desperate
move to normalize the Assembly, a leaders' meeting between President
Park and Madame Pak Sun-ch'on was prepared in secret and held at the
presidential residence on July 20. They agreed to suspend extreme
confrontation between their two parties in order to maintain consti-
tutional order in the nation. They also agreed to close the Fifty-
first Assembly session on July 21 without deliberating on the treaty.
This did not seem to have much effect on the opposition strategy.
It began to insist on dissolution of the National Assembly and on
the election of a new one with specific instructions for dealing with
the important question of ratifying the Korea-Japan Treaty, m a
desperate move, the opposition legislators warned the ruling party
that they would resign from the National Assembly en masse if they
failed to achieve the dissolution of the Assembly or fail to block
the ratification bill.
The opposition KF^with complex factional alignments^ differed
sharply on the strategy the party should take vis-a-vis the ruling
153The ruling party, in a surprise move, introduced the
ratifrcation request to the plenary session where a fist-wielding
pandemonium erupted between the ruling and opposition legislators
around the Speaker's rostrum as well as on the floor. See The
Korea Times, July 13 and July 14, 1965, p. 1. and The Korea Herald.
July 13 and July 14, 1965. p. 1.
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party in its mission to block ratification.^^ Yun Po-son and his
followers, who had Tailed to win the hegemony of the MP. took the
hard line by advocating that the party be disbanded as a first step.
The disbanding of the party would mean under Article 38 of the
Constitution^^^ that all opjx>sition members would be disqualified
to sit in the National Assembly. The moderate faction insisted that
they Should debate and then resign their seats in the National Assembly
should the ruling party refuse to yield and try to push the ratification
through as the latter possessed the required majority. In a resolution
adopted by the MP's Central Standing Committee on July 26. the principle
was adopted that "members will resign their seats in the National
Assembly" should forcible passage of the ratification be foreseen."
and that the resignations be "complete and irrevocable. "'•^^
iS5
c.o r>^/?- of events surrounding opposition strategies,see Choe Yong-ch'ol and Pak 3un-je. "Shinmindang" (ihe NDP),Shindon?'a
. Kay. I968, pp. 95-97.
165
4« T^^*^
article provides that "A person shall lose his membershipin the Ivational Assembly during his term when he leaves or changeshis party." For the motives of the militants and moderates on
the choice of strategy, see- K. B. Kim. od. cit., pp. 2^3-251.
The moderates were as much opposed to the treaty as the militants
were, but they were also preoccupied with preserving their hegemony
of the party. The militants, on the other hand, saw little chance
either for capturing party hegemony or for defeating the treaty
unless the party was disbanded and joined in demons trations on the
streets. On the streets, the militants could easily regain the
hegemony of the opposition in alliance with such extreme groups
as the students and the Struggling Committee. See, K. B. Kim,
ojD. cit., pp. 247-2^8.
^The Korea Herald
.
July 27, 1965, p. 1.
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This resolution was clearly unacceptable to Yun and his militants,
Yun suddenly submitted his letter of resignation from the party on
July 28 ar.d other militants immediately folW suit. In the face
Of the pressures from both militant legislators and the opposition
group outside the Assembly, the party's Central Standing Con^ittee
met again on August 4 and succumbed to the militant line by passing
another resolution that ordered the MP's Assemblymen to subnit their
letters of resignation from the party by August 18. The majority
of the opposition Assemblymen demurred. The party caucus in the
Assembly on August ? modified this hard-line by resolving that it
should take advice" of the Central Standing Committee "only when"
the DRP rejected the letters of resignation from the National Assembly
(to be submitted to the National Assembly as soon as the likelihood
of ratification became apparent).
By August 9, only five members, including Yon. had submitted
letters of resignation from the partyj fifty-three members had
submitted the letters of resignation from the National Assembly.
Meanwhile the Fifty-Second Session was convened on July 29. The
Assembly immediately formed an ad hoc committee of twenty-five
composed of seventeen DRP members, ten MP members and one independent
for preliminary study of the treaty. The majority faction of MP.
previousl]' committed to debate on the bill joined the ad hoc committer,
but the mounting pressure from Yun and his militant faction of MP
made the proper deliberation of the treaty in the ad hoc committee
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very ciirricult when it convened its Win.s on August >^en it
was n^e evident that the op^sition
.e.bers on the ad hoc con^ittee
intended to TiUi^uster the session, the ruling part., in a hUt^
move ,n the late hours of August 11. forcibly concluded the debate
and won approval of the co^ttee. sending the bill to the
.ain floor
Of the National Assembly. Stunned by what they regarded as irregular
and ur^en^ocratic procedure, fifty-one members of the opposition party
infomed the Speaker of the Assembly that they were resigning fro.
the liational Assembly on the following day. On August 1^.. in a
plenary session attended only by Democratic Republican Party members
and one independent, the National Assembly, which had 175 members,
ratified the treaty and the related agreement by a vote of 110 to
none with one absention.
The steam-roller tactics by the ruling party had the effect of
intensifying the internal strife in the opposition camp. The MP
Assemblymen resigned en masse from the National Assembly on August 12
in accordance with the resolution of the party caucus of August 7.
Nevertheless, the moderates refused both to resign from the party
and to dissolve the party when the DRP declined to accept the letters
of resignation. Caught between their previous pledge of resignation
under pressure from the militants and a strong desire to remain in
the NaUonal Assembly, the moderates were indeed in a deep dilemma.
With the ttoderates now insisting that the first task of the Mass Party
was to normalize the party organization in order to struggle against
th. ruling p^ty and to render the ratification nm and void,
the opposition ca.p was badly divided. Ho ChSng. a »e.ber of the
MP's Suprce Counoil. urged the Asse^bl^^en to return to the National
Assembly, pointing out the creation of the party was not predicated
alone
-on the blocking of the Korea-Japan treaty.... but also in
realizing a viable two party system."
The militants in a move to purge H5 and other returnees from
the party demanded, on Agust 18. a new natioal convention and sought
forcibly to dissolve the returnees' constituent party chapters so
as to rorce them to lose theirAssembly seats. On September 17. the
moderates met to agree on the principleSof return,in defiance of the
militants' pressures. The militants, in a disgraceful outburst of
their dissatisfaction, forcibly occupied the party headquarters on
September 21. destroying its furniture and other properties. It now
became apparent that the two factions of the MP could not share the
same bed."^^''
iLfter the two months of single party National Assembly, the
moderates along with those militants who refused to resign from the
Assembly returned to the National Assembly. Kadame Fak Sun-ch'on.
in an apology, made a self-criticism of her party's disgraceful
perfomance in its attempt to block ratification, blaming the party's
failure on Yun's reckless and misguided leadership and promised that
167-
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post-ratification feud in the MP, see Minjukongwhadang
(The IHP), Chon.iinun Tangkwadopuro ( Prosnress V/ith the Party: A Three
Year History of the CRP) (Seoul: The DRF Headquarters, I965), pp.
12?
the KP would be a constructive and loyal opposition. With the
public image of the KP at its lowest point, the fate of the party
had come a full circle as its predecessors had done- the old
Democratic Party and the Party of the People. The return of the
moderates and the departure of the intransigents brought the
turbulent career of the MP to an end four month after the party was
born.
In sharp contrast to the ailing opposition cainp during the
ratification crisis, the Democratic Republican Party since its
inception seemed to enjoy impressive solidarity. Park appeared to
rule the party with an iron hand. Underneath this seeming unity,
however, the seeds of discord that were sown into the party from the
beginning slowly started to crack at the seams. Surely the intraparty
maneuvering within the ruling party was less spectacular and operated
within limits. Nevertheless the transformations that were taking
place were significant ones and hence worthy of note.
As a result of the overwhelming victory in the Assembly elections
in 1963, some 110 DRP Assemblymen met to choose their leaders on
December ?. The power configuration in the Sixth National Assembly
was quite complex with some five factions vying for the leadership
positions in the National Assembly. They were; (1) the mainstream
faction; (2) the secretariat faction which supported the mainstream
faction; (3) the May Commrades's Society faction, which after the
initial split with Kim Jong-p»il»s organizers of the DRP joined the
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part, subse™,; (.) oM Liberal Part. Taction; (5) the Wr
Democratic Party and the New Democratic faction.^^S
For vhe speakership of the newl. elected Asse.bl, two Asse.bly.en
Of the mainstream Taction. Chong Ku-yong. the Torrner Party President
and run Ch'i-yong competed but President Park intervened to have a
relatively unknown aging university professor Yi Hyo^sang. who was
yet to be identified with any faction, elected to that post. The
vice^peakership went to Chang l^^ng-sun. the leader of the anti-Kim
Jong-p'il Kay Commrades Society. The Hoor leadership '
was given to Kim Yong-fae who was the right->nr^ man of Kim Jong-p-il.
The chainnanships of the standing con^ittees were distributed according
to the factional strength of each group, with six of the twelve going
to the mainstream faction. This factional distribution of key posts
in the National Assembly reflected Park's concern to check complete
domination b;^- the mainstream faction, which, in alliance with the
secretariat faction, voted to control all of them.
Despite the concession to other factions in the National Assembly,
the mainstream faction nonetheless controlled the party and the key
posts in the Assembly and was able to dictate party policies and
strategies concerning legislation. The non-maincurrent factions.
V
factional alignments in the beginning of the Sixth
National Assembly, see Yu Hyok-in and Xi Chin-hi. "Kin.iukongwhadan^ "(The Democratic Republican Party). Shindong'a
. August, 1966. po. 90-95See also Cnong Song-kwan, Minjukon^hadan^rui i\aemak"(The Inside Story
or the DRP), Sedae. June. I906. pp. 109-110.
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havin, been eliminated fro. the centers of ^wer in the Assembly,
deeply resented the domination..,, the mainstream Taction and awaited
the first opportunity to challenge the mainstream faction. The
history Of the ruling party from this time on may be shown in terms
of the confrontation and the gradual and eventual takeover of the
anti...incurrent factions as the main-current faction in the party.
The first such opportunity was provided when the Korea-Japan Treaty
issue triggered widespread student demonstrations in Karch.
The mainstream faction and the non-mainstream factions ostensibly
differed in their strategies in dealing with the students- the
former favoring a hard line and latter compromise and peace with
students- but the hegemony of the party was the real issue at stake.
In several non-confidence motions introduced from March to April in
1964 by the opposition against ministers, the mainstream faction was
able to defeat them only by a slim margin despite the overwhelming
plurality the ruling party had in the Assembly. This was a clear
indication that the non-maincurrent members had voted against the
ministers.
As a result of this incident, which has been dubbed "the
rebellion by vote." the floor leadership of the National Assembly
changed hands several times. The non-mainstream factions were now
demanding that President Park retire Kim Jong-p'il from all party
posts in a move to pacify the students and the opposition. The
non-mainstream faction's strategy seemed to have worked as Kim Jong-p'il
130
was recalled fro. Tokyo where he was negotiating the treaty, and
later disndssed as Party Chairn^ and sent to the United States on
his second "exile." m Ki^'s absence, the
.ainstrea. Taction
.ade .
the former party President ChSng Ku-yo^ng as Acting Party President,
but the non-mainstrea^ factions were making deep inroads into the
party apparatus as well, m the reorganization of the powerful Party
Affairs Council, the non-mainstream members had ^ come to occupy almost
the sa^e member of seats as the mainstream counterparts. President
Park, who needed the absolute solidarity of the party to have the
treaty ratified, ha d apparently given in to the demands of the non-
mainstream factions of the party. The erosion of the maincurrent
faction culminated in the revision of the party charter in February
25, 1965. The anti-maincurrent factions spearheaded the movement
to attend the party constitution with the objective of establishing
supremacy of the legislators over the party's secretariat organs,
where they had little influence. The revision of party charter was
aimed at dispersing financial and personnel powers of the Director-
General and generally to shift those powers from the Secretariat
to the Central Standing Committee. "'"^^
Cto March 25, a non-confidence motion against Vice Premier.
Chang Ki-yong, was introduced by the mainstream faction of the ruling
party. Although this motion was defeated, it represented the first
169
For details of the revision, see Yu Hyok-in and Yi Chin-hi,
£2. ext., po. 111-112.
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non-conn.ence vote„ .
^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^
itself a.d reflected not onl, the growin, 3ohls. between the party
ar^ the administration but also the
.ainstrea.
^e^bers- discontent
over the increasing control of ^utical f™ds by the non-.ainstrea.
factions. The administration
-s ap^i„t.ents were heavily influenced
by n Hu-rak. the Presidential Chief Secretary who was sympathetic
to the non-nainstream factions. "'''^
After the Korea-Japan treaty was ratified, the maincurrent faction
tried to recover its weakened position by reasserting the old principle
of "party supremacy" over the administration. Chong Ku-y5ng. former
President of the party demanded that President Park dismiss those
members of the administration who had refused to work closely with
the party. The President's subsequent refusal resulted in Chang's
resignation as the Acting Chairman of the DRP, who expressed his deep
di^fapointment at the erosion of the original ideals of the party.
On September 25, under pressure from the secretariat members,
the Central Standing Committee urged the return of Kim Jong-p'il from
the United States and his reappointment as the party's Chairman
+u •
"^successful non-confidence vote of Vice Premier Changiinpending need to achieve the unity of party before the
ratification of the treaty prompted President Park to issue theDirective for Improving Organic Cooperation Between the Party andthe Government on April 8. He instructed the Cabinet to strengthen
mutual co".sultation with the party on matters of aoDointment of key
administrative posts and important government policies. This gavebirth to the regular Joint Meeting of the Cabinet and the Party
Affair Council members at the Presidential residence. For contents
of the directive, see Kinjukonghwadang( The DRP), ChSn.linun
DangkwadoDijrofA Three Year History of the DRP). pp. 3^-33.
132
ostensibly on the grounds that
.e was the only
.an who could
revive the vitality of the party and provide the necessary leadership.
As a last resort the mainstream faction attempted to purge the leaders
of the non-»ainstream factions in the reshuffling of the Assembly
leadership. In a test of strength, Lee Hyo-sang and Chang Ky^ng-sun
of the non-mainstream factions, who were the incumbent Speaker and
Vice Speaker.barely defeated the mainstream faction's candidates,
ChSng Ku-yong and Min Kwan-sik. despite President Park's pleas for
party solidarity behind Lee and Chang. Had there been no support
from the opposition members who tended to favor the moderate stand
of Lee and Chang, their reelection would probably have been unattainable.
In what was then known as the "disobedience incident." the rebellion
hy the mainstream faction. Assemblymen Kim Yong-fai and Min Kwan-sik
had their party previleges suspended for six months and two others
were reprimanded by the party's Disciplinary Committee on President
Park's order.
The DR? IJational Party Convention of December 2?. I965 elected
Kim Jong-p»il as Chairman, but it also registered the factional
strength of the non-mainstream groups. Kil Chae-ho remained as the
Director-General of the Secretariat and so did Kim Song-kon as party's
Finance Coxnmittee Chairman, both of whom had been powerful figures
in the no i-mainstream faction. Hence, as a result of the reorganization
of both the party and National Assembly leaderships in December. I965.
the non-mainstream factions, had now replaced the mainstream faction
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as the majority faction. A new r.f +set of terminology was coined.
The non-mainstream of faction was now sometimes referred to as the
-new" mainstream faction, while the mainstream faction was sometimes
being referred to as the "old" mainstream faction.
The badly wrecked opposition camp, having returned to the divided
status before the Mass Party was organized, continued to have problems.
The five intransigent followers of Yun Po-s^^n. including big names
in the opposition camp, had resigned from the party, and hence losing
their seats in the National Assembly, were now preparing yet another
new "clean-cut opposition party." They had denounced the KP and the
returning Assemblymen as "elements of the DRP rule" and condenmed
the crippled party as a "quasi-ruling party" for its "dishonorable
cooperation" with the ruling party in the ratification merry-go-around.
The five vacant seats were filled by by-elections in which the DRP
chose not to participate in a reconciliatory gesture. ^''^
The defectors met to organize a new political party under the
banner of the New Korea Party(Shinhantanr) amid little excitement
on Karch 30. I966. with Yun Po-s5n as its President and simultaneously
its presidential candidate for the forthcoming I967 election. ^"^^
Initially the new party(l^KP) was envisioned to recruit members from
'''VxijijukonghwadangCThe DRP). Chon.iinun DangkwadoDuro(A Three
Year History of the DRP). p. I56.
172Ksm Jae-hi, "Shinhantangui Kwonryok Kujo"(The Power Structure
of the New Korea Party), Sedae. June I966. pp. 115-121. As of
August, 1966, The Dong-A Ilbo stated that the New Korea Party
organized its party chapters in 76 election districts with a total
membership of 300,000.
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..e PatHerXan.. But
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to
.o...ate t.e o^t.-s Xea.e.Mp
^sUXons ana t.e Pa.t.
„o„,„ation
the fortWn, elections ™ade such a union difficult to achieve
The KP. „hose public i..a.e deteriorated badly b. its unsuccessful
^nd vacillatin. strateeies to bloc, ratification, had maintained its
position as the largest opnosition part, in the National Assembly
with 59 seats.
^.^
^^^^ ^
Virtual absence of a leader who could ta.e the rei,„s of the carty
and oeco.e the standard bearer of the party, the party, no. with a
membership of 520.000. selected a renowned constitutional scholar
and university president, but a ^litical novice, iu Chin-o^as its
leader on October 20. m accepting the party nomination. Tu explained
that he did so because the believed it to be in the national interest
to bring about a constitutional transfer of power in 1967. The
transfer of power was needed. Yu remarked in his acceptance speech,
if a less corrupt administration could be secured, if a more equitable
distribution of income in what was presently a "Zaibatsu Republic"
could be realized, if the abolition of the CIA as secret police
could be achieved, if local autonomy stipulated in the Constitution
could be inplemented, if the build-up of Korea'^foroes
A
173 .
^-
n
-ang-hi,
"I-'injun^dariFrui Seryok Punp'o"(rhe PowerConfiguration in the Lass, .arty), Sedai, Junef 1966^^^^^2-127
.
in South Vietnam could be ended anrt if =a , d if a more positive approach to
the problem of reunification could be found.^^'^
I*e exigencies of the forthcoming election once again put pressure
on the opposition forces to unite. Despite the many difficulties,
.n attempt was made to bring Yun's and the MP together. After
a painfully slow round of eleventh hour negotiations among lun Po-s5n.
ru Chin-o ar.d two other prominent politicians, a new party under the
'
name of the Kew Democratic Party was created on February 7. 196? with
only three montte remaining before the presidential election. This
union was made successful by both sides accepting the principle that
Yun was to be the new party's presidential candidate, with Yu as the
head of the party.
The 1967 presidential election saw the participation of the
socialists for the first time since the Democratic rule, but attention
was focussed on two candidates. Park and Yun. in a repeated confron-
tation of two archrivals in the I963 presidential election. The
ruling party ran its campaign on the achievement of the First Five
Year Economic Plan and on the need to have political stability to
continue with the Second Five Year Economic Plan which promised
things *
among other*^: (1) an annual economic growth rate of 8.5 percent;
(2) self-sufficiency of food by 1971; and (3) a doubling of personal
income. Depicting candidate Park as the champion of Korean moderni-
zation, the DRP carefully laid out its campaign strategies as early
174See The Choson Ilbo
. October 21, I966.
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a. .id-1966. With its total part, ^e.bership re^.ted as 1.555 867
or ate.t 11 percent of the eligible voters, the relied heavUy
'
on its quiat organizational strength.^^5
nnli.e the I963 election in which the opposition p^t. conducted
its campaign mostly on the issue of President Parkas
"illegal seizure
Of pow^r." the KDP.S strategy now seeded based ^r. on policies.
The opposition attacked Park's civilian regime as being a dictatorship
and accused it of. a„ong othe^j!,^?^!he abuse of CIA power in politics
and the protection of a few large business interests. It criticized
the government policy for making "the rich richer and the poor
nan poorer." Its own platfon, promised the guarantee of freedom of
speech, the expansion of human rights, and curbing of presidential
power by increasing cabinet responsibility, the neutralization of
the police, the realization of the local autonomy, the revision of
the Korea-Japan Treaty, and the withdrawal of Korean troops from
Vietnaa. In the economic field, the opposition platform called for
a "mass economic system" based on a balanced growth between the
agrarian and industrial sectors. It promised a 20 percent decrease
in overall tax. a 30 percent decrease in fertilizer price and the
175
Plo.t-i ^v'" ^^^^ °^
«leotions. see Soon Sung Cho, "Korea:
o« Pq!?/^'^^ Asian^SiEvei:. Vol. VIII, 1. Janui-y. 1968.
Pa;i?WffSs M68"-nn' L'"^n"^%"'^"? ^'^^ Elections"£301112 Altairs. 1968. pp. 60-70. See also Glenn D. Paige. "1966-
1967).^d!*Ii-3o! ^SimS^Svei:,
Vol. VII. „o. l(j^Zry.
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abolition or preferential loans to large busine^s.^^^
-e eleotion ret^ns s.o.e. t.at Par.-s
.annate
.or tHe oo„in.four yBars was considerably increased^ a, compared with the 1963
Of the nost remarkable tren* in this election was the • ,3up»rt Parte
.ained in the cities-Hi on C . For FarV fv,^ -u
^. .
r k the urban areas werehis fiasco ^ the previous election, m 1963 -
.
in 1963, oeoul gave only 30 2percent of the rural vote.
The Assembly mandate for the p^^p t..=ov.as even greater. Takin^ place
r — - - ^"coeeded Ll,
TO be exact, it had 130 seats whereas the ,,.P had only
.5 seats
^0 part, in Korean history had dominated the National Assembly
^ith
such an Absolute majority. The char.es of widespread eleotion
-e...ritie3 in the
.ational Assembly elections and the opposition
orxsxs. on J^y u. spontaneous demonstrations of students erunted
-
Seoul and these soon spread to provincial towns. The
.o.ernment
-lied on the old tactic of closin. the universities and promised
to rectify t..e situation by punishing those where irre.^arities
ror oorooarison of two Dartie=!' r,i« + <-i» CMn^ian-aCA Kisto:.y°ofherein
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were discovered, with the op^sition de,nandi„, the nuUiTication
or the election, the rulin, p^t.. on orders of President ParK, tried
to appease the opposition
,y expelling
.ix of its partes elected
A»se.bl:™en and b. relinquishing one seat to a candidate, but
the opposition was adamant in demanding a new election wit^ut which
the party «,^d scuttle the forthcoming National Asse.bly.177
Having failed to noWi.e the political situation, the mP
opened the tiational Assembly without the opposition
.embers, thus
starting "one party National Assembly." The constitutional provision
which prohibits one party National Assembly^^S
circumvented by
the ruling party through an ingeneous method of organizing a
negotiation group under the name of ChongW( Political Friendship
Society). The ruling party "dismissed" thirteen legislators to
form a negotiation group in October 5. 196?, and its name was changed
to Ch^a^-uhoe on December 25, 1968. The membership of this society
was stabilized to ten and was to serve a useful purpose for the ruling
party. The hard line taken by the ruling DRP opened another factional
wounds in the opposition camp. The NDP was divided on the strategies
the party should adopt vis-a-vis the ruling party. The elected
members seemed to favor a compromise with the DRP to normalize the
177Sobs 266 election nullification suits were pending in theSupreme Court immediately after the election.
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Constitution( Chapter I. Article 7, paragraph 1) states:
The establishment of political parties shall be free and the pluralparty system shall be guaranteed." Secretariat, the National
Assembly, Selected Laws Governing National Assembly of rieoublic of
Korea , p. 8.
——t
,
>»Xitical Situation; the. de^nded „e„ elections only wHe.e election
irreeuxarities had occu^ed. The. also demanded a change in election
la« With a View to ^teeing neutralization of the police and
the government bureaucracy and the punishment of cabinet ministers
^ others Who were responsible for the irregularities. A hard line
was adopted by those who were defeated in the elections: they were
demanding nothing less than a new general election. As their demands
were not satisfactorily answered, the mp kept its «,rds this
tl«e. Until a protocol was signed between the ruling and opposition
parties on November 20. 1967. the WP Assemblymen stayed out of the
Assembly. The protocol called for a "guarantee legislation" to
safeguard fair elections.
The representatives of the two parties collided on a suitable
nechanism to solve the perennial problem of fraudulent elections.
In drafting the Guarantee Legislation, the two parties conferred on.
things . *
ainong other^: tl) speeding up of election fraud litigation procedure;
(2) prohibition of interference with elections by bureaucrats;
(3) safeguarding against fraudulent balloting; (^) fair campaign
procedure; and (5) redistricting.^79 ^^^^^ negotiations
between the representatives of the two parties was a much watered-down
version of what was originally contemplated by the opposition party.
179See, The Dong-A Ilbo, December 1?, I968. p, 1 and 3. For
?n
Guarantee Legislation, see The Dong-A Ilbo, December
JO, lyoo, p. 1.
1^0
Writing about the I967 elections Cho Soon Sung stated:
+>>o P^*" eventually be seen as one of
llttlZ .Tr^'^t politicalbisto.y of Korea because the elections will havedecisively charted the course of future politicaldevelop^.ent in the country. President pSk/wS has
l^Kt^^" "^'"'f for'the lastSIX years, cannot seek another term in I971 withoutamending the Constitution. He will be oniy fin?!four years old then. But Korea has not yet witnessedgovernmental change through constitutionaline viability of a democratic change of governm-nt will^ge upon the election outcome. ?hus, the p^sldenti^and_ National Assembly elections of I967 are casting
tiieir long shadows beyond I971,
Despite the important problem of succession to President Park,
the DRF had shown a remarkable tranquility through Kay. I968 partly
due to President Park's order which forbade any activity on the
question! of succession until at least 1970. Then on May 30. I968,
the Chairman of the party, Kim Jong-p'il, suddenly resigned from his
party post and as an Assemblyman. It was clear to everyone that he
was doing so because of his disenchantment over the matter of the
expulsion from the party on May 25 of Kim Yong-t»ai. The latter had
been one of the former's proteges. His departing remark was rather
suggestive: "I am not going to return to politics. I may have an
opportunity to reveal the reasons sometimes in the future. "'"^^
180S^oon Sung Cho. od. cit
. .
p. 29, By I967 assembly elections,
the DRP had thirteen more seats than the two-thirds majority for a
constitutional amendment
.
Doner-k Ilbo, "Political Statements of the Year,"
December 30, I968, p. 3.
1^4-1
As it was revealed later Km Ycs-fai was purged by the DRF
Bi3ci=linary Co^ittee for havin, carried out an a.ti-party activity.
He was ch^,ed with factional activity creating "a party within the
party.
-
by recruiting atout 900 loyal supporters
. „ost of who. were
core ner,bers of the present and past party secretariats, under a
cover organization known as the Korean people's
.velfare
.research
Institute. A position paper published by this "institute" reportedly
advocated that they would oppose any fon, of constitutional a.end.ent
that would nake President Park eligible for a third-term. ^82 The
road to the first constitutional amendment since Park took office
In 1953 treaded a rou* road and hightened the emotiorfof the ruling
and o^TOSition politicians alike. The original mainstream faction
of the party was against it as Kim Jong-p'il seemed to have been the
only logical successor to President Park, who was a husband of his
niece. Having lost all power position in the party, the Assembly
and the government to the non-mainstream men and their sympathizers
.
the mainstream faction itself was divided as to what their strategy
B. Kim, ot). cit., d. 203.
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The Txjsition of Director-Generalshic was held by Kil Chae-ho*
the^Chairnianship of the Party Finance Coinnittee by Kirn 5^n-kon, the'
ChairE^nsliar) of the Policy Committee by Faek Nam-ok; the floor
leadershii) in the rational Assembly by Kim Chin-man; the Speakership
of the x\ational Assembly by Lee Hyo-san?:; and the TX)st of Chief
Presidential Secretary by Lee Hu-rak, All of these men, although
with Traryijig degrees of commitment, belonged to the non-mainstream
factions
.
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Should be. ivesident Park himself regained silent until the
crucial moment.
In 1968. the prospects of whether or not the government would
introduce an ax.end.ent bill allowing a third term presidency
was a subject of wide speculation. During the question-and-answer
proceedings in the National Assembly, the opposition legislators
repeatedly questioned the government's intention on this matter.^^
On December 19. the trial balloon for a constitutional amendment
was first lifted by Yun Ch'i-ySng. the acting party Chairman, in his
speech at a provincial party headquarters. Without naming what
provisions he had in mind. Yun declared that, in a developing nation
"it is important, for the sake of modernization, that one party
remains in power for an extended period time." He said further that
"the question of constitutional amendment must be viewed in the
context of our international situation. The year 1969 began with
184
Prir-e Minister Chong Il-kwon in his answer to the NationalAssembly stated on July 25, I968: "The thought of amending the
constitution enabling three terms for the President has nSt entered
my mind. I do not believe that it would be fruitful to discuss this
matter since the Constitution stipulates a four-year term for
President." The Qon?-A Ilbo, "Statement of the Year." December 30,
1968. Yu Chin-o, the IJDP Chairman stated in an interview on July 5,1968: "Since President has not answered our party's question with
regards to aaiending the Constitution in favor of three terms for
the President, we assume that the President is willing to abide by,
and respect, the Constitution." Ibid.
"tQc """"
-The Dong-A Ilbo
. December 20, 1968, p. 2.
leaders of the major parties
.aking contrasting evaluations of
the record of the government in the 1960's.^'^ Meanwhile, the
Possibili.^ Of introducing a constitutional amendment was indicated
repeatedly by certain leaders of the ruling party.
On January 7. lun reiterated his belief that the current situation
in Korea called for strong leadership in order to achieve the
"^dernization of our fatherland." and that his party was looking
into the problems in the Constitution,
"including the question of
amending the provision which prescribes presidential terms. "^^^ a
day later Vice Chairman of the party's Policy Committee. Kim Chu-in.
echoed Yun's view by stating that "it is imperative to change the
constitutional provision which forbids a third-presidential term"
in order for "a strong leader to guide the nation when it is faced
with extraordinary challenges from Korth Korea. ""^^^
ISo^
....i^resident Park in his ew ear message remarked: "TheSixties m Korea have been marked by the departure from immobilismand low posture and the progress toward the modernization offatherland." Chairman of the KDP Yu Chin-o's message struck on amore pessimistic note. "The decade started by the hope of April 19Revolution has been overturned by the Military Revolution, and wehave had the oeginning of the period of non-presence of three things-
non-presence of individuals
• dignity; non-presence of freedom of
speech; and non-presence of ix)litics. To the burden of corrupt
political power we were asked to endure sabotage." He went on to
score "three enemies": excessive exercize of political power, fraud
and corruption, and over-reaction to IJorth Korea's aggressive activitiesSee The Dong-A Ilbo, January 7, I969. p. 3.
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January 7, I969, p. 1.
Ibid., January 8, I969.
The ton of events prompted an action by the man whon the proposed
amendment was to benefit. In his press interview on January 10.
President Park stated his belief that
-.he laws should not be changed
without sufficient cause." He expressed the hope that the Constitution
would not be amended during his term of office. Ee failed to settle
the matter, however, when he added that "if constitutional changes
are absolutely necessary, it should be discussed toward the end of
the year or at the beginning of the next.-^® ^^^^^^^ ^_
President specifically instructed his party not to discuss the matter
of amendment.
But a flurry of activities in the camps of both the ruling and
opposition parties continued. The NDP floor leader. Kim long-sam.
flatly declared on January 9 that "we are opposed to any form of
constitutional amendment." The party proceeded to organize a "Struggle
Committee to Defend the Constitution" and studied the question of
whether or not the task at hand should be done in cooperation with
other political groups. The ruling party, on the other hand, in
disregard of Park's statement of January 10, proceeded to take up
the issue of amendment. Despite apparent opposition from the
mainstream faction, the party took the view that if public opinion
was favorable to such a measure, it would not be necessary to wait
until the end of the year or the beginning of the new year as Park
had suggested.
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^Ibid . . January 10, I969.
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Xb«oretioal ar.^ents, both for and against a third ter. presidency
were reminiscent of those of the 195^ constitutional a.end.ent which
allowed President Rhee a life-long car.didacy.^^O
^^.^^ ^^^^
argued that in underdeveloped countries, strong leadership is a
prereqx:isite to economic modernization, without which there can be
no western style political order and stability.
"The present situation
in Korea demands that President Park should be given another chance
to serve his nation." Yun stated, and "the people of this country
should eliminate the constitutional obstacles if it is necessary for
the good of the future of their country. "^^1 continued: ^^2
The call of the time must be answered faithfully,
^e transfer of power can be made between politicalparties or between one leader and another in the sameparty. It is equally possible that one man can remain
xn power for an extensive period if necessary. If the
^posed amendment is designed to answer the call of
tile times— raoid progress— then it must be carried
out at all costs within the framework of democracy.
The opposition argument proceeded from the premise that the
proposed amendment ran counter to the principle of constitutional
ttnu 1 .
arguments in favor of the amendment, see Yun Ch'i-yong.
"Chokukui Maeilul Wihae"(For Nation's Better Tomorrow) Chung'an :^.
October, 1969. pp. 7^78, and also his "Constitutional Amendment is
Necessitated" Koreana Quarterly
. Vol. XI. No. 3(Autumn. I969) pp. I-I3.For arguments against, see Yu Chin-o. "Xaehonun Yoksaui Kongjonida"
(The Constitutional Amendment is the Repetition of the Shameful
History), Chung 'anp, October. I969. pp. 70-?^, and Kim Chae-kwang,
"Amendssent of the Constitution Lacks Logical Foundation." Koreana
Quarterly., Vol. XI, Nc 3(Autumn. I969). pp. 14-25.
"Constitutional Amendment is Necessitated," p. 2.
"•-^^Ibid., p. 12.
I'if6
d^^oorac. ru stated on January 1? that "it has been a historical
lesson that the P„petuation o. ^iitical ^„er in one party eventually
ciegenerat.3 into a regime of corruption, injustice and dictatorship...'93
Ki™ Da«.jung, an opposition Assembly™*, and later President Parks'
foe in the 1971 presidential election, insisted that the third te™
presidency would be tantamount to a second
..coup.' and the strange and
Illogical notion that, without Park. Korea would not be able to
withstand Communist challenges and bring about modernization is a
"mere fiction that is reminiscent of the attempts to justify fthee's
political power... He concluded: "Without Rhee. Korea still stands.
The mP. having staked the party's fort^e on blocking the constitutional
amendinent when it was proposed, ordered the formation of a Struggle
Committee to Defend the Constitution in each of the party chapters
Of election districts as well as in the provincial party chapters.
The party started on its barnstorming tour in May.
The DRP, with special instructions from the President not to
discuss the matter of constitutional amendment, was to have an
agonizing time to unify the party. The ruling party had the necessary
two-thirds vote in the Assembly, but the possible "revolf of the
back-benchers and the mainstream faction required that the party
proceed cautiously on this matter. Some members of the mainstream
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Thj Dong-A Ilbo
. January 21. 19$9, p. 3.
^'^'Ibid.
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faction had earlier expressed the view that they >«,uld oppose the
constitutional a.end.ent for the sake of democracy, despite the fact
that President Park had brought to the nation unprecedented prosperity
and pride. A prelude to the oncoming stonn was provided on April 8,
1969. when some forty-five members of the ruling party crossed party
lines to pass a non-confidence motion proposed by the opposition
against Education Kinister Kwon 0-byong for his "disgraceful and
perjorative remark about the National Assembly." The crossing of
party lines was made despite the fact that both President Park and
the party apparatus had given stern warnings and instructions to
defeat the motion.
Another "disobedience incidence" resulted in the resignation
of the DRP's floor leadership and the purge of five revolting
mainstream members from the party on orders by President Park. On
April 11. the President expressed his deep disaappointment about the
division in the party, lamenting at the degeneration of the DRP into
the pathologies of the past Korean parties. He ordered the Party
Displinary Committee to deal with the rebels no matter how many there
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were. On April 15, the Disciplinary Committee expelled five
mainstream faction members of the Assembly in connection with this
incident. All five of the expelled Assemblymen had been publicly
195^
For Park's statement, see The ronp-A Ilbo
.
April 11, 1969,
p. 1.
1^4-8
opposed to the proposed amendinent.^^^
Despite Park's discouragement, the amendment issue could not
escape public discussion. Kim Jong-p-ii, the heir apparent to President
Park, broke his long silence and came out in support of the President
without specifically mentioning the issue of amendment. He stated
on April 19 that "in order to guide this country to stability and
prosperity." "it is absolutely necessary to have President Park's
strong leadership. "197 On Kay 9. the spokesman of the Democratic
Republican Party urged the people to consider the issue of amendment
"with sincerity." taking due consideration of the "twin exigencies of
reconstruction and national defense. "^^^ m Kay and June, the ruling
party went into a barnstorming tour of the country drumming up support
for the amendment. The students erupting again in campuses all over
the country; the Ministry of Education ordered early vacations for
all schools.
While the New Democratic Party was taking the lead in organizing
a pan-national Struggle Committee against the amendment. President
Park issued a special statement to the press indicating his plan to
hold a national referendum on the proposed amendment. "In the event
196On July 12, more expulsion followed. Ninety-three party
members including eleven Central Committee members and four chairmen
of district party chapters were expelled on that day. See The Dong-A
Ilbo, July 13, 1969, p. 1.
—
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The Chosyn Ilbo. April 20, I969, p. 1.
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^ Ibid
.
.
Kay 10, I969, p. 1.
1^9
that the «ent bill fails in this referenda., the statement
continued.
"I would regard it as havin, received non-confidence and
government and I win step do«,." m the sa.e statement. President
urged the rulin, party to introduce the a.end.ent bill at an earliest
possible date.^^
Having heard the final word fro. the man for who. the amendment
bill was proposed, the ruling DRP Assemblymen spent agonizing seventeen
hours in caucus in the evening and the early morning hours of July 29
and 30 in an attempt to bring the dissenting Assemblymen into the
fold. In this meeting, many mainstream faction Assemblymen were
reported to have spoken against the proposed amendment, but they
finally agreed to support the party line on this crucial vote.
Meanwhile, despite the repeated assurances by the KDF leader Yu Chin-o
that he had sufficient votes(59) to defeat the amendment bill, three
NDP Assemblymen came out on July 30 in support of the amendment. In
a legal maneuver to disqualify these three Assemblymen, the party
decided to dissolve itself temporarily on September 5- Thirteen days
later, the party rescinded its action.
On September 9. the amendment bill was introduced on the floor
of the National Assembly. After four days of discussion and having
determined that there was no chance to block the passage of the bill.
199Tb^ Dong-A Ilbo, July 25, 1969. p. 1. and The Choson Ilbo.
Jiay 26. 1969, p. 1. '
the opposition Assemblymen forcibly occupied the rostrum in a move
to interfere with the parliamentary proceedings, m the late evening
hours of September 14, however, the Speaker called the National Assembly
into session in one of its annex buildings. Present at the session
were 122 DRP Assemblymen who favored the bill, m six short minutes,
the bill was declared passed with a vote of 122 votes to none.^^O
The oray DRP Assemblymen who spoke against the bill to the end was
aging Chong Ku-y^ng. the first President of the DRP. The KDP
immediately declared this extraordinary parliamentary tactic as null
and void after an angry outburst of emotions.
As promised by President Park, the amendment question was put
to a national referendum on October 1?. m a referendum marked by
a low voter turnout, some seven-and-a-half million voters cast
affirr^ative votes; only three and a half million votes were cast
against the amendment. Only in Seoul did the majority of voters vote
against the amendment.
Korean politics in the 1960's was marked by two transfers of
governtment through unconstitutional means. First, the Student
Uprisings on April 19, I960 brought down Rhee and the Liberal Party
governzaent overnight. The latter was replaced by the government of
Chang flyon and the Democrats, who, after having been relegated to
the role of perennial opposition, had come to find that the burdens
The Choson Ilbo, September 10, p. 1. and September 13,
p. 1.
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Of power were as great, ir not greater than those of the opposition.
At the prospect of power, the Democrats split badly, eventually
leading to the break-up of the party in two. with almost equal strength.
AS so^ argued then this division could have been a health,- phenomenon
at the time when the Democrats had an overwhelming mandate to rule
the country under the newly adopted cabinet system. Unfortunately,
however, the Democrats' effort to deal with the problems of open
polity and to manage political conflict was abruptly terminated by
yet another extraordinary method of transfer of power- a military
coup.
After a brief period of military rule, the transition to civilian
rule was effected through the medium of the Democratic Republican
Party to which flocked many former military officers. As a carefully
planned and well funded political party, the DRP launched on an
ambitious road to realize party politics based on policy commitments
transcending personality-centered political parties of the past.
In election after election, the party displayed its quiet organizational
stren^h with its salaried party functionaries and unprecedented
effective central coordiantion. Institutional ties were developed
in order to have party policies and platforms reflected in the
policies of the administration.
It 15 premature, however, to say that the DRP has completely
overccane the past ills of Korean parties. The problem of factionalism
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manifested on several occasions represents a .ajor cancer of the party,
although thus far President Park has prevented an open split of the
party. The original ideal of party politics has been compromised
because the party secretariat organization has relinquished more ar.d
wore power to the party's National Assemblymen.
The opposition parties, however, have shown no internal improvement.
The emergence of crisis brought the opposition politicians together
on occasion as during the Liberal Party regime, but the party had to
endure the perennial problem of factionalism, the struggle for the
hegemony of the party, and even an open split of the party. An
ineffective collective leadership, one of the notable characteristics
of the opposition party structure, continued through most of the
1960's; the party's image deteriorated through a series of bungling
and other poUtical errors; it failed to recruit fresh blood to its
ranks.
The development of Korean parties in the 1960's is summarized
in the following geneological diagrain(Diagram 2).'
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CHAPTER III IDEOLOGY. OROANIZATIOK AND LEADKiSHIP
OF MAJOR KOREAN PARTIES
Ideology
At the ti.e of the liberation Korea found herself divided along
the thirty-eighth parallel for the purpose of disarming the Japanese
troops by the Allied forces. This military expediency had left a
fateful ir,print on the ideological and political development in
Korea and on the nature of party politics. This military division
developed into a political one, with each of the two occupying powers
sponsoring a regiine to its liking when they could not agree on the
method of unification. The division was perpetuated by the continuing
inability to agree on the method of unification, by a brutal war,
and by frequent military provocations from the North.
In the onrush of foreign ideologies amidst the excitement of
liberation, the traditional Korean political thought remained a
mere ineffectual echo. Various imported ideologies competed to win
the place of the dominant ideology of the nation, but never were
these ideologies allowed to compete freely: the adoption of liberal
democracy can be attributed more to the vicissitudes of international
-to
politics than^any other factor in domestic politics. In the era of
confrontation among Weltanschauung parties in the immediate postwar
era, there were four discernible policy differences. The first of
these was represented by the Korean Democratic Party and the KARKI.
An analysis of the platforms and policies of these two groups would
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indicate that the. la. On the extreme right of the Korean
.Htical
spectn:m._^ Espousing the ideology of liberal democracy and the
freedo. or ^ individual
.
they favored a free economic system, e.ual
opportunity for all. particularly in the field of education. As far
as their policy of unification was concerned, they advocated unification
under a democratic system and through mediation by the United Nations.
On the thorny issue of land reform, they were in favor of it.
although they insisted on compensation for the distributed land.^
To the Korean Independence Party, the overriding ideology was
that of nationalism, through which the party .ought to solve
complex problems of the chaotic era. it advocated unification
through the efforts of the Koreans under a republican form of
government. In economic policy, it favored a planned economy and
redistribution of land with compensation. One of its notable social policies
was free, compulsory education. Except for its emphasis on
nationalism, the KIP's platforms did not differ much from the KDP's.
Of the two class parties, the Laboring People's Party was the
party of socialist inclination. It advocated nationalization of the
nation's financial and industrial enterprises; redistribution of land
without compensation and government ownership of the land; and
liberation of laborers through the proclamation of a laborers'
ror platforms and policies of theae parties, see Yi Ki-ha,
22' cit., and Han T'ae-su. Hankuk Chon^dangsa(A History of Korean
Political Parties) and The Central Election Management Committee.
Taehanrninkuk Chon.^angsa(A History of Korean Political Parties).
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Charter. In unification policy, the party, as the KIP. called for
a self-reliant unification under a democratic system. The South
Korean Co.^ist Party, like all Co^u::ist parties, proposed a radical
pro^ra. for the nation, the contents of which were similar to those
of the Laboring People's Party. It naturally advocated unification
under Communist auspices and constantly supported the Russian position
In the United States-USSR Joint Conference.
Kever were these differences in policies allowed to bloom in
the complex international and domestic situation to which the nation
was subjected in the postwar era. Since her independence, the policy
of anti-Comrnunism was adopted and elevated to the plane of national
policy. This unalterable policy seems to have prevented the development
of nationalism for. as one author has put it, "if nationalism were
allowed to develop without ^governmental restraint, it was apparent
that it could diminish the importance of anti-Communism to the point
of constitutin/T a threat to the stability of the regime in South
2Korea." The ideological wasteland thus created failed to evoke
participation in politics.
2
K. W. Kim, "Ideology and Political Development in South Korea,"
P^c^f^c Affairs
.
Vol. 3^. Summer, 1965. p. 166. For the treatment
of^ideolori-cal problems in Korean politics, see Yi Yonr-il. "iiankuk
Chonpch'i <iasan;Tui Ketaborism"( The Metabolism of the Korean Political
Thou^-ht). Sasanrvie. February, 196a. pp. 133-1^3, and So Jun--sok,
"Yinyon^C:\or-danrun Tabuinka?"(Are Ideological Parties Taboo?),
Chonrrkyonrr Yon Vu
. December, I969, pp. 97-10^.
Fro. the point of view of party clitics, the consequences of
anti-Communism may be viewed in ter^ of. first, the complete
domination of the political scene by the right wing conservative
parties and the resultant elimination of the socialist parties, and.
second, by the restriction of party programs and activities to a
narrow, cleaxly defined political framework. Here, the conservatism
of Korean parties does not mean that the parties adhere to the status
quo and rejection of the change of it. They are conservative in the
sense that they aim at gradual evolutionary process of equalizing
political, social, economic, educational opportunities under the
banner of liberal democracy without advocating a revolutionary change
of the status quo. Also, they are so called because their platforms
and oolicies advocate those which are in direct opposition to the
position of the North Korean Communists.
The Rhee government was from the outset beset by increasing
Communist agitation and violence. It outlawed the Communist Party
and allowed the arrests of Communists and their "fellow travelers."
This law has been subsequently strengthened by several amendments.
A similar anti-Communist law was enacted in July. 196I by the military
regime to strengthen the anti-Communist posture of the nation. Often,
this anti-Communist legislation was flagrantly abused by the government
to suppre<^s its political opposition, vocal students, and the press.
In the arena of international politics, an advocacy of even a
neutralism has been regarded by the succeeding regimes as dangerous
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and as in violation of national security legislation. In domestic
politics, this absolute oo^it^ent to anti-Co^unism as an unalterable
policy nade the line very thin bet«een democratic socialism and
Communism*
It Is no wonder that in the absence of a suitable ideology,
such near-ideology as Ilminchui, or "One People Principle^' should
be introduced by Rhee and his lieutenants in the 19^6- period.
This "philosophy," a manifestation of nationalism, elevated the
principle of national unity as a supreme goal. "Our supreme objective
is to carry on our affairs by sacrificing everything and uniting into
one." "Special interests," which have been the bane of the nation,
were said to deny the "true soul" of the nation, transmitted through
heredity, which longed for unity of action and will.^ This ineffective
and poorly disseminated "philosophy" never caught fire among the masses
and it became a mockery of the intellectuals. At any rate, with Rhee's
election as President and the achievement of comparable unity, this
philosophy was discarded.
In the absence of a symbol to which party elites and the rank
and file members are bound, the only practicable way of holding a
party together was to make an all-out appeal to follow the charism.atic
3See Koh Kwang-il, In Quest of National Unity and Power ;
Political Ideas and Practice of S.-'/nrrma'i £thee( Unpublished Ph. D
Disserta,tion: Rutgers University, 1963). See alscCregory Henderson,
op
. ext., p. 28^.
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ieader. The first of the three provisions of the oath of the Liberal
Party, for example, stated: "I uphold and whole-heartedly support
Chair^n Knee's spirit of patriotism and independence.'^ A Liberal
Party doe^ent published just prior to the I960 Student Uprising,
expounded this non-ideology as follows:^
0'^"5 to the brilliant guardianshio of our PresidentCoyn^an ^ihee] and wise leadership of Speaker Yi^fif?Cjpeaker of the National Assembly, ?956ll960 a^d rll^^
jade a steady orogress and has come to emer^^as astable political force despite insurmountable nattnn.iproblems and crisis. Without the S^ant leadeJshS
1'
a\To1refL'rt TM'^^'^: ^ the'a^t e^^,an ±±-out effor on the part of our members t+
ri^L'"^ !;^" ''^^ p-^^' tSt n:uer/:urnation could have preserved its identity.
i^liile the ruling party appealed for loyalty to the charismatic
leader, it authorized political activity only to such political
assemblies or organizations that could be considered to belong to
the conservative right. The ideologies of the middle of the road,
such as democratic socialism, and the leftist groups were not
permitted. That anything approaching leftist ideas was a taboo in
Korean politics can best be illustrated by the fate of the Progressive
Party and its leader Cho 3ong-am. The party was officially organized
on November 10. I956 after its leader Cho Bong-ain gained more than
4
Jayudang(The Liberal Party), Jayudangui Op.iokkwa Sich'aek(The Accor.plishments and Policies of the Liberal Party), (Seoul-
Jayudang, February. I960), p, 26?,
^Ibid,. p. 11.
two million votes in the May presidential election th.fx j. x at year. Though
a forrser Communist, Cho renounced the partv in iqL^ .y m 192^.3 and was considered
an anti-Communist thereafter.
The Progressive Party and its leading members including Cho
were implicated in an espionage case in January. 1958. The claims
of an extensive contact with the party leaders by an indicted soy
pr^^pted the government to carry out a mass arrest of party leaders.
The
^J^erment elataed before the court that the party's platform
which
,
for the unification through peaceful means was identical
With the North Korean slogan and hence
"jeopardized the existence
of the Republic." It also considered subversive an article w-itten
by Cho in the October, 1957 issue of the Progressive Party magazine
Chunslang ChSn^ch'i because it supported all-Korean elections as a
way of bringing about unification. In addition to the charges of
illegal possession of a weapon, Cho was held for accepting large
sums of money from Korth Korea for use in his 1956 presidential
election campaign.
Vrithout waiting for the decision of the court, the Office of
Public Information cancelled the publication license of the Chung 'ang
Chon^ch'i on February 24, 1958. and on the following day, it announced
the caxicellation of the formal registration of the Progressive Party.
The Director of the Office of Public JrLformation declared that the
action was taken on the basis that the Progressives "advocated means
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Of Korea. uniTication «hich are contrary to the la» of Republic of
Korea and the resolution of the United r.ation="; that the "constant
touch" beUeen the ft-ogressive Party a,J the Co^unists in North
Korea disqualified it as a legal ^litical party; and that the party
had sought to elect converted Cor»uni3ts ai,d their fellow travelers
to the National Asser,bly and thus subvert democratic institutions
in the republic.^
m the court proceedings that began in March, I958 and ended
in February. 1959. Cho was sentenced to death on charges of espionage,
violation of the National Security Law and illegal possession of arms.
The outlawing of the Progressive Party was to serve as a sober
reminder that the government would not tolerate the advocacy of
programs and policies that diverged from the officially set policy.
^
Since the Korean society lacks cleavages along the lines of
social classes, the Korean parties may be described as parties of
social integration, to use Sigmund Neumann's terminology. In the
socio-economic milieu in which anything approaching leftist inclinations
are not permitted, the existing conservative parties paid lip service
to what a social democratic party elsewhere might espouse. Whatever
these conservative parties may say in their platforms they were
—
z
The Dong-A Ilbo. February 25, 1958, p. 1.
For a brief history of the progressive movement and difficulties
encountered by it, see Yi Sang-du, "Chesam Chongch'i Seryi^kui
Yokchong"(A History of the Third Political Force), Sasanr'^e. AuPiist.
1968, pp. 110-118.
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mostly exercises i„ political rhetoric. Hence the . •n analysis of theparty policies and platforms does not offer
.
, , ,
^'^^^'^
^ meaningful insightinto Korean parti.-?s.
The non-issue contents of partv i^in+f-^y plat orms on campaign pledges
are veil illustrated by a comparison of the i960 •xn 1 5 campaign pledges
of the two ma.lor t>arti*»<! +v, t -r.
,
8
" ''-'^ I960 presidential
election. The Liberal Party promised, among other things, the
"elevation of public sense of morality" and the "d. 1a evelopment of new
ethics" based on democratic ideals: establishm. . .J ent of a self supporting
economy, improvement of Korea s international payment position; en-
couragement of agriculture, fisherv «nH ^
.
i y a d forestry, strengthening the
function of agricultural coonerat W^c= .p ives; encouragement of small and
-e.iu..si.e. enterprises; encouragement or consumption o. ao.estic
products; readjustment of the taxation system; strengthening of
international
.ends to establish collective security; and strengthening
Of economic diplomacy.
The Democratic Party, on the other hand, presented their pledges
in the following terms: realization of a cabinet responsibility
.yste. and abolition of authoritarianism, revision of the new security
"A Re!ie: orP^JtrcIr^L^rA^t^iirt" --^l-^ fro™ „an T-ae-su.
Korean Affairs
. Vol 2. No t QqS^t " ' " (1955-1960 ),"
Park Hee-bura.-'poiriicli Pa^-t, J . ^ 318-330. See also
Koreana .uart^r^v^ ^^^r^:-^::! ?sL!:r5ri96?:^=r ^39-i:3:"^^'"
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and local autonomy laws, removal of political pressures on labor,
agricultural, youth, women's and other social organizations,
non- interference by the executive branch in the affairs of^he
Judiciary, decentralization of police, fair management of elections,
remove of violence and the social vices, abolition of monopolization
of economic resources by a limited and privileged class. stabUization
Of agricultural and fishery economy, fair taxation and the lowering
of taxes.
The ruling and the opposition parties alike accepted liberal
democracy without apparently believing in the values. The ideology
of liberal democracy was a convenient tool to combat Communism, w'hen
necessary, however, the processes and the values which liberal
democracy represented could be circumvented. Almost an immediate
acceptance of the military coup in I96I. even in the intellectual
circles, is an eloquent illustration of how superficial the parties'
belief in liberal democracy had been. Highly visible and emotional
struggles between the parties have not been lacking, but rarely on
substantive issues. This has occurred because the opposition parties
have questioned the very legitimacy of the way in which the ruling
party has cone to power and maintain it. Eence the struggles
sometimes begin and end with matters of procedure without ever
reaching the matter of substantive policies.
In more recent years, the Democratic Republican Party with its
ideology of "nationalistic democracy" (sometimes called the Koreanized
democracy) tried to fill the gap in the ideological wasteland. The
concept was not given full elaboration and the DRP's leaders themselves
often disagreed among themselves, but. in its roughest form,
nationalistic democracy can be described as a formula which combines
liberal democracy with nationalism for modernization under the leadership
of a nationalist elite. The principles of democracy, developed in
the >/est, should not be imported to an Asian nation like Korea at
the time of modernization. Liberal democracy, this ideology seems
to say, should be "Koreanized" to fit the peculiarities of the
Korean society and must be based on constructive nationalism. Only
through this accomodation, Korea should be able to recover iU self-
consciousness(or self-identity)
. In order to do so, at this tran-
sitional period, a strong driving force imbued with a nationalism
or modernization and dedicated to creating a liberal society should
o
be secured. The founding declaration of the Democratic Republican
Party in its elaboration of liberal democracy stated the following
The liberal democracy which we aim at is not a
unidemensional one. By readapting it to the
peculiarties of the Korean situation, we should be
able to escape from the retarded development of our
9-
isee X. B. Kim, oo. cit.
, pp. 20^205. For President Park's
political thinking, see Park Chung Hee, Our hat ion's Path ( Seoul;
Dong-A Publishing Co., 1962), especially pp. 207-2^^?.
^S'Iinjukonghwadang(DR?), Min.jukonrhwadan? Sanyonsa(A Four Year
History of the DRP) (Seoul: The DA? Headquarters, 196?), pp. 32-33.
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society. .!/
^0^";ij^^^^,:f,,*^/2'i2
"'h*"^^*
^inciple that our trLi'So'^^aluebe recof^nized- nst-innoT -i^ vaxu systems should
The Ke» Democratic Party, on the other hand, explained its
acceptance of liberal democracy in the followin,
.a„„er in 1968=^
safe^S;S^lJ:,:,^,^\^j,ty'"^otT1
"esin? ItlT.
^^-^-^ Sra^tLT^hr^'-^'^
nation into a syndrome of fear under' Se ^r tex^"of anti-Comnunism. Our partv ah<!oi„t=i„
'^^^^^^
such basic liberties as frTloTlfllZrZ""''''
assembly, and elections. Eelieving thafS*develo™,ent of a healthy parliamentary democracya^d the attainment of peaceful transfer of »wer
"coeds' ^t^^" the failurTor
the e^.?f.
d^^ocracy, we will struggle to
While advocating the ideology of liberal democracy, both parties
have been placing a great emphasis on social welfare policies. In
its founding declaration, the DR? stated that it will "uplift the
people's standards of living by adopting a free enterprise system
and by rational economic planning."^ The opposition WP stated
„f A M: Dangul Klbon B--jt;ch'iM(The Easic Policiesof OurParty) (Seoul: The mp Headqua?t;;:Fn968)
.
p.
^linjukonghwadang, op. oit., p. 9.
in its policy paper that the party "aiMs at the development of an
•eoonony for the people-.
^^^.^^.^^
Jargon. i„ the policies of toth parties is significant. Factors
both internal and external to toth ^ties inhibited then, fron,
espousing radical welfare policies.
A comparison of the I967 presidential election campaign pledges
of toth parties reveals that the basic policies of the ruling and
opposition parties had not had a significant change fro. the 1950.S.
alttough the emphasis had shifted and the policies were better
elatorated. The ruling DRP defended its modernization program and
the Fi^st Five-Year Economic Flan and emphasized the need for having
r«>litical stability to carry out the Second Five-Year Economic Plan,
which promised.among other things, a 8.5 percent annual economic
growth rate, self-suffiency of food by 197I, doubling of per capita
income, creation of jobs for two million by I971. and salary increases
for r,ilitary personnel and public officials. The opposition program
was remarkably sinilar to that of i960 discussed earlier. It accused
the DRF regime of corruption, dictatorship and abuse of power by the
CIA m politics^and the protection of big business which tended to
make the rich man richer and poor man poorer. It called for the
"econo^ for the people" based on balanced growth between the agrarian
and industrial sectors. The rest were familiar: the guarantee of
Shinmindang, og. oit.. p. 11.
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freedom of speech, the expansion of human rights, neutralization of
the police, realization of local autonomy, the curbing of presidential
power, revision of the Korea-Japan Norr.alization Treaty and the
withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam.
Organization
Organizational Fragility. As Maurice Duverger stated, a party
organization "constitutes the general setting for the activity of
members, the forms imposed on their solidarity: it determines the
machinery for the selection of leaders, and decides their powers. "^^
The organizational structure of a political party often explains
"the strength and efficiency of certain parties, the weakness and
inefficiency of others. "^^ The absence of a strong organizational
base in Korean parties is one of the most widely condemned features
of the structure of Korean parties. For example, a student of
Korean political parties assessed the weakness of Korean parties in
the following terms. "^^
Korean parties^ are almost oblivious to their
orgarization. Subsequently, parties organize their
networks in consideration of the fame of their
candidates and their personal dignity as recognized
in local areas, and the candidates of their party
14
Maurice Duverger, 0£. cit.
, p. i^,
^^o Yong-bok, "Political Parties and Factionalism, Koreana
Quarterly , Vol. 9, No. 2(Summer. 196?), p. 16.
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through h^aT^elSSfw^'l"^
"ho, in a varying dllrll L -^""^^ Patrons
authorityr itlS sl^ft"'" '•eputatlonteve their oln orga^LaSL T' f^i^^i^ "hothe party headqwS" is T ^ thati^ation based on r.t " =n .7°^" °' ^ organ-
"ith irifluential o^Jy leaders ^f^h'""'tbroueh nrpmnrio^r,' T -^^^ae in the oaDital
WentiJ^'^^ith ' "1?^^"/"^^*^°"= ^ thereby
oerson^ S;^itf'^"''^ in Which
'
ideology S^rlLSattT^*^
The idea of cohesive political parties .ritv,
„„ ,
'^^^^ "^^'^ permanent organizations
on the central and local levels is a rei =f ,
.
" ^ relatively recent development
-
the Korean ^litical sense. The introduction of the Political
Party Lav in 1963 vhich required party affiliation in ord^r/St""^^
candi^tes for hoth the presidential and National
.ssemhly elections
helped to stabilize the number of parties, but previous to that
Korean parties were characterized by intra party split, one-man
political parties and abundance of independent politicians without
party labels.
For example, in the 1948 general election some 48 parties
cor,pet«i for Assembly seats and the astonishing fact was that 25
parties ran, only one candidate each. The sheer number of parties
participating in the past Assembly elections indicated in Table 3^7
is enough to show the ephemeral nature of Korean parties and party
1?
~
,
v^'J^® Central Election Kana=^ement Comrnittep yXi^Ho^ y • ^Son 'go 3an£hwan£(l967) (The Past fv^f inn=?T u-f ^^Mae Kukhoewiwon
i6q
::rr' ^ ----^ ----
hUf Of the n.ttonal electorate cast their votes for 1 .independent's,
.n4 33 per«„t or the Asse.M.„e„
„ere independents. Ta.le
,4n4i§ates that Boli ti' r>i ar,o < •p c ans jo.ned and abandoned political parties
All Of these data see„ to point to the fact
^hat the Korean parties lacked institutionalization.
I^^iiSnalis^ A „eaK part, organisation inevitahl,
,i.es rise
to factionalism. This appears to he particularly true in
the opposition parties. The reasons are not too difficult
to find. The ruling parties, hoth the LP and the DRP. re-
sulted their „e«hers individually and without regard to the
latter-s previous party affiliations. Their party „e„hers were
»0,e easily united under the centripetal force of governmental
pover. The opposition parties - the DP and the .DP. were for.ed
by splinter groups as a result nf -o a consolidation process in this
struggle against the ruling party at the ti.e. As one observer has
put It." an opposition party in Korea is the product of factional
power struggles and Is largely Motivated by res Is t an ce . "^^ Hence
1
8
ibi_d-. pp. 71. 1TJ+-75
.
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, 328, kkS-hkg,
cZizittiLi: Ko:h^ar""-(;he°sfr*^ 't''' """""'^ -^—'^
Candidate., ^^Tr^-. ' J ^^^'^^ Nomination of Party
V^U u! I^Tl" p? loSf''^ °^^"^^P^"'i^"t3). HankuK Chon.ch i ^Ha.Wh.
20
.
•
K»B. Kim> ag_. cit ,
, p. 223,
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Table 3. ^Jumber of Farf-i<=Q ^ •
^f^^ies Contesting in National
Assembly Elections.
Constituent Assembly
2nd National Assembly
3rd National Assembly
^th National Assembly
5th National Assembly
6th National Assembly
7th National Assembly
8th National Assembly
Contesting
Parties
kQ
39
Ik
Ik
14
12
11
6
Parties Having 10 or
less Candidates
30
10
10
8
1
1
Table k. Percentage of Seats and Votes Won by
Independents in National Assembly Elections.
1948-1960.
Constituent Assembly 42.5
2nd National Assembly q
3rd National Assembly 33.4
^th National Assembly 11,6
5th National Assembly 2I.I
Average 33.7
Won'hf ^"^'^ Percentage of Votesby Independents won by Independents
40.3
62.9
47.9
21.7
46.8
Average 43.9
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Table 5. Party Crossing m the National Assembly
Constituent Assembly 198
2nd National Assembly 210
3rd National Assembly 203
^th National Assembly 232
5th National Assembly 231
6th National Assembly 175
7th National Assembly 175
From Party
to Party
Party to
Independent
Independent
24 3
250 106
61 98 161
6 116 92
95 1 91
0 2 1
0 63 63
the previous ties of the
.e»bers of the newly created opposition
party became the basis of subsequent oleavages.
.aotionalis. i„ an
opposition party „ade it difficult to have a single leader, and
the p,rty often operated under a supreme oo™,ittee structure, which,
nore or less registered the factional strength of the party. The
'
opposition practice of choosing different
.en as the party head and
the presidential candidate is a reflection of the factional maneuvering
for political rewards. On a slightly lower level, the Political Affairs
CounciK previously the Leadership Council) had a similar practice
of taking note of the factional strength of the party.^^
P=.t ,'J°i ""-so^ffions of factional ali-nments in the IS" see
"Sh^tangnrhe New Democratic Party). ^S^^nlS, ty:T9X'pp. 82-103,
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As we bave seen earlier, the ruling D^P has .Tc^-^S ^ ^^ ^ also experienced
r.=t™... Hoover. case
.
econo^e leverages which the top leadership of the part, can
-IpuXate. xt has also
.een c.r.e. to a considerate decree the
presence of the part, leader who see^s to have a passionate disli.
for such tendency. President Park Chung Hee expounds! on the need
to have a strong discipline a.ong the ranks of party
.embers, especially
on the level oX party elites. In his speech to the DRP-s National
Party Convention on Dece,nfcer 27, I965. President Park en^erated
ideology, policy and leadership as prerequisites^"'^ a "™,dern"
political party and stated that "if any one or more of these pre-
requisites are missing, „e cannot call it a party, and it cannot
perform the function of a political party." While he believed that
party had fulfilled the first two conditions marvelously. he
stated that the DfiF lacked discipline. One should quote hi. at some
length on this point.^^
The question of discipline in the party still
remains in the dark. Since a political party is an
organization made up of many persons, it is imperativeto have discipline in order to maintain order and to
22
(Cnllf^J^^^^ Pom-sik, Chungdariian{^ni;.n.-^n Sferi Ha.llmothanda
cS?SdW ^qS?' president Park Chimg Hee) I^^-.-H^S ^L^Tll 1968) p. 223. For another appeal by President Park
^ ft^ : discipline and to el:lminate middle-level bosses
di<?;^n^-^''
occasion of his instruction to ourge thesse ting i^.P Assemblymen, see The Dong>A Ilto, Aoril 11, 1969 p 1
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Sscim': S l^Tfe'oT'°"- " =^ ^^i^ that
exaggeration to say that it iJ if i "°
A pa:-ty nember muS foUo^ tS ™r?fand obey the orrani,,*- 5 P^t^ guidelines
stage, Jll
^e^be'S^L^'^a'tiS fF«rty policy is dete™inS! hCSylr^aU-.e^S"' ^
le^" """^ this policy? ^his^Sdemocracy and a democratic c»litioal r^L
if political party can stani fir^Jv w^ k
in the «>st Visible te™s. the organizational fragility of the
Korean parties ^y be sho«, by the 1969 fig^es for the number of
party offices, general party members, and the district party m«t«rs.23
As the following table indlcatss ,^-!tv, iui e , with the exception of the incumbent
DRP. not a single party was able to maintain its district offices
in all of the con3tituencies(142). although the m? came close to
having this number.
Partz gembershin
. Despite the fact that about I5 percent of the
eligible voters in 1972 are registered as members of political parties,
the concept of party membership in Korea is a baffling phenomenon.
Each party has set up an elaborate procedure for acquiring party
membership, but these procedures are for the most part paper require-
ments only. Given the unwillingness of many Koreans to openly
the Centr?l"T»;!?; — ^''^^ ^""^ ^^S^^^ ^re compiled by•cn ;,entra ileotion Management Comaiittee. f
<=u ujr
Table 6. District Party Offices and
Memberships of Parties, 1969
Number of Average
District District
Offices Membership
Democratic Republican Party 132 1.334 8Q? y,^oi
Unification Korean Party 48 9 'J^nf t (j^ 162
JTiJstice Party 42 7.00'^ loy
Kass Party 67 ^97,541 7,425
People's Party 55 24,218 440
Unified Socialist Party 46 10,885 237
Liberal Democratic i-arty 46 3,026 66
Democratic Party 71 28,254 398
New D^nocratic Party 121 158,785 1,312
Ibtal 658 2,072,356 3,248
identify with a political party,^^ research on party membership has
been a most frustrating task.^^ m one survey of party membership
24See Eim Kyu-t'aek, od. cit.. p. 9.
25 —The Korean voters themselves appear to be baffled by the
concept of party membership. One survey asked the question: »^o
are the party members?" The results are as follows:
A person who filed an application for membership(34.5 percent)A person who pays party dues (5.5 percent)
A person who agrees with the objectives and policies of a
particular party(38.6 percent)
A person who is obliged to vote for party nominees(12.2 percent)
p. 67
^"0^9.2 percent). See Cho Il-mun and lun Kyong-u, o£. cit..
^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^^
.
dxfferenee beWeen the D.P and the ,J)P ^e.bers.^^
Party member elicribil i
^= determined by the FoliticalParty Law. Articl*^ 17 +v,- .
-^-^ -Lcai
17 Of this law defines the qualification of aparty xnember as "any cersnn ^rhr.
'
- to vote for the electionof members or the National Assembly, "2? but n..f v^» c , party membership is
t^rohibited to public officialuix is, officers of the <^fs + c. v.u_ Ln state-run corporations
and a., othe.
...ersons whose politioal activities are prohibited b.
an. other law or decree. The latter provision diso,anfies students
and the nation's school teachers to beco.e
.art.
„e.bers. xhe le.al
barriers set for these ,ro.ps are conde^ed b. so.e as unr.cessar.
and ha^f^ restrictions that should be softened considerably. One
political scientist has argued as follows:^^
~::^^r;ooSL"ST?? have
those Who ar^-ttt lUtlllTTtZ'tyTorT
26
Cho Il-mun, od. cit., p. 1^23.
Selecte^''r:s'^1e;nS^ "S^"^ ^'f"^'^ °f "^^P^^^^^ ^orea.
p. 180, — ^ ^iiional >u,sembly of .lepublic of Korea.
28
Fu.ctions^'^;:?^,;2S':^ C^r^dan^i Kinungkwa Yokkinu^."(The
Yon'^u, IJo. 25 p onofpH ^-^^^^J/^^l^tical Party). Chon.^ky^n..^. i^ p. y^, qu ted m Cho Il-mun, od. cit., p. 33^.
"
The ruling party claims to have as its members ateut one-tenth
of the total electorate, but the indications are that a great
proportion of these have not actively sought membership, but passively
gave in to the pressure from various^ sources
. At any rate, many of
these party "members" do not wish to'ldentified as such in public.
Under these circumstances it is easy to see how difficult the
recruitment of the opposition party members might be.
As of 1969, the DRP registered 1.334.892 members with the Central
Election Management Committee and the KDP. I58.785. In terms of
activities carried out, the DRP also surpassed the major opposition
party, but it should be noted that despite the inferior numerical
strength, the IJD? had also carried out a fairly wide-ranging
activities which are summarized in the following table compiled by
the Central Election Management Committee( Table 7).^^
The mP. The most notable characteristic of the DRP is the well
developed organizational structure which no other party in the past
could match. As discussed in Chapter II, the DRP was launched
preenptively before political activities were permitted by the
military government, in accordance with the "Kim Jong-p'il Plan."
This plan, prepared secretfcly by some leading political scientists
in Korea at the time called for a party that would be operated by
c^dre of
a statae, on-going party functionaries rather than by members of
29Quoted in Cho Il-mun, oo. cit., p. 340.
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Table 7. Activities and Meetings of Major Parties,
1969. '
DRP
112
32
7^
1* Activities to strengthen
and reinforce party structure I90
2. Meetings:
a. Provincial party conventions 23
b. Standing committee meetings 206
c« Subcommittee meetings I53 i^i^
d. Party member unity meetings 772 11
3. General activities:
a. Propaganda activities 228 90
b. Training of party members 1,52^ 32
c. Reports 8? 32
d. Rallies on constitutional
amendment 287 211
e. Public opinion surveys 28 2
f
.
Service activities 148 67
the National Assembly as had been the case of so many previous parties,
The organizational ideas contained in the Kim Plan was compromised
with the passage of time but the basic features of the original
structure has remained up to the present time and the DR? organization
still remains a potent machine.
A text published for the ne.bers of the ruling part, stated
the party's organizational principles as follo.ra.3°
and rtfi:it'1rLThe\"So\:rSiL°nti'=
f^flT^°Vl '""^ P-ty^-? dfte™in:d1h;ou'?'
proc^d^^eflL par^rLslnsur^'H °' 1e.oorati=
organs. in tituted representative
J*"^
policies thus obtained throu-h der-ooratio
?:r:sr:;e StioT' rer\L:~i "^^^
fulTill the expressed will of the party rnerr.be^sThis executive oower extends to ali party me'be;sthrough the existing organs of the party!
Of the two oreans- the representative and the executive-
the original founders of the DRF en^sioned.
. t.e latter°be the
operational headquarters of the party that would control not only
the party's local branches but also its National Assemblyn^en and
the government. The Secretariat structure was established on
March, 1963 with I.30O permanent members. Some 3OO paid party
members worked at the Party Headquarters, 20 to 30 at each of the
provincial or city branches, and 6 at each of the I3I district
offices.^1 The Central Secretariat consisted of four departments,
one board, one office, one bureau.' which altogether had 48
sections.
30
^
Kirgukonsrhwadanc^CThe Democratic xlepiJblican Party)
Tangwon K^^bonCManual for the Party Members)
,
(Seoul-
hinjuKone:hwadancr, I970), d. I58.
B. Kim, op. cit., p. 186.
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Soon thereafter, however, the Secretariat membership was reduced
considerably. This was brought ateut after the disenchanted Assembly,
men In th^ non-mainstream faction had criticized it. It was originally
conceived that party personnel at the center, provincial or district
offices be recruited and staffed entirely independently of the
National Assemblymen. This single command structure envisaged, for
example, that the district party organization might be headed by a
person who was not necessarily a member of the National Assembly or
a candidate for that body. Even if an Assemblyman served as the
party chief in a district, he would be forbidden to have appointive
and directive oower over party affairs and personnel. All matters
concerning the district party offices would be directed and managed
by the Central Secretariat, and the Assemblymen's function would be
merely that of representing his district in the Assembly. The gradual
weakening of the central command structure culminated in the charter
amendment of February. 1965 which gave more or less a free hand to
the local district party head, usually the Assemblyman from the
district, in the operation of local party offices.
The present charter of the Democratic Republican Party designates
the National Party Convention, held once every two years, as the
32supreme governing body.-^ Composed of a President, a Chairman.
32The present charter amended^as of June 1?. I971 is found in
its entirety in Cho Il-mun, Sae Chongdangron(A Kew Theory of
Political Parties), pp. 58I-587. s^e also Minjukonghwadang( The
Democratic Republican Party), op. cit
. .
pp. 137-138.
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Party Affairs Council members, the Party's national Assemblymen, and
delegates from the party's district offices, it elects the party
President and approves the President's
.election of a party Chai^an.
It is also empowered to elect the Central Committee, consisting of
less than 1.800 members „ho,in turn, elect the Central Standing
Committee made up of 300 to 500 members. The latter body functionsboard
as a sounding
^ that approves the decision of the party's leadership.
The President of the party supervises and controls all party
offices. Having the ultimate decision-making power all party
personnel, he can request reconsideration of any decision made by
the Party Affairs Council. The Party Chairman carries out day-to-
day affairs of the party on orders of the President. As a presiding
officer of the Party Affairs Council, he nominates all important
party officers, subject to approval by the President, including the
Director-General of the party's Central Secretariat.
The most powerful decision-making organ of the Democratic
Republican Party is the Party Affairs Council composed of no more
than fifteen members. Ex
-officio members are the party Chairman,
the Chairman of the Policy Committee, the Director-General of the
Central Secretariat, the Floor Leader of the party in the National
Assembly, the party's Vice-Speaker of the National Assembly and the
Minister without Portfolio. Although its decision can be vetoed by
the party i^resident and needs technical approval of the Central
Standing Committee, all major party matters are determined by this
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Council. Its r^ior powers include decisions on the party's basic
Polic. finance and budget as well as reco^endation of party nominees
for the National Assembly to the part, P^-esident who
.a.es the final
selection.
The Secretariat and its Director-General attend to administrative
.ffai« of the central party headquarters and supervise local party
secretariats. InitiaUy, the Director-General had the exclusive
power to appoint local party cadres. However, he lost this power
as a result of the charter amendment in February. 1965. This power
was assumed by the local party chairmen. It also became a con^^n
practice after late I9* that the DRP Assemblymen automatically became
the local chairmen of the party apparatus. Although considerably
weakened, the Director-General of the central party still exercises
a considerable influence on local party organizations and cadres
whose salaries are distributed by the Central Secretariat.
In order to realize the original aim of making the DRP a "party
of policy." the party charter provides for an elaborate set up for
this purpose. The Policy Committee, comprised of key DSP Assemblymen,
the government ministers belonging to the party, and party members
appointed by the party President, is responsible for initiating party
policies and advising the Party Affairs CouncU as well as other
party organs and the government. Under the Policy Committee are tV".
thirty-meiiber Policy Review Board andj^^folicy Research Office, composed
of specialists.
The or^Uation of the Democratic HepuUioan Party i.
ty the folloving diagram(Diagram 3).33
On ti. provincial level, the party maintains a Provincial
Cc»,ittee usually headed by the
.ost
Provi.ce an. a hranch of the Central Party Secretariat. On the levelOf the electoral district, the supreme party organisation is the
District Co^^ttee. headed hy a
.»„erf.l Assembly hopeful or a
National Assemblyman representing that district. l„ the
.ana,e.ent
Of the local secretariat, the District Co^ittee Chairman is aided
^ a Secretary-General who is \"Vto-day manager of party affairs
and Who is directly responsible to the District Co^,ttee. In each
Of the Ss am 23^{to„n and township), the party organization is
headed by a lcHanriJan,(Supervisor). who is in turn assisted by multiple
jidoiang(Leader) on the li( village) level; these Leaders are in turn
assisted by :rultiple hHaldonsjang(Functionaries). The organization
of the local party hierarchy is shown in Diagram 4.
As far as the policy-making process in the party is concerned,
the central role is played by the Party Affairs Council, which, in
turn, is dominated by its ex
-officio members. The Policy Review
Board which
.^intains relatively well-equipped research facilities
33~"
K^r,. I.
^'^^^^^ Kinjukonghwadang(The Democratic Reoublican Partvl
^^S^^^^^^^^ Four Year History of the'DeLcr'ir^^'Republican irart/)(5eoul: hinjukonghwadang Kihoek Chosapu, I967},
^Irtv of l^'^f Republican Farty. Democratic Reoubliknt^ ol t^ Reoublic of Korea(3eoul: The DRp-K^;d^e7rrmf^
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euhnits its reco^endations and supporting materials to the Party
Affairs council for consideration. The decision of the Party Affairs
Council then goes to the President for final approval. Ostensibly,
the Central Co^ittee has the right of a^endnent to the policy thu^
originated and the National Party Congress has full powers on party's
basic policies, but in actuality, this power is .ore sy:ntolic than
real^
The party decision to go ahead with the constitutional aaendnent
in 1969, for example, was first reached by a conference of the too
party personnel. After that policy had been approved by the President
himself, it vas officially propx>sed in the Party Affairs Council and
then was sent to the party caucus in the I.ational Assembly where
there was considerable dissent. After much work of persuasion* had
been done by the dissident members, the amendment decision was then
relayed to a Party-Government Joint Meeting chaired by the Prime
Minister. Finally, the National Party Convention approved the
decision in a unanimous show of support.
In this particular case, the party's Assembly caucus played an
essential role because the mobilization of the support of the party's
Assemblymen was indispensable to the ultimate success of the amendment.
It was only after the amendment bill was introduced on the floor of
the National Assembly that the party took, up the matter with the
Party-Ctovernment Joint Meeting and the National Party Convention.
The latter two organizations* role in the amendment proceedings was
merely that of ratifying what the party leaders had decided.
lap. The perennial problem of organisation in the mv and
its predecessor parties have been to construct an organisation that
can prevent the domination of the part. b. one ^ and to accommodate
the leaders of the .ajor factions in order to maintain the unity of
the party. This, of course, was necessitated by the complexity of
factional alignments in the party. Until the f.^P „as organised, its
predecessor parties had relied on the dual principles of collective
leadership and factional accomodation. The organisational structure
that could be agreed on was usually a cc»ittee fo™. The Suoreme
Councils Of the past were usually composed of thxee men. who were
the leaders of the three largest factions within the party. One of
the™ »as elected to be the head of the Council, i. e.. the nominal
head of the party. Usually no single faction in the past had an
absolute ^jority of the party's Kattonal Party Convention delegates
to control the key positions of the oartv Thi«wi p y. This situation necessitated
compromise among the leaders of the party for distribution of key
party posts, both within and outside the National Assembly. Sometimes,
this endeavor had taken the form of "position splitting," such as
Cho ByS-ng-ok and Chang Myon in 1959 and Yun ?o-son and Yu Chin-o in
1967, who in each case split the posts of presidential candidate and
the head of the party. In a non-election year, a powerful leader
was elevated to the post of "Advisor" in order to prevent him from
bolting the party and organizing a new one.
AS „e ^ve state. ea.Uer. the
.aotionaZ strength .
.presentedin the top ^Ucy
^^ga^s of the party. Membership ^ the
Leadership CouncU and the Political ^fairs Council refleotea
the strength of each faction at the ti.e of the Kational Part,
convention. The
.ainstrea. faction whose leader heco.es the head
Of the part, also usually controls such .ey co^nittees as discipline
and finance, and the floor leadership of the party in the National
Assembly. Sharing key party posts has been the bane of the opposition
party both at the present and in the na^t c=<d a m p s . Being preoccupied with
factional rivalries at the center, the party has not been able to
expend its energies on such natters as presenting a united front
against the incumbent party or strengthening party organizations at
the grassroots. As of December. I967. the figure registered with
the Central Election Management Co»ittee for the total membership
Of the party showed 381.500. This figure seems to be a grossly
exaggerated one and those party functionaries who retain their
membership in a non-election year ^estl^ted to be about one-tenth
of that figure, with many of its local branches staying virtually
closed during off
-election years.
Vhe current charter of the Kew Democratic Party is rather a
remarkable paper considering the past charters of the opposition
parties. For the first time in party history, it calls for a single
head of the party, unencumbered by such past posts as the Supreme
CouncU and the plural Vice-Presidents. The principle of collective
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leadership was eliminated for the first time, at least on paper.
Factional rivalry at the top was replaced by that in the Political
Affairs Council composed of twenty-five men who are elected by the
National Party Convention.
The Political Affairs Council, has a great deal more power than
the DRP's counterpart, the Party Affairs Council, in that it jx^ssesses
an exclusive power over the selection of party candidates for the
National Assembly and the approval of the elected local party chairmen.
The executive organ of the party is headed by the Secretary-Ge^^ieral,
who controls six bureaus. Compared with that of the DRP, the
Secretariat organization of the New Democratic Party is an impotent
machine with no weapons. The organizational set up of the opposition
party is shown in Diagram 5.-^
The organizations of major parties in the National Assembly
as provided for in the Political Parties Law^^ markedly differ from
one aixjther. The party caucus of the ruling DRP is considerably
weaker than the opposition NDP's. The DRP organization
,
for example,
merely functions as a coordinator of members ' floor activities and
does not participate in the party's decision-making process including
legislative strategy. The latter is determined by the Party Affairs
-'^Quoted in Cho Il-mun, oo. cit., p. 353.
35Article 29 of the x^olitical Party Law states in part: "A
Political Party shall, in order to maintain democratic internal
order, have... a general meeting of Assembly members, if there
are Assembly members affiliated with the political party."
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n . theCouncxa 3 Co^ittee / National Assembly. The selection of the
floor leadership of the party rests with the partes President and
the latte-s selection does not even require approval of the party
caucus. By contrast, the ^P's party caucus has the right to approve
the floor leadership of the National Assembly, it has the right to
veto iry a t«o.thirds vote a^ decisions „ade by the l.ational Party
Convention, the Central Standing Co^ittee or the Political Affairs
Council with regard to activities in the National Assembly.
to the rulin, parties of the present and the past, the relative
stren^h of the parliamentary party and the extraparlia„entary party
varied inversely with the personal power of the country's President.
During the early years of the Liberal Party regime, the parliamentary
party had been subservient to the party organization outside the
National Assembly. In the latter years of the Liberal Party regime,
however, when President Rhee chose to exercize his power through
Yi Ki-faung. the relative position of the parliaiientary party
increased considerably. Generally speaking, in the case of both the
LP and the DRF. where the initial impetus for organization of the
party cai.e from outside the national Assembly, the extraparliamentary
party originally exercized supremacy over the parliamentary party.
The latter's position increased, however, when the regime decided
to extend its rule beyond what was prescribed in the Constitution.
Since the Assemblymen's votes were unexpendable
, the position of
the party in the National Assembly was enhanced.
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Leadership
The prevalence of factionalism and the organizational fragility
of Korean parties have meant the corresponding importance of the
role Of elites in Korean politics, it is, therefore, necessary to
probe into the nature of party leadership in Korea after W5.
When Korea won independence in 19^.8, there were basically four
groups of individuals from which the top leaders of the government
and political parties could be recruited.36 ^he nationalist elite
that ^as based in Shanghai's Korean Provisional Government and other
parts of the Chinese continent was one such group. As the main
force of the nationalist movement during the Japanese rule, these
men had a built-in support after the liberation. As revolutionaries,
however, they possessed neither the political know-how nor adminis-
trative skills required as leaders of a modern government. Another
group was represented by the Western-educated elite that was oriented
more to peaceful approaches to nationalism through diplomacy and
propaganda. Although there was also a widespred support for this
group, they proved to be in the dark about the Korean situation due
to their long absence from Korea.
^ Their Western-oriented value
system prevented them from having an effective communication with
the general populace. The nationalists in Korea at the time of
36See Chin Dok-kyu, "Erit Yironeuihan Kwonryokkujo"(The PowerStructure Eased on Elite Theories), Sedae
. July. I971. Ho, 96
pp. 116-12^. ^ '
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liberation were potentially a powerful group as they had a solid
base inside Korea, but they lacked a prominent leader to compete
with those of the above two groups. Finally, the former bureaucrats
in the Japanese colonial administration were men of good education
and possessed the administrative skills needed. However, because
of their collaboration with the Japanese, they were clearly unacceptable
to fill the leadership positions either in the U.S. Military Government
or in the early years of the Republic. Their value as modern
administrators and their potential as a political force became
manifest when President Rhee carried out a wholesale recruitment of
these former bureaucrats in his government in the early 1950's.
In the U.S. Mlitary Goverr^ent. the second of these groups,
the Western-educated elite was the natural choice to advise the
Americans due to their natural affinity with the foreign rulers.
Their power, however, was gradually eliminated through Rhee's
maneuvering against the National Assembly in the years following
independence. Their position was replaced by the former bureaucrats.
Before the wholesale recruitment of bureaucrats into the party, the
Liberal Party leadership at all levels was a rootless and patternless
conglomeration of social, regional and associational groups whose
sole basis of cohesion lay in the simple spoils of power. The seeds
of disintegration were sawn in the nature of the party. Having
united under Rhee and his power, the leadership of the party dis-
integrated rapidly v/hen Rhee was overthrown. The recruited bureaucrats
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were forraer ofncials of both the central and local governments of
the Japanese administration, "not so high ranking as to be termed
collaborators nor so low as to be excused from any colonial dis-
obedience."^? And as minor functionaries, they carried with them
their previous habit and orientations-
"cautious and lacking in
initiative in every respect except deference to authority and
guardianship against enemies. "^^
It appears that the men with bureaucratic background had virtually
dominated the Liberal Party hiearchy by I958. Just prior to the
fourth National Assembly elections in I958, eight of the ten top
positions of the party were occupied by former bureaucrats. The
only non-bureaucratic leaders were President Rhee himself and
Yi Ki-bung, who as Speaker of the House, held the Chairmanship of
the party's Central Committee.^^ ^^.^^ National Assembly
(1954-1958). 28.8 percent of the legislators listed their former
occupation as being government bureaucrats. The virtual absence of
the opposition legislators with bureaucratic background and the small
opposition contingent in the National Assembly suggest that the
Liberal Party was dominated by former bureaucrats.^^
The elites of the Democratic Party on the other hand were a
union of essentially two large groups. To the "old" Democrats,
37
Henderson, on. cit .
. p. 295.
^^Ibid.
39Hahn-Been Lee, op. cit., p. 92.
The Dong-A Ilbo
. December 9, 1970, p. 1.
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ccmposed largely of landed aristo.crats based in ChWa Provinces,
a group of men from the Northeast F'ySng'an Provinces was added.
The alliance of these two groups was effected as a result of the
Liberal Party's assault against opposition and its autocratic control.
Whereas these men from the Northeast, principally the members of the
HungsadanCThe Young Korea Academy) were a welcome addition in improving
the conservative image of the opposition party, the difficulty of
integration of these men into the new party was evident from the
beginning. As one student of Korean politics has put it. "in religion,
in ties with the independence movement, in class, in occupation and
sources of wealth, in region of origin, in ties with the United States,
they (the "old" Democrats and the men from the Northeast) were widely
diverse and even antagonistic."^^ In antagonism to Rhee. in desire
. ^
Hungsadan was am culture group, seeking to inculcate the ideals
of independence, organized by an independence movement leader An Ch'ang-
who, himself a man from, the P'yong'an Province, drew men from that
area in its membership. An and Syngman Rhee had complex exile roots
of antagonism which was carried over to independence politics, althou^^h
An died before the liberation. This grouo, joining the Democrats in
"
1952, was a natural antagonist to Rhee. See Henderson, oo. cit.,
p. 300. The social characteristics of these men from the i\ortheast
are explained by Gregory Henderson as follows: "Their northern back-
ground had given them unusual sources of cohesion. They were not
used to deserting their region for the capital, since thetc had been
few officials from the province and very few ch'onmin . Favorable
location along the trade routes to the continent and the stimulus
of discrimination within the Yi system had given them ambition,
better distribution of wealth, and exceptional stimulus Tor economic
progress, modernization and change... he-.ice for education and
Christianity. Missionaries had found in this province one of the
single richest opportunities for propaganda anywhere in the world.
Through them, the P'yong'an middle class of the province developed
the closest educational ties with the U.S., the greatest entree to
democracy and its ideals of any Korean group." Ibid .
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^or a cabinet res^nsibiUty system and in certain prejudices in
favor Of the enco^ent of private property and laissez-faire
the Old Democrats and the now addition to the party were able to'
Share the same bed.
Table 8. Occupational BackCTounds of the
Seventh National Assemblymen.
DRP( Percent) M)p(:
Politics
23.3 56.6
8.5 8.9
Military 25.6 6.7
Farmer
3.9
Commerce
1.5 2.2
Kedicine 3.9 2.2
Law 6.2
^.4
Education 9.3 2.2
Mass Kedia 3.9 8.9
Business 10.8 2.2
Others 3.1 2.2
The present leadership of the major parties may be analyzed by
closely scrutinizing the Seventh iJational Assembly. Table 8
summarizes the occupational backgrounds of the Assemblymen.^^
k2
Cho Il-mun, oo. cit.
,
p. ^12.
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In terms of occupational backgrounds, the Assen.bly is composed of
men who belong to the upper strata of the social pyramid. When
these figures are compared with the occupation^ backgrounds of the
Constituent National Assembly which had percent farmers, ? percent
white-collar workers and O.5 percent labor unionists, one can see
that the political profession has become the occupation of the
well-to-do. The social profile of the party leadership is shown in
the following table( Table 9).^^
Table 9. Social Backgrounds of the Seventh
National Assemblymen
DRP Assemblymen MDP Assemblymen
(^)
1. Age
Above 50 71.2 50
Below 50 28.8 50
2. Place of Birth
South Korea 93.2 76.7
North Korea 6.8 23 [3
3. Characteristics of
Election District
Rural 63.5 13.8
Mixed 22.2 2^.8
Urban IZ1.3 7O.5
U Byong-kyu, Yiopop Kwajongron(A Study of Legislative Process)
op » cit., pp. 63-80. This study is based on a structured questionaire
distributed to some 110 Assemblymen in the Seventh National Assembly.
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As the above table incidates, the social backgrounds of the
ruling and the opposition party leaderships in the Assembly show a
marked diiference. The DRP Assemblymen are younger, overwhelmingly
born in South Korea and tend to be elected in rural districts. In
political experience, the same study showed, there was a similar
difference: the opposition legislators tend to have served more terms
in the National Assembly, acquired interest in politics at a
considerably yo^onger age. and participted in political party activities
at an earlier age. The attitudinal differences of these two groups
of legislators will be discussed in Chapter VI.
The leadership of the major parties are in the hands of men with
ages 1^0 to 59. Recently about 70 percent of the Assemblymen came
from this category. Table 10 shows that the average age of the Assembly-
men has decreased considerably with each successive National Assembly.^^
The injection of new blood, i. e., the military men since the coup,
is primarily responsible for this change. The Korean party elite
is a highly educated group and its educational level has shown a
remarkable improvement with each successive regime as the following
table indicates (Table 11).^^
hh.
Ibid
., pp. 68-69.
^^The Central Election Management Committee, Yokdae Kukhoewiwon
Son 'go San^:hwanr ( The Status of the Fast National Assembly r.lections),
pp. 72. 17(>, 253-254, 329-330. 451, 628, 752, and 872(1971 edition).
46
Ibid
., pp. 73-74. 177, 254, 330. 452, 622, 752-753, 870-871
(1971 edition).
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Table 10. Age GrouDs in the National Assembly.
Age Group
25 - 39
40 - 49
50 - 59
60 and over
LP Regime DP Regime
Constituent- 4th 5th National
Natio^l^ Assembly Ass^^ly
23.2 18.5
31.6
27.6
7.8
40.3
26.6
14.7
DHP Regime
6th-8th
Kation^^^As sembly
16.8
49.6
22.6
10.4
Table 11. Educational Levels of National Assemblymen.
Study of Chinese classics
Elementary school
Some middle school
Kiddle school
High school
Some 2-year college
2-year college
Some 4-year college
4-year college
Graduate school
LP Regime DP Regime
4th As sembly(^^) {%)
2.4
. 3
8.3 7.3
3.7 4.3
19.1 6
12.4
2.3
14.7 14.6
4.7 10.3
40.4 40.8
1.5 1.3
DRP Regime
Constituent-
.5th Assembly 6th - 8th
1.1
0.2
1.3
7.3
8.9
6.9
58.0
15.3
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CHAPTER IV GROUPS
. VOTSIS Am PARTIJS
Major Groups in Politics
One of the most remarkable features of Korean politics has been
the virtual elimination of middle groups that aould cushion off and
mediate the extreme and militant struggles between the ruling and
opposition parties. The interest groups of associational variety
exist on the national and local level but most of them function as
support groups for the administration.
The most prominent interest groups in Korean society are what
Gabriel Almond and James Coleman describe as "institutional" interest
groups, such as the military and the bureaucracy, and "anomic"
interest group such as the students.^ As a sign of political
underdevelopment, the weaknesses of the associational interest groups
should be probed with respect to their causes and manifestations.
Labor. The suppression of^labor movement during the Japanese
era gave way to the establishment of many labor organizations in the
immediate post-war era. That the labor movement at first was captured
by the leftist Chonp'yongrC The Korean Conference of Industrial Unions)
was a natural consequence of the labor movement being secretely
organized and led by socialists and Communists during the Japanese
^Almond and Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas ( Princeton;
Princeton University Press, I960), pp. 33-3?.
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colonial period.2 The labor organizations, as one of the very few
organized social force in the iirinediate postwar political chaos,
emphasized political struggles rather than economic struggles during
the period in which all problems, social ones included, had direct
bearing upon the political. Organized in November, WS, Chonp'ygng
played a key role in the brief period of the CPKI's ascendancy.
With the birth of the Taehan Koch 'ong ( The Korean Federation of
Trade Unions— the KFTU). which came with the blessing of American
military authorities in April, 19^6, disputes between rival unions
took the form of bloody street battles, murder, sabotage, strikes
and the ransacking of each other's offices. Finally in March, 19^7,
the KFTU succeeded in capturing the labor movement with the help of
the national police— the leftist labor organizations were forced
to go underground. After the achievement of national independence,
the KFTU fell under the control of government-appointees. Rhee's
first Minister of Social Affairs, Chon Chin-han, was made chairman
of the labor organization. From the very beginning, then, the labor
organization owed much of its existence to the government, and this
tie was to continue through most of the post-19^5 era.
2
For an excellent history of the Korean labor movement, see
Pak Hyon-ch'ae, "Haebanghu Eankuk Nodongundongui Chonkaekwachong"
(The DeveD.opTient of Labor Union Movement in Post-Liberation Korea),
Chisong, Vol. 2, No. 5. May, 1972, pp. 37-59.
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A student of the Korean labor movement observed the following
relationship between the government and labor unions:^
_
The government has kept a very close watch over
union activities. Ko union could be formed withoutthe advance approval of the government. Nor couldtrade union meetings be held without giving prior
notice to the police, and the police openly attended
any union meeting of any significance. Unions were
not allowed to issue publications without subnitting
advance copies to the governmental authorities.
Governmental intervention was sanctioned by the Labor Union
Law. Article 32 of the document gave the government the right to
"dissolve a labor union" when "it violates the law or acts against
the public interest". This provision was recently amended to read
that "if it is so deemed by the government that a labor union violates
the laws governing labor union operations or if it acts against the
public interest, the government may, with the approval of the Labor
Committee order the dissolution of that labor union or call for the
election of a new slate of officers for that union. "^ This all-
encompassing provision, clearly in violation of Article 29 of the
national Constitution,^ which ensures independent association by
3Tak Eijun, "Sarly Trade Unions in Korea, I919-I950," Korean
Affairs, Vol. 1, Ko. 1 (February/Karch, I962), p. 79.
Quoted in Pak Chong-yol, "Kankuk Nodongundongui Kibon
Songkyokkwa ku Banghj^ang, "(The Basic Characteristics and Directions
of the Korean Labor Movement), Chongkyong Yon'gu
.
February, 1971,
pp. i4o-m.
^This article states: "Workers shall have the right of
independent association, collective bargaining and collective action
for the purpose of improving their working conditions ."( Fara. 1)
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workers, has the effect of outlawing any political action by later
unions that are prejudicial to the governinent.
As or 1968. th KFTU reported that sc:ne 68 percent of the total
labor force had not been organized into unions.^ m the early years
of the Liberal Party regime, the .FTU became an affiliated organization
of the Liberal Party. Aside fro. its weakness in n^ber and organization,
the labor movement suffers from the crippling effects of factionalism
of labor bosses and from governmental manipulation. Labor unions
have been operating under various legal and administrative restrictions
which have prevented ther; from making a genuine collective bargaining
and collective action. Significantly, the government decided in I965,
not to allow the XFTU to join the International Later Organization
because it felt that it would be impossible to observe and enforce
Article 8? of the charter of the ILO, which enumerates laterers'
rights and privileges."^
In more recent years, the later group has tried to shed its
long dependence on and intervention by the government offices. On
December 28, I969, the KFTU issued a public statement to the effect
that the government and the National Assembly had. been ignoring the
The Korean Federation of Trade Unions, r.ochongui Undon?rki.iowa
Hwaltonrban.?ch ' im ( The Basic Policies and Guidelines for the KFTU)
(Seoul: The KFrj Fieadquarters, I968), p. 55. This appears to be an
exaggerated figure. The Economic Planning Board gives a figure
of 7^.^ percent of the later force not organized into the XFTU as
of 1970. See The Choson lite . Octoter 2k, 1971, p. 3.
See K. B. Kim, 00. cit.
,
p. 266.
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laborers' interests and that it would forthwith initiate strong and
autonomous political activities, m October, I97O, the KFTU reaffirmed
its stand of a year earlier, and its new leadership established a
special Committee on Political Education in March, 1971. Since then
the KFTU has been consistently pursuing this basic policy on political
participation, but it has not gone beyond this.^ Despite these recent
attempts at politicization, the prospects of establishing a meaningful
tie between labor unions and political parties are slim. The current
charter of the PO^TU severely limits the political activities of labor
unions: no union can engage in an activity to support a party or
candidate; no union can levy political funds on its members; no union
can use its funds for political purjx^ses.^ The rationale behind the
severence of political ties between political parties and lator unions
is to prevent parties, particularly the Communists, from attempting
to manipulate labor unions.
Farmers. Since the farming population still occupies a large
proportion of the total population"*"^ and since the farmers, more than
any other group in Korean society, have retained social and cultural
identity, they remain as the most powerful potential interest group.
g
See The Dong-A Ilbo
. December 14, I97O and April 22, 1971, p. 3,
9Article 12 of the Labor Union Law.
^*^As of 1970, some 45 percent of total population lived in
rural areas;. About 40 percent of the G. P. is derived from the
primary industries.
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Here again, governmental intervention from the early years of the
Republic has made the farmers' organizations semi-governmental
^institutions. The National Agricultural Cooperative Federation(NACF)
As presently the largest farmer organization in Korea, with 10,000
full-time officials and 20,000 local branches spread out to the
remotest Korean villages, allegedly serving the interests of some
85 percent of the farmers. From the beginning, this organization
has not been a voluntary organization of fanners themselves. All
high ranking officials of the KACF have been government appointees;
most of the business it discharges are government sponsored and
financed.
Since the KACF is a government sponsored and financed, it cannot
be expected to function as a true interest group representing the
farmers' interest. "^"^ It has rather functioned as an administrator
of the policies formulated largely by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry. Under the Liberal Party government, the majority of
local heads of cooperatives were appointed from among local members
of the party. Even today, the National Assemblyman has almost an
unlimited power of hiring and firing of local NACF branch officers.
Many of the important positions of the MCF are occupied by former
military men, and about a half of the local branches are headed by
^^o Yung-hi, "Kongch'onui Aproyktanch'e, "(The Pressure Groups
in the Farming Villages), Sedae, March, 1968, pp. 136-1^1.
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village chiefs, who are semi-government bureaucrats. The most
powerful agricultural cooperative in the country, therefore, is a
government sponsored and administered agency and most of the farmers
view it as such, "if not as outright subsidiaries of the ruling
party that provide jobs to its local members and deliver farmers •
votes to it."-'^
Business. The most numerous and well-organized interest groups
in Korea are those of business, industry and commerce. The ou^^^right
intervention by the government evident in the laborers' and farmers'
organizations is not easily visible in these organizations, but they
too have been suffering from the lack of independence from the
government and the ruling party. The Korean Business Association,
composed of big businessmen who virtually control the economy of the
country, and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry, composed
of twenty-eight local chapters with 120,000 members, are the most
active and powerful groups. The employers' group, however, also
depend on the graces of government in obtaining bank loans, government-
guaranteed foreign loans, government contracts, licenses, and
registration. They are eager to please the high ranking government
and party officials through supplying of political funds, supporting
government positions, and sometimes delivering votes of employees
in elections.
K. B. Kim, og. cit.
, pp. 266-26?.
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Lack of independence from government evident in all of these
groups- labor, farmer and business- is a consequence of the all-
inclusive power that the government possesses in these spheres.
Since the government car. easily change the status of any of these
organizations, they are capable of taking any action that does not
meet the government's approval.
Bureaucracy
.
The obverse of the coin of weak associational interest
groups has been the strength of the government bureaucracy. Numerous
legislative attempts to neutralize the bureaucracy and the police
force have been unsuccessful thus far. What has made the government
so powerful in relation to the interest groups is the centralized
state structure. Except for a brief period, the constitutionally
envisioned local autonony has not been implemented. The mayors of
Seoul and Pusan and all provincial governors are appointed by the
President; mayors of other cities and county(kun) chiefs are appointed
hy the Prime Minister; the national police is under the firm control
of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The finances of local governments
are heavily dependent upon national grants; upward of 85 percent
of the county(kun) level budget, for example is dependent upon
national subsidies. All of these ties induce the local officials
to be loyal to the government and the party in power.
Immediately after the liberation, a corps of lower-level
bureaucrats from the colonial administration existed but they were
20?
a politically unacceptable group to be employed by the Korean
government. The lack of any replacement group who had experiences
in running the government, the exigencies of the war in matters of
conscription, taxes and maintenance of civil order required rehiring
of a great many of these colonial bureaucrats, their Japanese ties
notwithstanding. This way, the colonial legacies of an all powerful
bureaucracy were transmitted to post-liberation Korean politics.
Another reason for the ascendancy of the bureaucracy was a political
one. President Rhee's battles with the I.'ational Assembly prompted
him to unite the extraparliamentary forces in the creation of the
Liberal Party in 1951. Gradually, many former bureaucrats seized
leadership positions in the party.
The presence of so many bureaucrats of the Japanese era in the
post-liberation government has helped to enhance the latter 's
authoritarian character. The extensive network of the government
bureaucracy has also been abused by the ruling parties for political
ends. The civil servants of the government have often degenerated
into the servants of the ruling party. The politicization of the
bureaucracy in other developing countries has been noted. For the
bureaucrats themselves, this politicization is helpful for self-
preservation as well as for seeking advancemient in the
bureaucratic hierarchy. "^-^
13For a condemnation of the bureaucracy's role as an agent of
the ruling party, see 6m Sang-sop, "hinjuchongdangkwa Kongmuwon"
(Democratic Political Parties and Civil Servants), Sasanpge
.
October, 195^, pp. 105-108.
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At any rate, the ties between the ruling party and the
government bureaucracy have always been a close one as one writer
^ 14has remarked:
The characteristic trait of Korean civil servants
is their strong bond with [the rulin?] political
party. Self-ores ervation and the short-cut to
higher positions are dependent on the degree of
civil servant's cooperation and involvement in
politics on behalf of the ruling party, as
demonstrated during the past regimes of the Liberal
Party and the Democratic Party. It has been
generally acknowledged by the general public that
the degree of cooperation between civil servants
and the party is directly in proportion to the
degree of the party's success in elections. To the
civil servants, election times are the real oppor-
tunities for flattering politicians, and this is the
only way for them to stay or advance in the hierarchy
of the government.
It could be flatly stated that the close collaboration between
the government bureaucracy and the ruling party has been one of the
the
major factors conducive to/continuation of the existing party in
power. The opposition party has been making an issue of this reality
after every election, but such close ties are seen in the nature of
the system and the solutions to this problem aire well beyond the
realm of legislation. Presently, all civil servants, including the
nation's school teachers are forbidden to join a political party or
campaign in elections, but this does not deter these men from taking
part in politics in a more indirect fashion.
14 ^ ^
No Chong-hyon, "Anatomy of the Korean Bureaucracy and Elections,"
Sasangge
, April, 1966, p. 72, quoted in K. B. Kim, op. cit..
pp. 152-153.
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The military
.
Despite the long political tradition in Korea that
men on horseback rarely intervened in politics and government^^ the
military officers staged a cou^ in May, I96I and many of them have
stayed on as politicians in a supposedly civilian government. In
fact, they have completely dominated the political scene, holding the
top positions in government, political parties and society at large.
The military men's influence in the Third Republic is evidenced
by the fact that they now hold 24 percent of the ministerial portfolios
and 23 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, in addition
to the Presidency, the I^rime Ministership, the headship of the CIA,
the post of the Presidential Chief Secretary, Chairmanship and the
Secretary-Generalship of the ruling party. As of December, I970,
men of military background also served as heads of twenty out of
and as
fifty-five foreign missions/ heads of eighteen out of thirty-one
government cooperations. '^ It is, as a popular saying goes in
Korea, kunin sesang
. "the age of military men."
The participation of the military in the politics of new states
has been variously explained. Morris Janowitz has argued that the
military intervention is usually invited by the corruption of the
17political elites and groups. Arguing similarly. S. F. Finer sees
'"^or this tradition and a historian's reaction to it, see
Edward W. Wagner, 00. cit., p. 2?.
•^^The Dong-A Ilbo, December 9, 1970, p. 1.
17
'Morris Janowitz, The Military in the Political Development
of New Nations (Chicago; University of Chicago I^ress, 1964), pp. 89-91.
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military intervention as inversely proportional to the strength and
effectiveness of political parties, pressure groups and the civilian
political institutions.^^ In addition, such possibility increases
*8 the public empathy with the civilian regiine is weak. J. j. Johnson
has argued that the possibility of military intervention is weakened
when there is a widespread active participation by the public in
politics: Edwin Liewen sees this development as a result of the
increase in political terror- terror which cannot be kept under
control by the police.^^ sa^uel Huntington, on the other hand, sees
it as a result of a political decay caused by the imbalance between
social mobility and political institutionality. Political decay,
to use his terminology, invites military intervention.^^
Almost all of these hypotheses seem to have applicability in
the Korean situation. But the ascendancy of the military in Korea
should also be viewed as a consequence of the steady growth and
expansion from a small constabulary force of 65. 000 men at the time
of the outbreak of the war in June. 1950 to a massive organization
S. F. Finer, Th§ on Horseback(Lew York: Praeger, 1962)
p. 115.
19
J. J. Johnson, "Latin American Military as a Politically
Competing Group in Traditional Society," in J, J. Johnson ed..
The Role of Military in Underdeveloped Countries(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), p. 12?.
20^, •
Edw:i.n Lieuwen, "Militarism and Politics in Latin America,"
in ibid., tp. 132-133.
21.
'Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Decay,"
pp. 386-430.
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Of 600.000 men at the ti.e of the military coup. During this process
of maturation, the Korean army had developed a modern organization
modeled ai'ter the United States army; it had achieved ideological
unity, i. e., anti-Communism; it had gained administrative and
technical expertise not only in military matters but also in areas
of civilian concern: it had become a fairly cohesive army with
esprit de corns.
At the tiir.e of the military coup, an official publication of
the junta government stated the army's role in Korean society as
follows
... there is a universal acceptance by the Koreanpeople of these facts: (1) the Anr.ed Forces, hitherto
aloof from politics, were the only remaining
organizations which retained the resoect of the
people; (2) the Armed Forces, by virtue of their
training in organizational matters, were alone
capable of reorganizing the Government into an
efficient body...; (3) The Armed Forces were the
only force strong enough to elminate the corrupt and
self-serving interests which had brought the country
to the verge of disinteerration; (^) only the Armed
Forces, in the existing emergency, were able to stop
increasing Communist infiltration and subversion and
the growth of pro-Communism among some irresponsible
elements among the people.
Obviously, some of these claims were exaggerated. Even in
relative isolation from the society and in possession of the most
22
For a short description of the development of the Korean
armed forces, see Kahn-Eeen Lee, on. cit.
, pp. 1^152.
^^inistry of Foreign Affairs ( Korea ) . The Kilitary .^evolutionin KoreaCSeoul; kinistry of Foreign Affairs, 1961), p.
V
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inodern organization, the military also was beset with internal
dissension at the top. The basis of promotion of generals during
the Liberal Party regime was largely rx)litical. The military, too,
had not been free of corruption as evidenced by the luxurious life
the top generals enjoyed.^^ The military was a personal instrument
of President Rhee. It was an open secret during his regime that the
generals played an imt)ortant part in delivering votes for his party
by installing ballot boxes within the compounds of military barracks
in violation of the law, and where the opposition was forbidden to
campaign and even denied the right to observe the voting.
Wiereas the top ranking officers of the armed forces were well
treated by Rhee and the other Liberal Party leaders, there had been
growing discontent among the lower and middle grade officers,
especially among the colonels. In the absence of continued open
hostilities, the Korean military launched an ambitious training
program. This enabled many officers to go to the United States on
various training programs and also to attend many follow-up educational
institutions within Korea. The effects of these educational programs
were not imjnediately felt, but the officer corps was becoming a
2^
For a discussion of dissention and other ills within the
military before the coup, see Paek I.'am-ju, K,yokr-von? Chido.ja
Pakchonghiron(On the Revolutionary Leader Park Chung-Hee)
(Seoul: Inmulkesa, I96I).
26
^See K. B. Kim. o£. cit.. p. 272.
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vell-educated, modernizing a^ent,. The colonels participated in the
Korean V/ar as junior rank officers, and the end of war terminated
their war-time privile=:es and created hardships among them. The
salary scale for military officers was pitifully low. Their
promotional ladder was crowded, if not folded, in the post-war
period as practically all the top military ranks were filled with
very young generals, who were not atout to retire to make room for
those working under them.
The military coup was staged by those members of the Eighth
Graduating Class of the Korea llilitary Academy whose prospects for
promotion looked bleak because of this situation. Among the ninety-
four officers who participated in the coup, there were some seventy-
two colonels. Significantly, the members of the Eighth Graduating
Glass contributed some thirty-six men.^^ The organization of the
ruling Democratic Republican Party, as noted earlier, was also
dominated by men of this class.
The figure for the proportion of former men in uniform in the
Democratic Republican Party hierarchy is not available, but the
occupational background of the ?? founding members, compiled by
Lee Chong-sik is suggestive (Table 12)?"^
26
K. B. Kiin. OD. cit., p. 275« 5ee also Kang In-sop, "Yuksa
P'alkisaeng,"(The Sigth Graduating Class of the Korea Kilitary Academ.y),
Shindong-a
. pp. I7O-I93. Sohn Jae-souk basically sees the Korean
military coup as the consequence of an internal disorder of the
military organization. See Sohn Jae-souk, "The ^.ilitary in Korean
Politics." Retort, pp. ^64-466
27Lee Chong-sik. "Political Parties in Korea" (Unpublished Mfjmeograph,
Philadelphia, April, I967), pp. 6O-6I. quoted in K. B. Kijn, op. cit., p. 190.
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Table 12. Occupational Backgrounds of
the Founding Members of the
Democratic Republican Party
Occupation
Number
Military 20
Education
13
Politics 8
Press
7
7
Bureaucracy
7
Legal Profession k
Banking 2
Medicine 1
Art 1
Total 70
Despite a conscious attempt to recruit men from outside the military,
military men dominated the Democratic Republican Party at its inception.
In the ruling party as well as in the government, the military's
influence seems so great that it is difficult to imagine the present
government except in terms of the military.
The students
. The students as a group have been an active agent
in shaping the course of Korean politics si'ter 1945. The April
the
Uprising in I960 eventually led to the downfall of Rhee Government;
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in the Second and Third Republics, ^he active participation of
students in politics in the form of massive rallies and demonstrations
made these students the most important ar.omic interest group and
political force that had to be reckoned with by the party in power.
The sense of political efficacy acquire by the students continues
to play an important role in the process of politics.
Student movements in Korea have always been the vanguard of
popular movements in Korea, at least since the colonial period.
Exposure to modern education motivated the students to analyze the
contemporary political, social and economic ills, and relegated to
themselves the role of national conscience and that of the innovator.
During the Japanese period, the students served as the main vehicle
of the indigenous nationalist movement. In the March 1 Movement in
1919, the June 10 Incident in 1926 and the Kwangju Student Incident
in January, 1929, students spearheaded the struggle against the
Japanese. It is no wonder that the Japanese authorities discouraged
Koreans from receiving higher education. Nationalism appears to be
one of the main, if not the main, ingredient of today's student
movement in Korea.
Since 19^5, the student population has grown at a spectacular
rate. At the time of liberation, there were some 8,000 students in
seven colleges and universities in the South. After some twenty
years, the number of colleges and universities increased to 110
where about 150,000 students are enrolled. Such a tremendous rise
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in student population presented a great social problem by the 1960's.
Pouring some 30.000 students annually into the labor market which
was already- flooded, this created a vast enclave of frustrated
intellectuals and made the college campuses a hotbed of discontent.
In an average year in the 1960's, atout two-thirds of the graduating
class^-^^-^e not ensured an appropriate employment in society. A
hypothesis about the dislocation of the university students and the
university trained intellectuals is provided by John Kautskyr^^
The key role of the intellectuals in the colitics
of underdeveloped countries is largely due to their
paradoxical oosition of being a product of modernization
has reached or become widespread in their own country.
In the universities, the intellectuals absorb the
professional knovrled^e and skills needed by an
industrial civilization.... When they return from
the universities, whether abroad or not, the
intellectuals find, all too often for their taste,
that in their societies the newly acquired skills
and knowledge are out of place.... During their
studies the intellectuals are likely to acquire
more than new knowledge. They also absorb the values
of an industrial civilization.... On their return,
they find that these values, too, are inappropriate
for the old society. To the extent, then', that a
native intellectual has substituted for the values
of their traditional society (with) those of an
industrial one— a process which need by no means
be complete in each case— he becomes an alien,
displaced person in his own society. V/hat could be
more natural for him than to want to change that
society to accord with his new needs and values, in
short, to industrialize and modernize it?
In political terms, such dislocation becomes manifest in what
John Kautsky, "Am Essay on Political Development," in
John Kautsky, ed.. Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries
(New York: John V/iley, 1962), pp. k6~^7.
21?
Edward Shills callc, "oppositional mentality. "^^ The student movements
in Korea have a long tradition of rejecting existing values and
institutions. First, their target was against the colonial rulers
and their suppression. Then, it was against the leftist student
organizations in the immediate postwar era. The April Uprising
started out as a demonstration against illegal election procedures.
Under the Democratic Republican Party regiine, it sought repeal of
the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty and the status of forces
agreement with the United States. It also opposed the proposed
30constitutional amendment. Such inclination to oppose is the
logical consequence of the student movement starting as an anti-
Japanese nationalist movement. For nationalism to be effective,
enemies, real and imagined, had to be created. Their denials of
the existing social order and the willingness to fight for its
rectification caused the student movement to merge with the opposition
party's campaigns against the government in the National Assembly.
For whatever degree of effectiveness the opposition party achieved
in its struggle against the ruling party, the party out of power had
devoted, energetic and sometimes violent colleagues in the street.
29^
Edv;ard Shills, Political Develoraient in the New States (The
Hague: Kouton & Co., 1966), op. 34-36.
30
For a critique of the Korea student movement, see
Nam Jae-hl, "Haksaeng Undoni^kwa Ch'ongnyon Munhwa"(The Student
Movements and Youth Culture), in Nam Jae-hi, ed., Kyondae Kankukui
Wich ' ixva Kwaje(The Present Situation and the Tasks of Korea)
(Seoul: Kyondae Sasangsa, 1970), pp. 283-299.
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The ruling^ party was careful from the beginning not to arouse
the students. Gestures of conciliation, public relations, group
travel abroad have been used to conciliate and appease the students.
In more recent years, however, the governments have relied more on
punishment of student demonstrators by arrests, forced induction
into the anny, expulsion from college, and criminal prosecution
under the Anti-Communist Law. The government, in addition, has
begun since 196^ to tighten its grip on the student movement by
infiltrating the ranks of the students who are watched by agents
from the CIA, the police, the Ministry of Education and even the
Democratic Republican Party.^"'- This has become a widely known fact.
On several occasions, the campuses of vocal universities were raided
and occupied by men in uniform in the name of restoring law and order.
The government evidently has lost its patience with the students.
In President Park's own words, the government was determined "to
exterminate the idea of students that they should act for politicians
on every issue and decision. "-^^
Despite the lack of a single cohesive nationwide organization
of students in Korea, the students have come to exercise a tremendous
influence on the nature of opposition politics in Korea. Although
a strong tradition of academic activism is harnessed at the present
31
Thfcse. government activities on campus are exposed by Maeil
Shinmun(Taegu). September ^, 196^. See K. B. Kim, o£. cit., p. 28?.
32Quoted in K. B. Kim, og. cit., p. 288.
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time through governmental intervention and suppression, it is
definitely too early to predict its eventual doom. The students
have a sense of historical responsibility and some would risk their
future to challenge authorities for the grave problems they see in
society.
The Korean Voter
What and how a voter perceives of his political universe is a
good yardstick of the viability of a democratic system. The nature
of the picture he carries in his head is affected not only by his
status in society but also by his perception of how the political
universe in which he is a part affects him. In order to understand
this process, one must rely on opinion surveys that measure people's
opinions and attitudes about politics. Opinion surveying is rapidly
developing in Korea, but also beset with shortcomings in the area
of question wording, interviewing and analjrsis."^^
Views about institutions
. In order for the imported sjrstem of
democracy to take root in Korea, it is important that the Koreans
themselves accept the system as the most acceptable and suitable for
them. As we have seen earlier, one is hard^jressed to trace democratic
political tradition in Korea's past. In this milieu, the Koreans
33
^^Ralphy Lewis and Helen M. Crossley deal with the development
and shortcomings of opinion surveying in Korea. See their "Cpinion
Surveying in Korea," The Public Opinion Quarterly
. Vol. 28, No. 2
(Summer, 196^), pp. 2^7-272.
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have lived with democracy for nearly three decades. It is in this
context that we must ask the question of how Koreans perceive democracy.
A recent sarvey asked the question.
-Vhat do you think is the meaning
of democracy?" to a national sample and yielded the following results
>
Table 13
.
Understanding of Democracy by
Korean Voters
Responses % Respondents
Don't know
53
Freedom, civil liberties, respect for
the individual Z6
Majority rule, representative government 14
Equality k
Rule of law, constitutionalism
.3
Capitalism, private ownership
.2
Others
5
Although it is extremely difficult to generalize from such an isolated
data, it could be said that Koreans have a rather sophisticated view
about democracy. The "don't know" responses are most numerous, of
32J! 3 ^ ^
Yi Yong-ho, "Hankukminui Chongch4'<wan, "(The Political Views
of Koreans}, Shir.dong'a
.
March, 1970 quoted in fak 3ung-jae,
"Hankuk Minjujuiwa o5n'f5"( Korean Danocracy and Elections), Hankuk
Chongch'i Hakhoebo
. Vol. 4(1971), p. 6?,
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course, but of those who gave responses, most of them seem to have
a good understanding of what democracy is.
How the Korean voters view political parties in Korea remains
a crucial question which may well determine the development of
political parties in Korea. Indications are that, through twenty-
five years of party politics, the Korean voters seem to accept the
legitimacy of political parties as an essential institution in the
Korean political system. In a national survey taken in I971, 70
percent of the respondents replied that parties are "necessary"
, _ „ ^ Another
whereas only 7.2 percent thought them "unnecessary."
^^10.3 percent
felt, on the other hand, that it mattered to them little whether
parties existed or not.^^ Among the reasons listed by those who
answered affirmatively, the reply that the parties represented the
"foundation of democracy" was most numerous (21.8 percent) followed
by "integration and management of people's will"(15.9 percent),
"formation of a stable political order"(l6.5 percent), "prevention
of prolifieration of independent candidacies "(12. 9 percent) and
"organization of the opposition forces"(7.3 percent). Among those
who denied the necessity of political parties, the most frequently
given reason was that "it is amenable to political corruption"(2^.
3
percent). Others felt that the parties "look after their own
35 ^
Gho Il-mun and Tun Kyong-u, "Kankukinun Chongdangul Ottoke
Ponunka?"(Kow Do Korean People View Political Parties?), Sedae,
April, 1971, p. 58.
^^Ibid., p. 59.
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interests without due consideration given for the interests of the
nation" and still others gave their reason as "the failure of parties
to carry out the platforms and policies."-'^''
The Koreans, moreover, seem to favor a two party system. When
asked about the preferable number of parties, a two party system
was favored by the majority of the respondents (50.4 percent), followed
by three parties(31.6 percent) and four or more parties(6.5 percent).
In a survey of the rural population made just prior to the 196?
elections, the question of whether the people would consider joining
a political party was posed. Only 22.3 percent of the respondents
felt that it is -all ri.^ht" to join: 26.5 percent replied that it
is "unnecessary" to join; 12 percent felt that it was better not to
• • 39join. Although the results indicated that the more highly educated
respondents showed greater inclination to join political parties if
opportunities are offered, the fact that only one-fifths of the
respondents showed unreserved willingness to join might be interpreted
as a stumbling block to further institutionalization of political
parties in Korea. The reason for such unwillingness to participate
-^"
^Ibid .. p. 60.
38
Ibid
.
. p. 59. It is interesting to note that the respondents
in the same survey felt that the Political Parties Law which
prohibits independent candidacies received the support of the
majority of respendents (52.1 percent). See ibid./ p. 6^.
39Kim Kyu-t'aek, "Son'gowa T'up'yohaengt'ae, "(Elections and
Voting Behavior), (Seoul, Mimeographed), p. 9.
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in the political process as a party member is not difficult to find.
Their experiences taught them that it is wise to keep anonymity as
far as parties are concerned— in the violent political struggles
in the immediate post-liberation era, at the time immediately after
the downfall of the Rhee regime, and in the period after the fall
of the Democrats, affiliation with a political party, especially with
the ruling party, proved to be an unwise venture for their personal
well-being.
Another problem is how political parties affect voting behavior?
That is. what criteria, if any. do voters use in simplifying the
complex political universe about them and reach their decision on
whom to vote for? Table 1^ summarizes the responses to the question
in a national sample survey, "what criteria do you use when you vote
for a certain candidate?": The results of this survey indicate that
political parties have not been a major determinant of voting behavior.
The voters seem to give more weight to personalities in both
presidential and parliamentary elections. This makes it doubly
difficult to predict an outcome of elections in Korea, where
membership in political parties are not encouraged as has been noted
earlier.
Whereas a reasonable percentage of the voters accept the
legitimacy of the political parties and many view them as a short-
cut to voting decision, the Korean voters still tend to identify
22k
Table li+. Criteria for VotingkO
Personality
Political Party
Campaign Pledges
Combination of
above three
Others
National Assembly
Election
(%)
kl.k
13.3
7.1
36.7
1.5
Presidential
Election
(%)
42.5
12.6
6.9
36.1
1.9
parties with the individual. When the party supporters were asked
about the basis of such support, the most often given(58.9 percent)
answer was the "leading personality in the party. " Next came such
reasons as: the achievements of the ruling party or the opposition
party's history of struggle(13.4 percent); policies and campaign
pledges(11.6 percent); the strata the party represents(8 percent);
and significantly, "because of having supported the party for a long
40
Cho Il-mun and Yun Kyong-u. 00. cit.. p. 6I-63. Chong Ch'ol-su's
survey used different categories and yielded the following results:
Urban Rural Urban Rural
Party 20.1 19.5 14.7 ii+.6
Personality 52.8 57.7 67.9 63.2
Both of Above 23.6 8.6 16.2 6.7
See Chong Ch'ol-su, "T'yryohaengwie Kat'anan Chongch ' ikwan ,
"
(Political Thinking Reflected in the Voting Act), Asea
. July/August.
1969, p. 110, Table 10.
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time." only 3 percent, when asked about whether one should vote
for the same party in presidential and parliamentary elections,
more respcndents preferred to jx^stpone this judgment until election
time because the candidates are important(37. 6 percent). Respondents
were almost evenly split between those who replied one should vote
for the same party(23.5 percent) and those who saw no necessity for
such(24 percent)
The urban-rural £ao. As has been noted in Chapter I, despite the
rigid social stratification that existed in traditional Korea, it
has disintegrated as a result of rapid social change both before and
after 1945. Absence of ethnic, religious, linguistic cleavages in
the nation further makes an analysis of the party system along these
lines meaningless. What then are the basis of the cleavages that
exist in Korean society and how are they translated into party politics?
The answer first of all must be sought in the effects of
urbanization in Korea. At least since the third A'ational Assembly
election in 1954. the Korean electorate has been divided along the
urban-rural continuum in their support of the ruling and opposition
parties. That is. the more urban the constituency, the greater the
support for the opposition and vice-versa. In the general election
of 1958. for example, fourteen opposition candidates were elected
41
The question asked was %"hen you support or oppxDse a political
party, on what basis do you do this?" Cho Il-raun and Yun Kyong-u.
op . cit
.
,
p. 64.
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in Seoul compared with a single candidate for the ruling Liberal
Party. In the twenty-six other cities, the Democrats led the Liberals
29 to 12 and in the semi-urban towns(up), the Democrats also ran
ahead of the Liberals 63 to 56. In the 98 village constituencies,
however, the Liberal Party won one-sidedly by capturing 70 seats to
the Democratic Party's meager 16.^^
Such urban-rural voter alignment has been visible in all
elections after 1954. In the Assembly election of 1971. for example,
the ID? candidates won 57 percent of the total vote in large cities,
compared with the DRF's 40.6 percent; in the medium sized cities,
the DRP garnered 5O.8 cercent to the M3F's 44.? percent; in the rural
constituencies, the DHf ran 22.8 percent ahead of the MDF.^^ Compared
with the 1958 voting trend, there is a evidence of the ruling party
making a trememdous inroad into the oppositions base of strength,
but the urban-rural dichotemy in voter alignment is a reality with
which both parties are forced to contend in their election strategy.
The roots of the urban-rural cleavage in the Korean electorate
must be viewed from the point of view of differential social
development that has occurred since 1945. The sum of the social
42 V/
Yun Ch*^?n-ju, KarJcuk Chonr:ch'i Ch' eke(The Korean Political
System), 00. cit.. Table 7, p. 73.
43 ^
-^Cho Il-mun, Sae Ghon£-dangron(A New Theory on Political
Parties), oo. cit
. , p. 426.
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changes can be shown by the Population and Housing Census in I96O
(Table 15).^
Table I5. Some Social Indicators by
Administrative Units
Average Number of Years Percentage Households
of Formal Schooling with Radio
Cities (Shi) 5.63 31.76
Towns(Up) 3.86 15.87
Villages (Myon) 2. 71 7.73
National Average 3.66 15.50
The urban-rural gap is also manifested in terms of the levels
of political information, political involvement and political
opinionation. The following three tables are compiled by long Ho L
based on his national survey taken in 1965( Table 16, 17, 18).^^
44
Yong Ho Lee, "Toward a Comparative Theory of Voting
Participation, "(Publication Draft, Mimeographed, 1970), p? I7.
45
'Yong Ho Lee, The Korean Political Culture Survey
, quoted in
ibid., pp. 14-15. For persons thirteen years and older^ some 28
percent of the Korean population was illiterate in I96O. W'hen the
illiterate was further divided into urban and rural areas, the
figure comes out to 17 percent and 32 percent respectively. See
the KACF, Agricultural Yearbook
, 1965 (Seoul: Headquarters, the
National Farmers Cooperative federation, I965), p. 253.
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Table 16. The Levels of Political
Information
Urban Res^ndents Rural Respondents
Could name one or more
political parties
Could name one or more
political leaders
Could name one or more
government ministries
77.0
59.0
61.0
59.0
48.5
42.1
Table 1?. The Levels of Political
Involvement(;b)
Donated m.oney
Influenced national
government
Influenced local
government
Attentive to
campaigns
Urban Respondents
1.0
5.9
17.3
26.2
Rural ResDondents
(<)
0.3
1.0
7.6
12.4
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Table 18. The Levels of Political
Opinionation(^^)
Urban Respondents Rural Respondents
Have partisan oreference 30.9 19A
Have opinion on the
DRP performance
^7.9 ^1.3
Have opinion on pro-
portional representation 30.1 14.2
The media through which the voters obtain their information
also markedly differ in urban and rural areas. In a survey made in
Seoul and small villages in Kyongsang provinces in 1969,^^ some 84
percent of the respondents in Seoul replied that they had obtained
their information on the election campaigns through various mass
media such as newspapers (61. 2 percent), radio(l4 percent), movies
and television(5.3 percent), and pamphlets and magazines(4.2 percent).
Less than one percent of the same respondents replied that they
obtained their information thjrough members of his family or relatives.
In the rural villages, however, there is a marked lessened impact
of mass media. Twenty-nine percent of the rural respondents obtained
their information from mass media— newspapers (10. 7 percent), radio
(17.6 percent), movies and television(0.6 percent). The importance
^^Chong Ch'61-su, OD. cit., p. 110, Table 10.
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of the family ties in the rural area is demonstrated when 26.9 percent
of the respondents replied that they gathered their information about
the electoral campaign from members of h^s family or relatives.
Another interesting statistic is the role of party campaign workers
in diseminating political information. In the urban areas, 2i^.8
percent relied on the campaign workers to obtain information on the
campaign. '
The urban-rural cleavage seems to be expressed also in terms
of the sense of political efficacy. The same survey indicated that
51 percent of the urban and 50 percent of the rural voters share
the view that the voting act is the people's duty. However, whereas
a significant proportion( 40.5 percent) of the urban respondents
replied that they voted "in order to reflect my will in the national
policies," only 2kA percent of the rural voters replied in the same
category. Some of the other inducements listed by the voters were
"encouragement of others or because of personal ties, "(6.5 percent)
and "because others do"(l4.5 percent).
If the urban and rural voters differ markedly in terms of socio-
economic variables and political awareness, how are they manifested
47
The newspaper as the most important source of political
information establishes that medi.um"as a determining factor in
voting behavior in Korean elections," as another study concluded.
See "Hankuk Ch'onsson'goe Itsoso Kascomui Hybkwa Ch'ukjong,"
(The Keaswurement of Mass Communication in General Elections)
(Research Institute on Newspapers and Eroadcasting, Chung'ang
University, Seoul), summarized in The Dong-A Ilbo, April 1, 1971,
Special Edition, p. 3*
Chong Ch'51-su, oo. cit., p. 105, Table 4.
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in terms of their voting behavior? One curious and significant
manifestation is the fact that the voter turn-out and the size of
comrnunity have shown inverse relationship as the following table
indicates (Table 19).^^
Table 19. Voter Participation in National
Assembly Elections by Size of
Community
1958 I960
{%)
Seoul 80.4 75.4
Cities electing two or
more A3sembl;>Tnen 85.9 78.3
Cities electing one
Assemblyman 88A 84.6
Towns (up) 90.7 83.4
Townshios ( myifn
)
93.3 87.1
One is hard put to explain such inverse relationship between
voter turn-out and the community size in view of the fact that in
developed countries of the West, voters with high socio-economic
status tend to have a higher rate of participation in elections than
those with low socio-economic status. In Korea, the answer must be
sought in the nature of rural life and in the fact that the rural
^^CEf.C, Yokdae Kukhoewiwon Son 'go Sanghwang( 1968) (The
National Assembly Elections), pp. 357-439 and 279-324.
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voters can be more easily manipulated with meager material inducements.
In the relative state of poverty, the farmers have relied heavily
on the administration and its agents such as the Farmers' Cooperative3
for distribution of fertilizers and other farming related goods.
Their livelihood having been dependent upon the graces of the
administration, the farriers have been much more vulnerable than the
urban voters to administration's demands for compliance. Lack of
mass communication facilities and the relatively widespread illiteracy
in the farming areas means that what they hear about the outside
, , . severely, ... <^oworld IS limited.^ Through the speaker systems which pipe
out the programs of the national broadcasting system run by the
government, and through the mouth-to-mouth dissemination of information,
the rural voters are a great deal easier to be laanipulated and made
to comply than the urbanites who are able to obtain information
more extensively and intensively.
As far as the urban voters are concerned, the lower rate of
participation can be viewed from two aspects. First, it may be
hypothesized that they shy away from the polls as a result of
alienation from the arena of politics. The pro-opposition proclivities
of the urbanites have already been mentioned, arid it may be stated
that they have not been awarded any "pay-back" for this perennial
The newspapers, for example, are heavily concentrated in
Seoul and large cities. As of 196?, there were some ^3 daily
newspapers in Seoul, out of which 20 were published in Seoul.
See Kim Un-t'ae, "1-Iascomkwa Kyondae Chongch'i"(Lass Communication
and Kodern Politics), Chongkyong Yon'gu
.
April, I969, p. 96.
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voting pattern, resulting in a kind of resignation that the voting
act brings no substantial change to their lives. Second, unlike the
rural voters who can be easily manipulated and mobilized to come to
the polls, the possibility that the same might occur appears to be
Slim with the urban counterparts. The combination of these two
factors— political alienation and the unlikelihood of manipulation
and mobilization— seems to contribute to the low voting participation
in urban areas. ^"^
The consequence of the urban-rural gap is expressed not only
in terms of voter participation in elections or the direction of
vote, but also in other areas as well^as Table 20 suggests. -^^ What
Gregory Henderson has said about the Korean rural voters appears to
have a grain of truth
Voting to a villager was little more than the
chance to reward a national or local worthy with a
personal avenue to power. Except for national
A Similar argument is made by Yi Yong-ho, "SSn*go Sowekamsoke
Chongch'iuisik,"( Political Awareness Midst Electoral Alienation),
Chung 'ang
.
Kay, 1971, pp. 90-91. Looking at the rate of voter
participation nation-wide, the following table summarizes its trend:
National Assembly Elections Presidential Elections
Year Turn-out(^) Year Turn-out(^)
W8 95.2 1952 88.0
1952 86.0 1956 9^.^
195^ 91.1 I960 95.0
1958 90.6 1963 85.
0
i960 8^.^ 1967 83.6
1963 85.0
196? 76.1
^^Ibid., p. 84.
53
"^•^Gregory Henderson, op. cit.
, pp. 25^255.
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questions like agricultural orices and the needfor expanded irrigation, localized interests
rarely exerted influence on the daily work ofthe Assembly or served as basis for groupings
parvies, programs or legislative compromise.
Once elections were over, communication between
assemblymen and their districts tended to cease
except for the performance of personal favors
involving the bureaucracy....
Table 20. Forms of Political Participation
Among Urban and Rural Voters
Kation(^) Urban(;0 Rural(-/o)
Contributed funds to
parties or candidates 0.5 1.0 0.3
Try to change things
they were doins in the
national Assembly 2.5 5.9 1.0
Participated in party
activities or campaigns 4.0 6.9 2.7
Kembership in a
political party 4.4 3.7 4.6
Try to change what
"they were doing in local
.government 10.5 17.3 7.6
"itfatch campaigns with
considerable interest 16.6 26.2 12.4
Discuss politics with
others 17.4 31.9 11.0
Read magazines 23.0 34.1 18.1
Read newspapers 26.0 51.9 16.0
Listen to radio 50.2 66.9 42.8
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Regionalism in Korean elections
. In the more recent elections,
the division of the electorate along regional lines has been a
significaut development. The emergence of sectionalism as a factor
in Korean elections harks back to the sectional bias that existed
long before the li Dynasty, as we have indicated earlier, but it has
been a consequence also of the economic structure of the regions
involved, and the real or imagined sense of maltreatment of a region
in the distribution of national wealth and resources.
Illustration 1. Sectionalism in Recent Presidential
Elections, 1963-1971.
The above illustration^ visuall^^ indicates the sectional split
in the three presidential elections. It can be stated that Park who
^Adapted from The Don,g-A Ilbo, April 29, 1971, p. ^»
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ran in all three elections was a kind of "regional" candidate in
this context since he was identified with his native province,
North Kyongsang Province. This fact, combined with the opposition's
traditional strength in the Konam areas (Worth and South Chonra
Provinces), might spell a modified "friends and neighbors" effect
on voting behavior. The roots of the problem seem to go deeper,
however
.
The problem of the regional gap has not grown acute until in
recent years. The industrialization program stai-ted in earnest
since the adoption of a series of Five Year Economic Flans in the
Third Republic. The Honam area, heavily dependent upon agriculture_^
did not lag behind other areas of Korea at the time when the nation's
econonic base still lay in agriculture. The regional gap emerged
as a political issue when the Honam area began to lag behind in
regional development and in government investment. This effect was
popularly known as the "maltreatment of Honam areas" by the government,
not only in matters of economic resources but also in the recruitment
policy of the government. Of the ten provinces in Korea in I960,
the Korth and South Ch??nra Provinces ranked sixth and tenth
respectively in per capita income. In 1966, of the eleven, the
same provinces ranked tenth and eleventh in the same category.
Compared with a heavy government investment in. oil refineries,
textile and steel industries, and construction of the nation's
^^These figures are quoted in U Byong-kyu, Yir?$p Kwa.jonpron
(A Study of Legislative Process) (Seoul: Iljokak, 1970), p. 422.
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longest super highways through the Yongnam areas, the DRP government
created the impression that it was favoring that region. Anyone
traveling through both of these regions is left with an impression
that there has been a lopsided ^elopment in favor of the Yongnara
areas, and this fact made the DRP government vulnerable to the
charge that the Konam areas are indeed being discriminated against.
Regardless of whether such charges are true, the government has
failed to bring home to the people of the Honam areas that their
regions are economically unfeasible or unsuitable to bring in
industries. At any rate, these factors tend to reinforce the
traditional prejudice complex of the people of the Honam areas.
Thus the elimination of regional cleavages remains one of the most
important tasks of Korean politics.
YT5ng-il, OP. crt.
, pp. 32-33*
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CHAPTER V THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: A CASE STUDY OF
THE 1971 FRESIDEA^TIAL ELECTION
The extent and the mode of competition in election campaigns
is an important yardstick in measuring the meaningfulness of any
democracy. As Joseph Schumpeter put it, the "democratic method is
that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions
in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a
competitive struggle for the people's vote.""^
The major objective of a campaign is to marshall the resources
available to candidates and parties and to convert them into votes.
How well a candidate converts these resources will determine whether
he will become a decision-maker in government. In trying to convert
these resources, candidates to some extent work with the political
circunstances or environments which are "given'|^ and to some extent
with uncertain circumstances which he tries to make predictable and
marshal! to his favor. The resoijrces a candidate posesses and the
ways in which he develops strategies to convert these resources
differ from one candidate to another.
For conceptual purposes, one can consider the reasonably
predictable elements of an election campaign and the campaign
activities by parties and candidates separately. The first we shall
call the "strategic environment," to use Folsby and Wildavsky's
^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism , Socialism and Democracy
(New York: Harper and" Row, 19^2), p. 269.
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words. By strategic environment, we mean the following: those
aspects of attitudes and habits and behavior of Korean voters which
have become known to us through various, though somewhat disjointed,
opinion surveys conducted by various persons and institutions;
interest groups, both associational and institutional and their
loyalties, and other voting blocs; political parties, their organi-
zational and numerical strength, and their ideological and policy
commitments; the distribution of campaign funds, the control of
infomation and the control of government.
Other participants in the campaign are, of course, the candidates
themselves who are selected by the political parties. The process
of their selection, the personalities and images they project are
one of those uncertainties which are superimposed on the strategic
environment. Finally, the campaign activities themselves affect the
eventual outcome of an election. The campaign might then be seen
as specific steps and activities taken by candidates and other
participants in order to convert all available resources into votes.
The Strategic Environment
Voters . According to the Central Election Management Committee,
the number of eligible voters for the 1971 elections totaled
15tl78,l8l."^ Representing a 9*3 percent increase in voting population
Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron B. Wildavsy, Presidential Elections
(New York r Charles Scribner's, 1964), p. 5.
^The Dong-A Ilbo
.
February 23. 1971. p. 1.
2^0
over four years ago. some three million young voters were enfranchized
as a result of their reaching the voting age of twenty. Of the
total, some 31.7 percent were voters who were below thirty years
of age.
The Korean voters in general show a remarkable interest in
the
elections. It now appears that the Korean voters regard /electoral
process as one of the vital institutional arrangements of democracy.
One recent survey eloquently shows the degree to which the Korean
voters are interested in elections (Table 21).^
As has been discussed in Chapter IV,
, the most significant
behavior pattern of the Korean voters is the degree to which the
urban and the rural voters differ not only in the direction of the
vote, but also in the mode and intensity of political participation,
the sources of political information and the level of political
Table 21. The Level of Voter
Interest in Elections
Urban Voters Rural Voters
m ii)
Very Interested 26.2
Fairly interested ^5.7
Not Interested 11.6 28.1
Chong Ch'6l-su, oo. cit., p. 110, Table 15.
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awareness. The issues of regionalism are also a volatile issue in
view of the historical and emotional cleavages between the southeastern
and the southwestern provinces. And the probability of the deep-
rooted antagonism to emerge into the open would be increased if the
major presidential candidates came from these areas, as was the case
in the 1971 presidential election. Candidate Park Chung Hee, with
his southeastern roots, was pitted against Kim Dae-jung who came from
the South Ch^nra Province and who represented the city of Kokpo, a
southwestern port, in the National Assembly. These urban-rural and
regional c-aos are a fact of tx^litical life with which the candidates
and their t>arties are forced to deal. This meant, among other things,
that they have to develop strategies separately for each of these
regional pockets at a considerable risk of backlashing in other areas.
Interest groups and voting blocs . It has been noted earlier that
the conditions conducive to active and open participation in politics
by Korean associational interest groups such as farmer, labor and
business have not been present in the Korean context. Monolithic
control of such social organizations by the government, often with
elaborate legal prescriptions, has been largely responsible for this
situation. There have been signs of restlessness on the part of
these Frroups— especially that of labor^but it did not lead to
anti-goverment action in the 1971 presidential election.
Where farmer, labor and business associations remained silent
throughout the campaign, anomic participation of the urban intellectuals
2^1-2
and students occurred. The National Consultative Conference to
Safe^ard Democracy was organized in March and officially began its
activities on the day of the eleventh anniversary of the April 19
Student Uprising. Comprised of some sixty prominent intellectuals
from the universities, the mass media, and religious, legal and
literary circles, it issued a statement on April I9, encouraging
the voters to play a meaningful role in the "revival of democracy."
In particular, the statement stated: "we apoeal to the people to shun
all temptations, resist all pressures and exercize people's sovereign
rights solemnly."^ The Conference also criticized the government's
"cruel ooriression" of the students, who were demonstrating against
military training on campi;[S. Although not stated in so many words,
it was clear to anyone that it was a hasty gathering of pro-opposition
groups in the latter half of the presidential campaign. It acted as
the command post for various student organizations which participated
in the final stages of the campaign as "election supervisors" in an
attempt to oversee the fairness of the balloting and ballot counting
throughout the country. In addition to the several hastily drawn
organizations on various university campuses^ ^e Student League
for Safeguarding Democracy recruited some 1,300 students from 13
universities who volunteered to serve as election supervisors.
These sti:dent groups made themselves available to both parties through
^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo , April 19, 1971, P- !
2^3
the Consultative Conference as election supervisors after the
Ministry of Education had ruled that such activity did not constitute
student participation in politics as prohibited by law.^
Tlhe press, especially the prestigious newspapers, has had a
long tradition of being critical of government since independence.
It was an iinportant ally of the opposition along with the urban
intellectuals and the students since the xlhee regime. That the
editors and reporters of The Don^-A Ilbo, the Seoul daily newspaper
with the widest circulation, found it necessary to adopt a Declaration
of the Freedom of the Press during both elections indicated that the
goverrsnent had been putting pressure to bear on the press. The tone
of the declaration expressed xirgency and disgust;
At the forefront of the freedom of the press, we
are in sad realization of the fact that the crisis in
the press has reached the limit, and we proclaim that
the freedom of the press which is the foundation of
democracy should not be assaulted by anyone.
The movement by The Dong-A Ilbo newspapermen spread to the Korean
Newspapermen's Association whose 3.000 members adopted a resolution
on the freedom of the press in April.
The government-owned radio and television networks have played
a significant role in supporting the ruling party. The pro-ruling
party broadcasting ranged from, showing repeatedly on television
screens one of the campaign catchphrases of the DRF "Progress without
^bid
^Ibid
2^
Interruption" to tailoring the contents of the most popular programs
to favor the ruling party. These prejudicial treatment5of the
contesting candidates and parties was visible to even a fairly
unsophisticated eye and it was carried out in clear violation of the
o
code of broadcasting ethic.
The government bureaucracy . The role of the government bureaucracy
becomes a vital one for the incumbent party whenever an election
approaches. In the past, civil service personnel, high and low, openly
participated in the campaign for the ruling party, but recently the
participation of government officials occursAin a highly sophisticated
manner. During the campaign under discussion, one newspaper reported,
an extraordinary number of vacations for high and low government
officials alike was allowed. The heads of government ministries and
corporations often visited their native places under various pretexts.
Both of these tactics, this newspaper report complained, were used
9
to propagandize the achievements of the incumbent government. It
was also during the electoral campaigns that an extraordinary nuiiber
of opening ceremonies for the building of bridges, roads, schools
and factories took place. Always present at such a ceremony were
the DSP provincial party chairman and the Assemblyman from the district.
These strategies were used to impress the people to the fact that the
projects under construction would have been impossible without the
^The Dong-A Ilbo
,
April 30, 1971, p. 5'
^Ibid., April l6, 1971, p. 3.
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support of the incumbent party and its candidates. In addition to
this "indirect display of influence," various new promotional
associations and neighborhood ^oups were created, some defunct
associations were revived, and the existing ones strengthened in
order to revitalize the web of personal relationships leading to the
support of the incumbent party. At their frequent meetings, the
achievements of the incumbent government were praised, government-
produced films were shown and voters were invited to make "study
trips'* at the expense of the campaign organizations. It was known
to everyone, the rem.otest villager included, that the local government
took extraordinary measures to please the local people. Popularly
known as the "benevolent administration," the government at the
grassroots exhibits unusual sensitiveness to the residents* needs
and activities during the campaign . "^"^
Political parties . In terms of organizational strength, a
comparison of the two major parties may be analogous to Gulliver
and his midgets. Throughout the campaign the performance of the
two party organizations showed a painfully striking difference
—
it was, in effect^ one between a well-oiled organizational machine
12
against an individual.
•^4bid
., April 1?. 1971, p. 3-
"^For a condemnation of the "benevolent administration," see
The Choson Ilbo , March 26, 1971, p. 2.
12
This section is based on personal observation of the campaign
by the author and his reading of newspapers, journals and booklets
published at the time of the election. See also Cho i\'am-cho and
Ko Jun, "Taet'ongnyong Son 'go Yangdang Funjonki, "(The Presidential
Election Campaigns of the Two Major Parties), Sedae, June, 1971, PP* 128-1^5-
Zk6
The separation of the post of the party leader and the
presidential nominee in the opposition ^DP seemed to have created
disharmony at various points, not to mention the effort to bring
together those party leaders— especially the mainstream leaders
grouped under party leader Yu Chin-san. Outward unity was achieved,
but later developments proved that it was a false unity. '-^ It was
charged botn within and outside the party that the party head
Yu Chin-san and other factional leaders have waged a half-hearted
campaign for the presidential election. Still complicating the
picture was the choice of Chong Il-hyong as the chief of the M)P's
The strains of the factional rivalry leading to the
presidential election finally exploded when Yi Jae-hyong, once the
Vice Chairman of the KDP, announced his withdrawal from the party
on February 8, 1971. He explained his reasons as follows: "I
reached this painful decision because I came to zhe sad conclusion
that the party has neither the will nor the ability nor the qualification
to effect a change of government. Instead of fighting to overthrow
the corrupt regime of the ruling Democratic Republican Party, the
NDP members are busy satisfying their parasitic appetite in futhering
their nersonal ambitions for the party leadership or a seat in the
National Assembly while offerring only lip service of oPTX)sition to
deceive the people and history . " The severity of Yi's condemnation
was unprecedented whether inside the party or out. He continues to
attack the party in the following manner: "The lower echelon members
of the party are becoming poorer and poorer while most of its leaders
are becoming richer and richer. The party posts, high and low, can
be purchased with money or by promises of votes and other favors.
The door is wide open to 'yes' men while honest, responsible members
are kicked out. It makes me mad to watch the leaders exhorting the
front members to wage war ap-ainst the DRP while behind the scene
they are preoccupied with how the leftovers of the battle can best
be seized . I have been aware of the onronic illness of the ^Or which
even the best doctor in the world cannot cure. " emphasis his.
Quoted in The Korea Herald, February 10, 1971, P- 3»
2^7
Election Headquarters. Chong's support of Kim Dae-jung's presidential
candidacy at the nominating convention was critical in swaying the
convention to support the darkhorse candidate. Under the circumstances
where three different factional leaders, Yu, Ch^ng and Kim^sought
the control of the campaign, one can easily see the roots of discord
in the grand task to wrest the power away from the incumbents.
At the election district level, the NDP claimed a membership
of 500,000 but it is said that the actual members who could be counted
on to help out^the campaign was about half that number. In many of
the district party chapters, even a party office could not be funded.
The party relied almost entirely on personal contacts— the district
party head and his subordinates made contacts through blood and
school ties.
As such the l\iDF faced a formidable foe in the DRP and its
extensive organization right down to the neighborhood level. In
addition to the personal contacts the district chapter president(in
many cases, the Assemblyman from the district) had, the party could
boast a general membership of l,350|000^which constituted about 9
percent of the total electorate. The party Secretariat extended
its arm through various administrative levels and to the natural
villages on the town(up) and towns hip( myon ) levels, in the form of
3,083 Supervisors
(
kwanri.jang ) . And 15.109 Vice Supervisors were
given the task of overseeing the activities of youth and women at
the corresponding levels. There were 60,180 Leaders
(
.jido.jan.? ) at
2^8
the village(li) or blo^ck(tong) level. At the natural village
level, there were more than 180.000 male and female functionaries
(hwaldon^.iang). This hierarchy of party officials was under the
firm control of the party chairman^ and his hold on the party personnel
was all the more stronger if he happened to be the fetional Assemblyman
from that district.
Whereas the ^IDP trained some 500 party officials down to the
level of the district party Vice Chairmen and organization and
propaH-anda chiefs for only a few days before the campaign started,
since its inception in I965, the DRF's impressive training center
in Seoul had enrolled some 40,000 functionaries who were coeched
in party activities for two weeks. At the center Candidate ?ark
had a firm control of the party as its President. The Campaign
Headquarters was headed by Paek Kam-ok who coordinated the activities
of various parts of the party organization ^and its day-to-day
functions were under the direction of Kil Jae-ho, the party's
Secretary-General, who headed the campaign office. The newspapers
in Seoul likened the campaign office of the incumbent party to
a battle operation room full of maps, charts and telephones.
Distribution of campaign funds . According to the law on campaign
funds promulgated in February, I965 and amended in January, I969,
any person or group can make contributions to the Central Election
Management Committee which in turn distributes 60 percent of the
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money thus raised to the majority party and the rest to other parties
in proportion to the percentage of seats in the National Assembly.
Since the law was promulgated, the CEMc](reported to have received
contributions amounting to 263.000,000 won.^^ This is a meager
amount compared with the actual amount spent by presidential and
Assembly candidates in a single election year. In the 196?
presidential election, for example, the CEMC set a limit of 270,000,000
won as a sum each presidential candidate and his party could spend
for electioneering puriDoses ."'^ It was estimated by observers both
within and outside the party that the legal limit set by the CHi'.C
was several times short of the actual sum spent in that election,
particularly by the ruling party.
That the opposition party was beset with financial problems
was made evident when candidate kim of the 1<I)F remarked that if his
party could afford to spend one-fifth of what the DRP did, he would
handily win the election. The party has had a perennial record of
publicly appealing for campaign funds and the 1971 election was no
exception. The pre-campaign plan for raising funds called for both
compulsory and voluntary donations from party members and the general
public. The party leaders were subject to compulsory donation
ranging from 100,000 won to 10,000,000 won. Besides these official
14
The Dong-A Ilbo
.
March 19, 1971, p. 3. At the current
exchange rate(1972), this amount is equivalent to US $ 657f500.
^^The limit set by the Ca*iC for the 1971 election was
962,000,000 won(US ^ 2,155,000).
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contributions of the party leaders and members, party representative
Tu Chin-san and the presidential candidate
-to be were charged with
the responsibility of making up the shortage of funds. At any rate,
several leaders of the m? Campaign Headquarters visited the Korean
Business Association on March 18 to request that powerful group to
contribute funds to the CB<C.^^ On the other hand, the incumbent
party appeared to have no problem raising campaign funds. It wa?
reported that the oarty was able to distribute some three to four
million won to each National Assembly constituency by the beginning
of April. While the actual sums spent by the ruling party and the
NDP remained a secret, it has been speculated that the I.D? spent
some 560,000,000 to DRP's 5.000.000 won."'-^
Selecting Candidates
On March 17, 1971, the Democratic Republican Party, at its
fifth National Party Convention, made official t5:e long expected
nomination of President Park Chung Kee as its presidential candidate
and adopted a 56-point election pledge. By that time, the party
was able to patch up the old wounds in the party— especially that
of the maincurrent party dissidents who h-ad supported Kim Jong-p'il
to becx)ne the party's nominee, although they never challenged Park's
-jz
The Dong~A Ilbo , Karch 19, 1971, p. 3-
-^"
^The Korea Times. April 11, 1971, p. 2.
^%ee Cho Kam-cho and E6 Jun, op. cit. , p. 1^0.
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leadership openly. The ostensible unity of the party was achieved.
however, when Kim came out in supirxDrt of the constitutional amendment
in 1969 and then appointed "Advisor" to President Park along with
Chong Il-kwKn and Yun Ch'i-yong shortly thereafter. At the nominating
convention, Kim became the party's Vice President, a step which
necessitated an amendment to the party charter.
Through eight years as President and two additional years as
Chairman of the SCia, the DRP's nominee had been preoccupied with
bringing about modernization of the country. This iron-willed
determination was well expressed in his inaugural speech in I967
when he stated that his "life-long dream has been to drive out
19poverty..,** Park's modernization program has resulted in a near
ten percent increase in gross national product every year during
his tenure as President. Although his policies were often criticized
as being too drastic at times, he was above criticism as far as his
honesty and integrity were concerned. His preoccupation with
modernization was accompanied by his determination to provide
political stability and strong leadership. As head of the party
and the administration, he was in a strong position to enforce
discipline in the party.
Born and raised in a poor family of military background, he
becaine a professional soldier early in his youth having graduated
"^^Quoted in The Dong-A Ilbo
.
March 2^, 1971, p. ^.
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froin the Kanchurian Kilitary Academy and Japanese Military Academy
before the liberation and from the Korea Kilitary Academy after
independence. Having participated in the Korean War as a middle
rank officer, his rise in the military was less than spectacular.
He was reputed to be an extremely competent soldier who refused to
compromise with political power. At the time of the military coup
which he headed, he was second in command of the Second Army. Aft-er
he became the sixth President of Korea, he seemingly stood above
politics: he projected a father image and that of a common man with
an empathy for poor farmers and their problems. He often stated
that proverty to which he had been subjected as a youth and as a
young officer has been both his "teacher" and "benefactor."
Despite the widespread identification of the DRP as a party of
Piilitary men and big businessmen, he was credibly presented as a
champion of the common man.
The party that nominated Park elevated him to the status of
the creator of a "new Korea," whose people have rightfully begun
to have courage, pride and hope for the first time in her long
history. As a military expert, he seemed best suited to lead South
Korea in the face of/^military threat from North Korea. He had been
a leader with a vision on the unification of the country. He had
also been an administrator par excellence who had responded to his
own call of modernization forcefully.'^^
20
For the DRF appraisal of its own nominee, see the statement
written by the party's Secretary General, Kil Jae-ho in The ChosSn
Ilbo
.
March 30, 1971, p. 3.
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\<hlle the ruling party presented the electorate with an image
Of a unified party, the opposition i\T)F faced a series of crises
prior to the nomination of its presidential candidate. Soon after
the party had suffered a one-sided defeat at the polls on a
constitutional amendment on October 1?, 1969. the race for the
next presidential nomination began. On November 8, the i\DF Whip
in the National Assembly, Kim Yong-sam, declared his intention to
enter the race for presidential nomination. In doing so, he also
advanced a theory that the only way to improve the party's fortune
was to entrust the party leadership to the younger elements of the
party and that a man in his forties should be chosen as the party's
presidential candidate in the forthcoming election. This idea
received widespread support among the younger factional leaders of
the party such as Yi Ch'ol-sung and the eventual winner, Kim Dae-jung,
In the plenary national convention held on January 26, 1970,
Yu Chin-san was selected as the head of the Party on the second
ballot defeating Chong Il-hyong and Yi Jae-hyong for that post.
Political Affairs Council members were to be chosen by consultation
among those three who vied for the top leadership of the party. The
council structure of the NDP was again assured when the chairmanship
of the National Party Convention which had the crucial responsibility
of nominating the party's presidential candidate went to a non-
maincurrent member, Kim Hong-il, who won over Yu Chin-san 's choice.
25^
Yu. while opposing the theory that a man in his forties should
be chosen as the party's presidential candidate, declared his non-
candidacy on March 10, 197I. Ke insisted that the three presidential
hopefuls. Kim Y5ng-sam. Yi Ch'ol-sxJng and Kim Dae-jung should work
out a compromise plan which would determine the party nominee and
that should these three men fail to agree on a nominee, he should
be empowered to make that decision himself. The three youthful
a
presidential hoDefuls resisted such/proposal and vowed to make a
fair comoetition for winning the party's endorsement.
Yu reversed his decision on September 21 when he declared a
"conditional" candidacy, stating in effect that he would not
"refuse the party's nomination should that be the party's decision."
He added, however, that he would withdraw his candidacy if the
three youthful candidates could unite behind a single candidate
before September 2^— a possibility which Yu apparently discounted.
The three candidates persisted in vowing to support the winner at
the National Convention. Yu again reversed his stand on the eve of
the nominating convention when he announced that he would support
Kim Yong-sam's candidacy.
When the nominating convention convened on September 29, the
race was narrowed down to Kim Yong-sam and Kim Dae-jung. The former,
having received the avowed support of the maincurrent members and
their delegates and of the faction led by Yi Ch'ol-sung, was a heavy
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favorite. Kim Bae-jun- could count on the support of Chong Il-hy^ng
and his followers and aiDpeared to have the support of the rank-and-
file delegates to the convention. V^ien the votes were counted,
however, Kim Dae-jung energed a surprise victor.
Kim Dae-juns: entered the presidential election as a far less
well known personality than his foe, Park Chung Hee. He nevertheless
represented the cream of the young intellectuals in the party of old
politicians: in this respect, he brought with him a "new image" of
the party. Although he had a far less iiapressive credential than
Park, he entered the thick of politics long before Park shed his
military uniform, as he often emphasized during the campaign,
a non-maincurrent leader of the party he had ably served as a chief
of the opposition party's procaganda section.
The KD? nominee entered into politics early in his youth by
participating in student movements after the liberation. After
repeated failure in the National Assembly elections, he was finally
elected to that body from, a rural Kangwon Province in I96I. During
his term in the sixth and seventh National Assemblies, he earned a
reputation as a fine oratorical speaker and an economic theoretician.
What he called dae.iun? k7/ong-.ie , or "an economy for the masses," was
adopted as the official econom.ic tenet of his party before he won
21 »/
On the first ballot, Kim Yong-sam gained 421 votes to
Kim Dae-jung's 3S2, with 86 invalid votes. v7ith no one winning the
majority of vote, Kim Dae-jung edged out Kim Yong-sam on the
second ballot.
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the presideiitial nomination. As a pwlitical figure not well known
at the grassroots, he made a conscious effort to project an image
as the defender of ordinary citizens from the arbitrary exercise
of administrative power while strengthening his ties with the urban
intellectuals and students with whom he had a great deal in common.
The W praised him for his unwavering belief in democracy, and
him
described /as an economic theoretician of a high order and a statesman
with a will to act.^^
In addition to the candidates of the tvro major parties, five
more parties put uv their presidential candidates; Pak Ki-ch'ul of
the Democratic I.ationalist Farty(Di;p), Song Fo-kyong of the Kass
Party, Yi Chong-yun of the Liberal Democratic Party, Chin Fok-ki
of the Justice Party and Kim Ch'ol of the Unified Socialist Party.
Of these, Kim Ch'ol of the Unified Socialist Party made it clear
from the beginning that he offered himself as a candidate not to
win the election but to make the public conscious of the party's
platform during the election. Of the five minor parties, the DI;P,
headed by Yun ?o-son, whx) opposed President Park in I963 and I967
presidential elections, was the most serious challenger, but the
party's failure to come up with a strong candidate sealed any hope
22
For profiles of Kim Dae-jung, see The Dong-A Ilbo
.
April 2^,
1971, T). 5 and The Choson Ilbo . March 30, 1971. p. 3-
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of drawing a sizable vote.^^ On the eve of the election day, two
candidates of ninor parties withdrew their candidacy in the name of
"opposition unity." On April 24, Pak Ki-ch'ul of the DNP, however,
reversed his earlier announcement that he would give up his candidacy.
Throughout the campaign, the minor party candidates drew very little
attention.
The Campaign
In accordance with the election laws, the campaign could last
for thirty days prior to the election day. The ruling party reportedly
took great pains to choose April 2? as the election day. The choice
was made on the basis that the selected day would precede a busy
farming season and would therefore guarantee a maximum rural voter
participation in election. It would also give little time for the
24
opposition to prepare for the campaign. The law required that
the election must take place sometime between April 21 to May 20
23
-^The DKP was organized by those former Civil Rule Party
members who broke away from the party. To this core element, the
party was able to recruit many politicians who were disenchanted
with the opposition party. Yun Fo-son declined the nomination of
the party. There. was even e talk of recruiting Yi Bom-sok to
became the standbearer of the party, but he showed no interest in
that possible offer. The DI.P finally nominated Pak Ki-ch'ul, a
former Assemblyman.
24
This section is based on the personal observation of the
author and the following: Cho Nam-cho and Eo Jun, od. cit..
An Ch'i-sun, "Chongch'i SonjSnkwa Sondonui Tekunik"( Political
Propaganda and the Technique of instigation), Sedae, June, 1971|
pp. 80-88, and Yi Kang-sik, "Dukpyo Jakch6n"( Vote Getting Operation),
Shindonp-'a
,
Kay, 1971t PP» 176-185. -^ee also Ch'a Ji-s5n,
Taet 'onrmyonF T'ansaeng(The Birth of President) (Seoul: Shin Hj-'onsilsa,
1971).
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(70 to ^0 days before the presidential term ended on June 31, I971).
Hence the official campaign began on Karch 2?.
Even before the official campaign began, however, the two parties
began exchanging charges of irregularities. Since the early months
of 1971, the m? stumping team ^including its presidential candidate^
had been making a nation-wide tour in a drive to collect signatures
from 500,000 voters to introduce an amendment bill rescinding the
constitutional amendment passed in I969 allowing a third-term
presidency. The incumbent party charged that such activity constituted
a clear case of pre-election campaign prohibited by law since it would
involve canvassing individual households to collect signatures. Cn
petition from the ruling party, the CQIC ruled that such activity
must be considered as constituting a campaign activity, hence un-
constitutional .
On the other hand, on February 25, the IflDP representative
Yu Chin-san publicly accused the sxiministration of irregular activities
and challenged President Park to rectify these iminediately. Among
other things, Yu attacked the use of administrative power in elections;
oppression of the press; interference in the judicial branch; use
of government-run radio and television stations soley for propagandizing
against the opposition party; formation of a government inspired
third party to disrupt the KD? and to seduce NDF members to desert
25the party with offers of posts in the government.
^^The Choson Ilbo, February 26, 1971, p. 1.
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As far as the issues both parties raised in the campaign, the
1971 presidential election was conducted in the manner of the 196?
election in that the canpaign was waged almost free of attacks on
personalities. A relatively coherent set of policies was advanced
by each of the two parties. The grand strategies to power were
formulated one week prior to the official beginning of the campaign.
The incumbent DRP was to emphasize the "inevitability" of the
constitutional amendment for the third term presidency, the need for
securing political stability midst dangers from Korth Korean
belligerence and uncertainties in the international arena. The DRF
election catchphrase was "Stability without Confusion." The hW,
on the other hand, v;as to rely on the familiar issue of the danger
of long tenure of power and rampant political corruption in the
incumbent regime.
Throughout the campaign, the policy confrontation of the two
major parties was a lively affair with the opposition initiating
the attack on the ruling party and its policies and the ruling party
providing the explanations and counterattack on the MDP stands. As
far as the campaign issues were concerned, the ruling party was
clearly on the defensive— as all incumbent parties in democracies,
the burdens of power placed the incumbent party on the defensive.
The Dong-A Ilbo
.
Karch 19, 1971, p. 1.
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The two parties differed in six major areas. ^'^
The opposition party insisted that a "mood of peace" was
prevailing throughout the world, pointing particularly to the seeming
rapprochement between the United States and Communist China. Under
the circumstances, Korth Korea would not attack South Korea, nor
would it have the capability to do so in at least ten years. The
four big power guarantee of peace proposed by candidate Kim was
envisioned to restrain North Korea from provoking war and ease
tension in Northeast Asia by making Japan and Communist China play
the role of the balancer in Asia while having the United States and
the Soviet Russia check one another. It claimed that the ruling
party's persistent v/arnings against the possibility of another i\orth
Korean invasion was designed to cover up its scheme to retain political
power. The ruling party, on the other hand, retorted that it was
irresponsible for the NDP to assert that I'iorth Korea would not provoke
another war for ten years, and it warned that r'yongyang had already
completed war preparations. The four big power guarantee, contended
the ruling party, was a "dangerous illusion" which not only was
unrealistic but constituted a subservient diplomatic posture. The
four years to follow would be critical for the current situation^ re-
SQnbling the eve of the Korean War. North Korea would try to take
27
The summary of the campaign issues are found in The Hankuk
Ilbo , Acril 22, 1971, P. ^. See also Yu Kyong-hyon and Hwang Stfn-p'il,
^Son'go Ctiaengjom"( Election Issues), Shindong'a , July, 1971, PP« 90-101.
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advantage of the disorder that might arise due to a transfer of
power in the south. The key to national security at this critical
moment was to achieve stability through economic growth, argued the
ruling party.
on
Another major issue that was capitalized/ by the opposition
was the question of tenure of power. The Constitution, it claimed,
was sabotaged as a result of the ruling party's scheme to enforce
a perpetual rule. Democracy, contended the opposition party, means
the
that a person cannot retain/presidency for more than two terms. If
brought to power, the party would not only rer^eal the amendment that
was oassed by the ruling oarty in I969, but it would restore honor
and orestige to the constitutional government. The opposition party
also charjred toward the end of the campaign that the ruling party
was contemolating to install an institution of generalissimo for
candidate Park. Should the DRP want to retain power for itself
rather than for Park, it could do so with another candidate,
suggested the opposition party. The DRP argued, however, that there
was no point in wrangling over the m.atter of tenure of power for
candidate Park as the overwhelming majority voted in favor of it in
the 1969 national referandum. A twelve-year tenure of power was the
minimum period necessary to guide the nation to a high stage of
economic development: such examoles had been provided by Japan and
West Germany where long tenure of power for one party under a strong
leader had helped bring about economic rehabilitation and development,
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As far as the economic policies of the two parties were concerned,
the KDP proposed what its candidate called "an economy for the masses."
Whereas the economic policies of the incumbent party had abe4d
corruption and widened the gap between the rich and poor and between
various regions, and between different sectors of the economy, the
NDP policy was aim.ed at achieving balanced develorment between
apiculture and industry by promising to invest at least 20 percent
of the gross national product in the agricultural sector. A dual
ffrain price system and a system of taxation favoring the low income
grouns would be imolemented. The DRP, on the other hand, insisted
that at the conclusion of the Third Five-Year Economic Plan, Korea
would join the ranks of the advanced countries by having a per
capita income of 400 dollars. The benefits of modernization would
be shared without discrimination. The party also promised to create
two million new jobs so as to eradicate the unemployment problem in
the country.
Other issues that were presented by both parties were those of
corruption, graft and irregularities in governnent, the maintenance
of reserve forces and the military drill for students. The M)F
charged that the corruotion in government was so widespread that
even President Park himself had admitted^ In addition to a system
of resristration of private property owned by hic-h ranking government
officials, candidate Kim pledged to make public his personal
properties and take the lead in eliminating corruption and
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irregularities. The DA? argued that corruption would multiply, if
the NDP was brought to power. The DRP claimed that President Park
had a stringent and concrete plan to elipxinate corruption and
irregularties
,
which had been by-products of development.
The opposition party attacked the Homeland Reserve Forces and
military drill for students as a violation of the Constitution^ as
they forced a dual military obligation on the people. Evaders of
military service, stand-by service youths and the surplus manpower
beyond the annual conscription quota could be better used in other
ways than the cumbersome dual military system. The ruling party
warned that the disbanding of Homeland Reserve Forces would create
too much of a military disparity with North Korea. It therefore
insisted that these forces should not be disbanded regardless of
whoever might come to power. It also stated that so long as North
Korea continued to make war preparations, military drills for college
students should not be abolished.
As the campaign wore on, each of these issues received differing
emphasis by the candidates and other party leaders. It appears that
the opposition party was successful in pushing the DRP on the defensive
on almost all issues. As far as presenting the issues to the
electorate was concerned, the opposition candidate possessed the
ability to criticize the ruling party's policies freely and sometimes
in exaggerated terms, whereas the incumbent candidate was often
restrained by his official responsibilities.^^
Since such campaign techniques as door-to-door canvassing were
prohibited by election laws, both parties relied heavily on the
campaign rallies. The two major parties staged altogether some
600 rallies throughout the country involving some 5,000,000 voters,
who constituted about one third of the total electorate. Candidate
Park of the DR? appeared in only 9 rallies in provincial capitals
and Seoul and Pusan. The burden of the Dkl-'s sturring tour was
borne by Kim Jong-p'il who was popular among the people. The team
headed by Kim held campaign rallies for a total of 75 times throughout
the country. Other teams headed by the party chairman, Assembly
Speaker Yi Hyo-sang, and Advisor Chong Il-kwon toured the country
simultaneously in different sections of the country. The combined
DRP rallies throughout the country numbered 296. The bulk of the
opposition party campaign rallies was conducted by candidate Kim
himself. Compared with his DRP foe, Kim spoke to crowds at least
110 times. Other party leaders held rallies for another 155 times
for a combined total of 265 times. In addition to the campaign
rallies where the candidates were exposed to the electorate along
with other party leaders , both parties published propaganda material
28
Fo]' newspaper debates among party leaders on the major
campaign issues, see The Dong-A Ilbo
,
February 15, 1971 » ?• 3,
April 8, 1971, p. 3, Aoril 1^, 1971, p. 3 and April 22, 1971, P. 5.
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profusely. At the height of the campaign, the party organs- the
Kin.iukonc^hwano of the DR? and the Kin.ju.lgnson of the W circulated
some 1,000.000 copies. In case of the latter, the figure represented
about ten times the normal size of circulation. Through a series
of speaking tours, each party had tried to erase the "footsteps"
of the other party. This was particularly true of the opposition
party which seemed to rely almost entirely on cajnpaign rallies to
create a "boom" for its candidate. The DRP, on the other hand, seemed
to have a m.ore well ;)repared blueprint for victory.
The DRP's Campaign Headquarters made triumph in Seoul as one
of its objectives. It established a special Seoul Planning Office
under the Central Secretariat and completed the training of some 600
party workers at the Central Party Training School by the start of
the campaign. Several days prior to the election day, the DAP staged
one of the most impressive campaign rallies ever held by a ruling
party in the Capital City. In the rural areas, a peculiar campaign
technique, known as the "Drawing Room Discussion Group," was used
to lend a more personal approach. Taking place in the house of an
active party worker, this discussion group drew people from the
neighborhood to discuss all problems related to their lives, including
political ones. Each of the party's district offices reportedly held
an average of 80 such meetings throughout the campaign. In addition,
the party initiated campaigns to build village libraries and create
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scholarships with the objective of strengthening the villagers'
affinity with the party.
The Results and Aftermaths
The nation went to the polls on April 2? in the midst,^relative
calm. As many as 81A percent of the eligible voters participated
in this election. Compared with the I963 and I967 voter turnouts
there was some decline in the voting rate despite the tremendous
interests generated in the campaign. The I963 and I967 figures
were 85 and 83.6 percent respectively. The two major parties polled
98 percent of the total votes cast; in both the I963 and I967 elections,
the minor parties polled as much as 8 percent of the total vote.^^
The incumbent candidate emerged victorious in a hard fought
battle polling 6,3^2,828 to Kim's 5,395,900 votes. Park polled 54
percent of the votes cast for the two major candidates and had the
plurality of some 900,000 votes. The results of the election are
summarized in the following table( Table 22).-^°
The voting pattern of the 1971 presidential election showed
once again that there was a tremendous gap between the urban and
rural areas in voting patterns. Whereas Candidate Kim led Park
29
For an analysis of the 1971 presidential election returns,
see Yi Ycng-ho, "Saich'il Son'goui Chonf^ch'iuisik"( Political
Awareness of the April 27 Election), Shindon.^'a
.
June, 1971,
pp. 86-96.
30Compiled by the Central Election Management Committee.
The CEMC data are quoted in Chon~kyong Yon'gu
. i.o. 76(Lay, 1971),
pp. 20-33.
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Table 22. Provincial Breakdown of the Votes
Cast for the Two Major Parties in
the 1971 Presidential Election
Percentage the votes cast for the
two parties
Park(DRP) Kiin(NDP)
Seoul 40 60
Pusan 56
Kyong^i Province 50 50
Kangwon Province 61 39
Ch'ungpuk Province 58 kZ
Ch'unp-nam Province 55 45
Chonpuk Province 37 63
Chonnam Province 35 65
Kyongbuk Province 76 2k
Kyongnam Province 7^ 26
Cheju Province 58 42
Nation 5^ 46
by the ratio of 54.6 to 45.4 percent in the nation's seven larger
cities, the incumbent overshadowed his opponent by the ratio of
58,6 to 41.4 percent in the rural constituencies. However, it is
interestir.g to note that the DRP and Candidate Park have made
strong inroads in cities as well. In the eleven medium-sized cities.
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Park was winner over Kim by the ratio of 53.1 to -^f6. 9 percent: in
small cities, Park's percentage increased to 56.3 percent, whereas
his princioal opponent's percentage dropped to 43.?.
In this election, however, the urban-rural cleavage in voting
behavior was completely overshadowed by the regional gap between the
Yongnam and Honam areas. In the Yongnam area, which included Pusan,
Kyongsang Namdo and ?:yongsang Pukdo, its "favorite son" had a
plurality of more than a million and half votes over Kim, who, in
turn, beat Park by a little more than 600,000 votes in the Konam
area of Chonra Pukdo and Chonra Namdo. Despite the public pleas
made by both candidates to set aside regional sentiments, the sectional
vote concentration emerged as the most significajit voting pattern
in the election. In more visible terms. Park outcast Kim three to
one in the Yonpjiaan area, whereas Kim outclassed Park two to one in
the Honam area. The effects of the regional confrontation erasing
the urban-rural gap was naturally the greatest in these two areas j,
and this was well illustrated by the fact that Kim as the opposition
candidate polled 62.1 percent of the rural vote in the Konam area
31
whereas Park won 62.8 percent of the urban vote in the Yongnam area.
Park's victory then can be attributed to the fact that his
native provinces which constituted the largest voting bloc in the
country gave an overwhelming support to their favorite son candidate.
^^Compiled by Yi Yong-ho, "Saich'il Son'goui Chongch'iuisik"
(Political Awareness Shown in the April 2? Election), p. 89.
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The same was true with Kim's area of strength. But the low voter
turnout of ?? percent in Kim's area^^ combined with the fact that
there were about a million and a half less voters in the Honam region
than in the Yongnam area proved fatal for the I^DP candidate. In
addition, the opposition candidate failed to win in medium-sized and
small cities where his predecessors usually gained plurality.
As soon as the ballots were counted, however, the two parties
once again diverged widely on the fairness of the election. In what
they called "silent election frauds," Candidate Kim and the i\D?
claimed that they were deprived of "millions of vote" through
manipulation by the ruling oarty and the administration."^-^ In sharp
contrast, the ruling oarty claimed that the election Just completed
was carried out in an atmosphere which even the advanced democracies
could envy, While the foreign correspondents ' dispatches generally
agreed with the ruling party's assessment of the way the campaign
was conducted, the observation team of the U1\CURK, which was asked
the
to observe the election at/request of the Central Election Kanagement
Committee, reported that it could not confirm the opposition charges
32 <^
Kyongsang Fukdo and Kyongsang l>;amdo had a voter turnout rate
of 85.4 percent and 83.2 percent respectively. Both figures were
well above the national average of 81.^ percent.
33For the newspaper advertisement entitled "Silent Election
Frauds," tree The Done-A Il'oo
.
Kay 1, 1971i , p. 7. It claimed that
the DRP illegally manipulated 3,000,000 votes.
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of irrecrularities and that the election was carried out in calm and
in apparent fairness .-^^
Kim Dae-juns, in his after-election interview on April 30, stated
that he regretted the fact that he was unable to send congratulatory
flowers to the winner and stated his reasons why the election was
a "fundamental fraud. "-^^
The ruling party has used scores of times more
money than the^legally allowed 920 million won in
bribing the members and buying votes, while theWF could not raise even half of the legal limit.
All out mobilization of administrative power
was used in the election.
Government funds were used for electioneering
purposes,
Innmerable pro-MDF voters were deprived of
the opportunity to vote whereas pro-D.iF voters
were rej^istered in the voters' list twice or
three times so that two or three votes could be
cast under a single name.
34
The assesment of elections by various individuals and groups,
domestic and foreign, are summarized in Kam Jae-hi, "Saich'il^Son'gS
ChJ5nhuui ChSngch'i Kaekrak"(A Campaign Sketch of the April 27
Election), Chonrkyon? Yon'gu
. Uo. 76(Kay, 1971), pp. 98-112.
^%ee The Korea Times
, April 30, 1971, p. 1. The National
Consultative Conference to Safeguard Democracy shared the liDP's
assessment of the election procedures. In its statement released
on April 30, the Conference charged that the "election irregularities
were manipulated by unprecedented exercize of money and administrative
power" and that such manipulation constituted an "assault on
democracy. " The association set out to boycott the May 25 Assembly
elections. For the statement of the Consultative Conference, see
The DonF-A Ilbo
.
April 30, 1971, p. 1.
Proxy-voting, ballot inserting and replacing,
and expulsion of M)P supervisors at polling places
have taken place.
The government disclosed voting results first
from pro-government party districts to give the
false impression that the DRF victory was only a
matter of time and then committed various irregu-
larities as the KDF election supervisors were
discouraged.
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CHAPm VI THE PARTY IK THE GOVERN^SI.T
Since the holding of governmental power is a raison d'etre of
a political party, it is important to probe into the behavior of
party's representatives once they are elected to office. In terms
of organizational and financial support that candidates receive
during Assembly elections, the present ruling and opposition
Assemblymen markedly differ.^ Since these men owe varying degree
of graces from the party to which they are affiliated, their perception
of the party's role in their election is one of the factors affecting
the behavior of Assemblymen in the legislature. In order to under-
stand the peculiar characteristics of the Korean legislative process,
it is important to discuss the attitudinal differences of the ruling
and opposition party Assem.blymen and probe into the sources of such
behavior
.
In a newspaper survey made immediately after the I967 Assembly
election of the successful and unsuccessful DrtP and KDP candidates,
it was revealed that they had a sharp difference in their estimation
of the role of parties played in their campaign. As far as the
successful DRP candidates were concerned, their victory was owed to
their political party than to any other factor: party organization,
17.7 percent; support of the affiliated party, I5.6 percent; policies
and platforms, 10.^ percent; and the success of the constituency.
"'^ee The Hankuk Ilbo, June 9, 1970, p. 5» and U Byong-kyu,
op . cit., t). 71.
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projects sponsored by the candidate. 1^.1 percent. As far as the
successful roP candidates were concerned, only 9-^ percent replied
that they attributed their victory to the party organization; 17.
6
percent to sur)nort of the affiliated party; 12 percent to personal
ties; 17.3 percent to name recognitions. These figures seem to
indicate that the opposition candidates x^ere definitely more on
their own than the DRP counterparts, and consequently tended to
exhibit more independent behavior as Assemblymen.^
The attitudinal differences m.ay also be ascertained by each
party member's perception of the internal order of the party to which
he is affiliated and his relationship vdth the party in the
legislative process. Table 23 summarizes the Assemblymen's view of
the internal order of the party in the Seventh x\'ational Assembly."^
There was a less marked but still significant difference between
the DRP and KDP Assem.blymen on their perception of the role of party
organization, either within or outside the National Assembly on
their legislative voting ^as the following table indicates( Table 24).^
Although the majority of the members of both parties regard themselves
as bound to the party's decision in their legislative voting, such
2
The Kankuk Ilbo , June 9, 1970» P» 5« In another survey made
on the Assemblymen, a similar result was obtained, oee U Byong-kyu,
OP . cit . , p. 71« This seems to indicate that there is a considerable
difference between the two parties as tc the hold of the parties
on their legislators.
-
^Ibid .
. p. 31.
k
Ibid.
Table 23. The Assemblymen's View of the
Internal Order of Their Party
(to)
Very democratic 5.3 63.3
Fairly democratic 30.0
Slightly democratic 33.3 6.7
Undemocratic 38.7
Severely undemocratic 8,0
Table 2^. The National Assemblymen's rtelationship
with Their Party in Legislative Voting
DRP Assemblymen ID? Assembl^inen
Vote according to
decision of the
party leadership 16.2 I3.3
Vote according to decision
of the party caucus 61.3 60.
0
Vote according to personal
belief ^ I7.5 23.3
Vote according to public
opinion 5«0 3.3
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tendency was somewhat more evident in the DRP. Similarly, there was
also a marked difference between the Assemblymen of the two major
parties in their estimation of party sanctions when they voted against
the party decision on a bill. About 7^ percent of the ruling DRP
members thought that it would be "stern." whereas only percent
of the opposition legislators thought so.-^
Although the majority of the Korean legislators hold to the
Burkean notion of representation.^ with a majority of the Assemblymen
in the Seventh National Assembly having: felt that they should represent
the whole nation, all available evidence seems to indicate that there
is also a sifrnificant difference on this score between the DRF and
the NDP law-makers. In one survey, it was shovm that the DRP
legislators emphasized the need to behave according to their own
"beliefs" rather than according to public opinion. The opposition
legislators, however, overwhelmingly endorsed the view that the
nation's elites should follow public opinion.*^
The attitudinal differences between the DRF and the KDF Assemblymen
did not cease on procedural matters discussed above. In a recent
5 ^ V
U Byong-kyu and Kim Chong-rim, "Wonnae Ch'ongmuron"(On Party
Whip). Shindong'a
.
February. 1971, p. 104.
Kim Chong-rim and U Eyong-kyu, "Taeui Chongch'iwa Kukhoewiwon"
(Representative Politics and the National Assemblymen). Ch^n.-rkyong
Y^n'gu
.
September. 1970, p. 25.
7 s/ v
Yi Yong-ho, "Hankukinui Kach'ikwan"( The Value Systems of
Koreans), Special Series No. 16, The Choson Ilbo , May 4, 1972, p. 4.
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extensive survey on the values systems of Koreans and the K'ational
Assemblymen, it was discovered that there are major differences on
substantive matters. In ordering the nation's priorities, for
example, the opposition legislators tended to emphasize political
stability m.ore often than their DRP counterparts, who tended to
identify economic problems as the urgent national issue. Table 25
demonstrates this proclivities.^
On the liberal-conservative continuum, the opposition legislators
leaned consistently to the liberal side on such questions as ecological
problems and the distribution of wealth. The ruling party Assembly-
men tended to be more conservative than the national sample; the
opposition law-makers were far more liberal than the national sample.
On the question of their preference between the two conflicting
values of the national priorities— economic growth on the one hand
and democracy and freedom on the other, it was discovered that the
DRP legislators are for more economic growth oriented than the
national sample; the KDP legislators, on the other hand, were fo^
more democracy oriented than the national sample. On the question
of whether the agricultural sector or the industrial sector should
g
Ibid. This national survey is the most extensive study of
Korean value systems ever made. The study was made between
September and November, 1971.
9Ibid
. .
Series No. 10, March 16, 1972, p.
^'
^Ibid
. , Series No. 1, January 1, 1972, p. 5.
^^Ibid., Series No. 4, January 20, 1972, p. ^.
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Table 25.. Issue Awareness of Korean Voters
and National Assembljnnen.
Nation
(%)
Assemblymen DRP NDP
Unification 16 15
Corruption 8 J. T OiZ
Economic stability 2? 19
Rural develoment 11 3 J J
Social stability- 7 9 6 12
Ethical stability 7 9 15 6
National integration 2 8 Q7 <
Political stability 17 10 21
National security 6 5 9 2
Diplomacy 1 1 1 1
Education 3 3 4 3
Others Ik 2 1 3
be emphasized in setting the nation's priorities, the results of the
survey showed a curious result in that the Assemblymen from the rural
electoral districts (which tended to be DRP Assemblymen) exhibited
a pro-industrial inclination; the lurban representative(which tended
to be NDP law-m.akers ) , on the other hand, showed a proclivity for
12
the agricultural sector.
Ibid., Series No. 3» January 13, 1972, p. 4.
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How should one explain the differing attitudes of the ruling
and opposition party members in the National Assembly sketched above?
The answer should perhaps lie in the faci that through long years
out of government, the opposition legislators have internalized the
anti-government and the anti-ruling party complex. At least since
the Third National Assembly, the nation's legislative branch has been
dominated by the ruling party Assemblymen. Having been relegated
to the role of permanent opposition, they apoear to have acquired
a value system which dictated opposition for the sake of opposition.
Such ODpositionalism is explained by Aris tide Zolberg in the following
13
terms
:
The incumbent leaders ^and3 challengers tend
to view conflict as an all-or nothing proposition...
(since 3 factors v/hich might make for the limitation
of issues are almost non-existent, whether it be.-ins
by asking for better wages or better prices, whether
it is dissatisfied v/ith the delimitation of
constituencies or with lack of consideration for
general claims, the opposition almost always ends up
challenging the entire order which the regime is
dedicated to build.
What makes for the militant posture of the opposition and the
ruling party Assemblymen is the fact that opposition members basically
13
Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order ( Chicago : Rand NciVally,
1966), p. 75' Asoka Kehta argued similarly: "In colonial, as well as
ex-colonial countries , the tradition of opposition goes deep.
Constructive aprroaches are limited; the debris of wrongs, real or
imagined, is littered all around. National movements usually achieve
negative solidarity thoup-h ooposition to alien rule, while positive
agreement remains vague. The posture of opposition tends to become
normal...." Asoka Kehta, "The Opposition in the New States," in
Democracy in the New States, ed.. Office for Asian Affairs of the
Congress for Cultural ?reedom(New Delhi, 1959) » PP. 86-&9.
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view the incimbent party as illegitimate since the latter gained
power through manioulation and illegal means. For example one
prominent WP leader remarked in I967 that:"'"^
Only when the ruling party and the opposition
recognized that the elections by which they were
elected to the l.ational Assembly were fair, would
the members of opposite parties have mutually
respected each other's political integrity and
recognized each other's existence. Only such a
National Assembly could be operated smoothly....
From the beginning of its admiriistration the DR?
government had been advocating political stability,
coooeration, and contest based on issues. But such
advocacy had been in vain. The cause of the
failure lay in the irregular process through which
the DRP gained TOvrer.
Another IDF leader compared his party's tactics against the ruling
party with a soccer game. Ke said that the "militant line" is
a "reaction to the unconstitutional means employed by the Park
government." "Suppose," he continued, "the opponents in a soccer
game play the ball with both feet and hands, we should not be
unilaterally forced to observe the rule of the game by playing the
ball only with the feet.""""^
Without any hope of unseating the incumbent party, the opposition
remains adamant to deal with the ruling party on its terms. Such
extreme tactics— Assembly walk-out, demonstration in the streets.
Kim Yong-sam, Chongch'inun Kilgo Chon^IctTOnun Tchalrjta
(Politics and 'Government rower) (Seoul: Sasanggesa, 196?), p. 100.
Translates and quoted in K. B. Kim, 00. cit . , p. I69.
-"^Statement of Kim Su-han, quoted in The Choson Ilbo, October
26, 1965, Translated and quoted in K. 3. Kim, og. cit., p. I7I.
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physical violence on the floor of the National Assembly and caustic
public condemnation of the government and the ruling party— have
invited militant reaction from the ruling party. Extremism begets
extremism. For the opposition legislators, the struggle against
the ruling party is deemed a patriotic duty— "the more extreme the
struggle, the more patriotic the struggle for democracy in the
country. "'^ One consequence of such extreme style of opposition
has resulted in the ascendancy of the militant factions in each of
the parties.
The Legislative Party
Since the middle of the Sixth National Assembly, the autonomy
of the Assembly has been a subject of wide debate in the country and
among the Assemblymen themselves. The degeneration of the legislative
branch into a "handsmaid" to the executive branch has stemmed from
a host of factors. Except for the nine-month period during which
a cabinet system operated, Korea has operated under a presidential
system which tends to give the executive branch a superior constitutional
status. Under the present Constitution, for example, the President,
who is elected directly by the people, is not accountable to the
Assembly except in case of impeachment as stipulated in Article 6l.
The National Assembly has no power to paF-s non-confidence motions
•^
^Ibid .. p. 170.
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against the government as a whole except for individual motions
asainst the Prime Minister and the Kembers of the State Council.
Except for the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
and the Chairman of the Board of Audit which requires the approval
of the Assembly, the President can freely appoint all government
officials including the Prime Minister. The executive branch can
participate in the legislative process by exercising its power to
introduce bills(Article ^8) and the power to issue ordinances in
emergency situations (Article 73 and 7^). The President also has
the power to return bills passed by the Assembly for reconsideration;
he can participate in the Assembly sessions to state opinions and
answer questions(Article 56). Moreover, the constitutional requirement
that a candidate for the Assembly must first secure endorsement from
a political party(Article 36) and the stipulation that a member of
the Assembly shall automatically lose his seat if he changes or leaves
his party(Article 38), have further strengthened the President's
position in relation to those members of the Assembly who belong to
his party.
On the other hand, the Assembly is empowered to enact laws to
pass on government budgets, to inspect the Administration(Article 57),
to impeach the President(Article 61), to cast non-confidence votes
against the Prime Minister and the members of the State Council, to
require the attendance of the Prime Minister and the members of the
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State Council at its sessions for the purpose of answering questions
from the Assemblymen, l^rhen the relative constitutional status and
powers are weighed, the executive branch appears to have an upperhand.
This would be r^articularly so if the President is the leader of the
ruling party as is presently the case. The ruling party's unchallengea-
ble majority in the Assembly has also encouraged the government to
treat the legislative branch in a cavalier fashion. The Political
has
Party Law, too, been utilized to control the Assemblymen. Among
the non-institutional factors contributing to the wanin,^ of legislative
authority is the recent em.phasis on policy output in the name of
development, which has had the effect to cause the process of conflict
and dialogue in the Assembly to recede into the background, as it
is believed to be a waste of time.
The impotence of the legislative branch can also be considered from
the point of view of the cross-pressures that are exerted upon the
Assemblymen in regard to their voting in the National Assembly. The
Assemblymen themselves do notseem to feel/^great necessity to have
a close communication with either the interest groups or his constitu-
ents. The constituents seem to view their representatives as persons
who could do favors for them at the center. It rarely occurs that
a voter would take the trouble to either support or oppose certain
policy positions that his representative has taken or the way he has
voted on the floor. Hence the constituency pressure on legislative
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voting is kept at/minimum. It is significant to note that about 70
percent of the DRF Assemblymen thought that ^^^^oting in the Assembly
would have little or no relationship to^^^^'^reelection. Some ^5
percent of the I'D? counterparts answered similarly. 17
Such a lack of communication is demonstrated between the
legislators and the interest groups as well. The majority of both
the DRF and the m? law-makers in the Seventh ^.ational Assembly
reported that they had either not been approached by any interest
groups or had been approached by a few interest groups on very few
occasions. Among the very few interest groups that were reported
to have contacted some Assemblymen were the Korean Business Association
and the Korean Chamber of Commerce. 1:0 farmer or later organizations
were included in this list.^^ The majority of the Assemblymen in
the Seventh National Assembly thought that the interest groups in
Korea exercized no influence on the legislative branch, though many
of them saw the desirability of pressure group activities in the
19Assembly. The reason why the interest groups do not seek frequent
contact with the legislative branch is not very difficult to find.
As vre have seen in Chapter IV, much of their well-being depends
upon the graces of the administration. They would obtain their
desired results more rapidly if they go to the high levels of
17
U By^ng-kyu, op. cit., p. 33.
-"•
^Ibid ., o. 37.
^^Ibid., p. 238.
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administration rather than the Assembly.
Given the situation where the channels of communication between
the legislature and both the electorate and the interest groups are
closed and remain largely ineffectual, the only possible non-official
channel is that of mass media, especially the daily newspapers.
Although several surve^^ indicated that newspapers exert pressure
upon the Assemblymen, and hence affect their behavior in the Assembly,
their effectiveness in communicating with the legislative branch has
also been beset with difficulties— the most serious of which has
been the lack of autonomy from political power in every aspect of
21their activities. Kewspapers in Korea have had a venerable tradition
of dissent since the time of the Japanese colonial rule and the
tradition had been kept alive since the independence. Other channels
of communications having been virtually closed, the newspapert has
remained a potent "potential" interest group. The successive Korean
governments, except the short-lived Democratic administration in I960,
have tried to cuirb the potential influence of newspapers through
various means, including the issuance of administrative orders to
close their doors, but the newspapers today remain as a powerful
20
Ibid., p. 335*
21
For the role of newspapers in the Korean political process,
see Bonr-p-i Kim., A Brief History of the ;lorean Press (Seoul: Korean
Information Service, I965), and Choe Chun, "-olitics and Fress in
Korea," Korean Affairs, Vol. 3(December, 196^), po. 296-303. A
good summary of the oroblems encountered by the Korean newspapers
is found in U Byong-kyn, oo. cit., pp. 3^9-355
•
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potential interest group in the context of Korean politics.
Because the ooposition party in the Assembly rarely quarrels
with the ruling party on substantive legislative matters, the
legislative program of the Assembly is always originated, directed
and managed by the top leadership of the ruling party in consulation
with high government officials. Table 26 shows the status of
government-sponsored and. individual member-sponsored bills in the
22National Assembly since 1948. The table clearly reveals that both
in term of number of legislative proposals and the number of bills
enacted into law, government proposed bills had a^upperhand compared
to the bills proposed by individual AssenblyTien. It is also significant
that goverrxment bills had a far greater chance of passing the National
Assembly than the bills proposed by individual members. V/ith the
exception of the Third and Fourth "National Assemblies, government
proposed bills showed a consistently higher rate of passage in the
National Assembly than individual Assemblymen's bills. As has been
noted by a student of the Korean legislative process a great
percentage of the bills proposed by individual Assemblymen are
23
cleared in advance with the appropriate government ministries.
This is particularly true under the present ruling party, which, in
coordination with the administration, often first drafts a bill in
22
——
—
^
Comoiled and adooted from the data presented by Kan Chong-il,
Hankuk Ghon?ch'i Haengchongron(A Study on Korean Politics and
Adjninistration) (Seoul: rakyongsa, 1972), pp. 62-86.
^^Ibid., p. 94.
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Table 26, Bills Proposed and Passed in the
National Assembly
Government Bills Assemble/men's Hills
No. Ko. passed I.o. I^o. passed
Constituent Assembly
of bills
'to passed 73.1 ' /^gO
Ko. 1/4-5 106 89 lV\
-1 — _
Second Assembly
No. of bills 216 137 i8l 75
% passed 63A h,\,k
Third Assembly
Ko. of bills 2^1 85 169 71S passed 35.2 42
Fourth Assembly
Ko. of bills 202 44 120 31
io passed 21.8 25.8
Fifth Assembly
No. of bills 108 40 92 26
io passed 37 28.2
Sixth Assem.bly
Ko. of bills 242 I55 415 177
I0 passed 64 42.6
Seventh Assembly
No. of bills 188 120 162 67
^ passed 63.8 41.9
its policy Committee or the Office of Policy Research and then arranges
to have one of its Assembly members to introduce it in the Assembly.
Such a legislative tactic is adopted whenever the government deals
with a sensitive political issue and wishes to evade the responsibility
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of formally sponsorinP, a bill on that matter. During the Sixth
National Assembly, for example, two of the most controversial bills
were propc-sed by individual Assemblymen-^- the Bill on the Establishment
of Committee on Journalistic Ethics and the Bill on Safeguarding
the Campuses. Both of these bills were introduced amid highly
emotional and militant struggles within and outside the National
Assembly over the question of ratifying the Korea-Japan i;orralization
Treaty. The curbing of press activities and those of the students
during this period was a sensitive issue which nevertheless required
some sort of legislation. Thus two leading DR? members of the
Assembly were asked to formally introduce these two bills even though
the government itself was their real sponsor.
The gradual weakening of the status of the legislative branch
vis-a-vis the executive branch has begun to be felt am.ong the
Assemblymen themselves. In a survey of the Assemblymen of the
Seventh National Assembly, a great majority of them felt that the
Assembly had degenerated into an ineffective body. The following
table shows their responses (Table 2?).^^
The S eventh National Assembly : a case study
. The refusal of the
elected ND? Assemblymen to sit with the ruling party members for
the opening of the Seventh National Assembly marked an ominous
beginning for the highest law-making body in the nation. The ND?
2^
U Byong-kyu, op. cit
. , p. 70.
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Table 2?. Estimation of the Effectiveness of the
Legislative Branch by the Assemblymen
Very effective 2.6
Fairly effective 17.9
Slightly effective 33.3 20.0
Ineffective 46.2 80.0
charges of widespread election irregularities in the general election
on June 8, I967 were partly redressed by the ruling party's recognition
of such election frauds, termed "degrading" by President Park himself,
and the expulsion of eight DRF Assemblymen who were allegedly involved
in the irregularities. The LDP, while filing a joint election suit
with the Supreme Court, boycotted the Assembli'- for more than five
months
.
While the negotiations with the opposition for the normalization
of the Assembly functions were being dead-locked, the ruling party
expelled another eight others and founded a satellite negotiating
grouD called the October Five Club(so named because the group registered
with the Secretariat of the National Assembly on that day). This
ingeneouc method was adopted to circumvent the constitutional
provision which guarantees multiparties in the Liational Assembly.
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Even after the return of the opposition law-makers on Lovember
29, the sessions of the Assembly were not normalized. Insisting
that the conditions of their return were not faithfully carried out
by the ruling party, the I.DP legislators staged a sit-in strike
while the budget bill for I968 was on the agenda of the Assembly.
The DRF disolayed its show of strength when the budget was rained
through on December 28 in one corner of the Assembly floor. The KDP
proceeded to boycott several more sessions and it was not until
April 29, 1968 that the Assembly was r.crrualized after the it
passed a five-point Guarantee Legislation. The one-party .National
Assembly in the meantime passed many bills, including the important
Revised Petroleum Tax Bill which v/as submitted by the administration
just five days prior to the closing of the Assem.bly session, with
a request to pass the entire provisions of the bill without revision.
Without having a sufficient time to study the bill and discussion
on the floor, the bill was passed two days after it was introduced.
The two miajor parties entered on another collision course in
the beginning' of I969 on the issue of constitutional amendment for
the third term presidency. In a disobedience incident which shook
the ruling party, the "maincurrent" DRF legislators allied with the
opposition to help pass the non-confidence motion against the Education
Minister Y.won 0-byong. The incident was followed, as hasy^seen earlier,
by the expulsion of the rebelling leaders on strong orders from
President Park, As has been discussed in Chapter II, the am.endment
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bill was passed on September l^f during the predawn hours in a highly
irregular fashion after the opposition legislators' occupation of
the Speaker's rostrum. The opposition party, having resolved to
dissolve the party temporarily to disqualify three of its own members
who cajTie out in support of the amendment, once again remained outside
the Assembly. It took more than eight months for the opposition to
return to the Assembly to begin their negotiations with the ruling
party on revision of electoral laws.
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CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION
The -foregoing chapters probed into the development of party
politics in Korea since 19^5 when Korea emerged from the authoritarian
rule of the Yi Dynasty and the subsequent Japanese colonial rule.
Circumstances were generally '
" unfavorable to the development
of healthy political parties. A low degree of popular participation
in politics and severe restrictions on political activities had
been the norm of political life. During the Japanese colonial rule,
the nationalist movement turned out to be an ineffective and dispersed
venture due to internal dissension and external prosecution. In the
post-war era, Korea lived under three years of American Ililitary
Goverranent( 1945-19^1.8) during which the vicissitudes of international
politics largely determined the course of domestic politics. Since
independence, Korea experienced twelve years of authoritarian rule
under Rhee( 19^8-1960)
,
though there was some competitive party politics
in the latter years of the First Republic. The April Student Uprising
brought t?iis government down through bloodshed smd opened a way for
a multiparty liberalism under a cabinet system for a nine-month
period. A military coup brought this governm.ent to an end, and, for
two years, the nation was in the hands of the military, which, however,
under
was increasing pressure to reestablish a constitutional government.
A
The trasition to a constitutional government was made in 1963 . Since
then Korea has been experiencing growing two party competition under
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a presidential system. In the short span of some twenty-five years,
Korea has rcne through the authoritarianism of one dominant party,
multiparty liberalism, military authoritarianism and constitutionalism.
Chapter II has given a detailed account of the origin and
development of political parties in Korea since 19^+5. it has /clearly
shown that political parties cannot be institutionalized simply
because the party elites want them to. Both the ruling parties of
the past and the present— the LP and the DR?— are externally created
parties: the form.er was created by a decree of an authoritarian and
charismatic President who saw it useful for consolidating his power;
the latter was organized preemptively by military men who had staged
a COUP before party activities were permitted. This peculiar situation
affected the functioninp- of ruling parties in various aspects. As
LaFalombara and Weiner have noted, externally created parties tend
not to be identified with the legislature but with the administration,
thus foresaking its representative function.
The first major opposition party was created more or less in
the legislature as a response to President Rhes's systematic alienation
of those who had supported him. To these initially disenchanted
former associates flocked many politicians who had been frustrated
in their bid for positions of power and influence. Rhee's and the
LP's repe?..ted attempts to perpetuate their power gave solidarity to
these politicians who otherwise had little in common. A collection
of ambitious politicians with little or no positive common denominator.
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the OT^tDosition party was in fact, a "party of parties" in which
several factions with each led by a dominant personality fought for
the hegemony of the party.
By the latter half of the First Republic, the form and the
substance of a quasi-competitive two party structure were attained,
but the prospect of a peaceful transfer of power was betrayed by
election riggings and the resultant student uprisings which toppled
the LP regime. The collapse of the Liberal Party clearly showed the
degree to which the ruling party was dependent upon the power of the
administration. With the forceful overthrow of the L? government,
the hope of the first ruling Korean party to outlive its dominant
personality disappeared.
The Second Republic, as a negation of the ancien regime
, operated
under an entirely different system. As far as parties were concerned,
almost unlimited freedom was accorded in the range of activities and
the scope of policies they could espouse. The party in power was
badly split into two groups and in endless counter maneuverings to
gain ascendancy over each other. The factional struggle had taken
its toll when the military staged a coup d ' etat in I96I. Political
activities were banned for two years, during which the groundwork
was laid by some elements of the junta for the organization of a
politica? party to nrovide for the transition to a civilian goverrjnert.
The paj-ty thus created, the DRP, was a product of a careful political
engineering, and it has functioned as a cohesive and disciplined
29^
oolitical Dai-ty quite unlike the LP. As for the major opposition
party in this period, it, too, has been a refuge for frustrated
politicians
.
In this dissertation, Korean political parties are seen as
structures which carry out activities in the pursuit of oolitical
power. In the manner of Frank Sorauf 's study of American political
parties, this study has divided the Korean parties for analytical
puriDoses into thj-ee sectors— the party in the electorate, the narty
organization and the party government— and has examined their
activities.
Charter III dealt with the oarty organization nroper in terms
of the policy orientations, the formal and informal structures and
the elites of m.ajor Korean parties. Except for a very brief period
iinmediately after the liberation, the international position of
Korea dictated the elimination of the leftist and progressive
ideologies. A bloody war with Korth Korea, continued armed provocation
from the North solidified the conservatism of major Korean parties.
Under these severe restrictions, party programs or policies were
advocated vrithin the boundary of the conservative right. This in
turn reduced Darty politics to;^ struggle for power. Rarely have the
two major parties fought on substantive issues; such issues as
dictatorshio, tenure of power, abuse of power— all procedural ones
—
emerged as salient election issues. More often than not, the two
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narty battle was fought not on the basis of policy but on personalities,
not on the basis of substance but on procedures.
Kore often than not, Korean political parties failed to outlive
its founder or the dominant personality. The Korean parties have
been prroups of individual politicians seeking personal power. Kany
Doliticians have deserted their original parties when that would
better serve their self-interest. In other words, the or,';anizational
frapility of Korean parties is rooted in personalism. Faction and
factional Tx>litics have blocked institutionalization of party structure
and leadershio. They have caused discontinuity of party politics
and rarty rxjlicy. They have evoked the sense of alienation of the
public toward oolitical parties. They have caused corruotion. A
party e;enerally draws people for reasons of money, personal power,
special interest, blood relations, place of origin, and on occasion,
involuntarily through abuse of administrative power. It appears that
the commitment to membership in a party is rarely made on the basis
of ideolopy or policy. This means the transiency of party membership
—
when conditions chane^e, one could abandon a oarty in favor of another.
a.',gravated
The recruitment problem has been ^ by the severe legal limitations
on the elif^ibility to party membership.
If any categorization be made of Korea^^ political parties, they
each
are all "elite" oarties in a sense that is exclusively oriented
toward maintenance of personal political power. The party elites
in the National Assembly tend to be a highly educated group. Since
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1963, the DRP's Assemblymen were principally composed of two groups—
the bureaucrats and the retired military men. The opposition party's
Assemblymen tend to have a more varied background who have come
together mainly to oppose the ruling party.
Chapter IV treated the sector of the party structure ensconced
in the electorate. The associational interest groups in the Korean
context lack autonomy from state fXDwer in their internal affairs
and hence in their external affairs. They tend to shy away from
taking independent political action since their well-being depend
to a cTeat extent on the crraces of the administration. In the early
years of the L? reo-ime, these ?-roups served as adjuncts to the party
in power and a mere accessory to the regime in power. On the other
hand, the strength of the institutional and anomic interest groups
in Korea may be viewed as a consequence of the failure of party
politics. In the political milieu in which the legitimate interests
cannot be articulated and aggregated into policies, the likelihood
that the public discontents and social maladies explode beyond the
prescribed procedures are increased.
How are we to evaluate Korean voters? How have the twenty-five
years of riarty politics affected their political habits and orientations
fron the lonfr tradition of subjugation to the state and the ruling
elites? AA'ailable data clearly point to encouraging directions.
The imriorted system of liberal democracy is on the way of earning
legitimacy through some twenty-five years of challenge, opposition,
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acceptance, adoptation and acculturation. Although the Korean voters
are yet to vote the incumbent party out. they seem to have accepted
elections as a vital institution of de^nocracy. The rate of voter
participation in elections is analogous to that of western democracies.
Yet there are disturbing signs as well. While it was discovered that
they accept political parties as a legitimate institutional apparatus
in the Korean context, they are hesitant to openly identify with a
narticular tx)litical party or become a member of a political party.
The 'Vaos" evident between the ^orban and the rural areas and between
the regions in Korea, and, especially the forr.er, ha.ve substituted
the ethnic, religious and class cleavages evident in other developing
states of Asia and Africa.
The electoral process sketched in Chapter V has provided an
outline of the functioning of political parties in the sectors of
the electorate and the party organization proper at the peak of their
activities. The elections in Korea exhibit characteristics peculiar
to many developing countries in that the incumbent power holders
have a built-in advantage over the party out of power in the resources
they manage— in terms of mem.bership. political funds, organizational
strength and the ixjtential use and abuse of administrative power.
Where these resources could easily be translated into votes— in the
has
rural areas in the Korean case, the incumbent party fared consistently
A
well. In the urban areas with their opix)3ition proclivities, the
opposition party^ied the ruling party, at least since a semblance
of the two party system was established. The election under study
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pointed to an encouraging sign that the party battle for the
electorate's vote on the whole took the fom of reasonably clear-cut
policy alternatives. This was a clear departure, for example, from
ten years ago when presidential elections were fought basically on
the virtues of the personality of the candidates. This can be
interoreted as the maturation of both the party system and the
electorate which are mutually supportive.
Strictly speaking, elections do not determine the policy of the
nation, but decide who shall decide what the government shall do.
Korean voters rarely bind their representatives— both on the
presidential and the Assembly levels— to a certain set of policies,
except for the broad mandate the winning party brings into office.
The nation has undergone eieht general and seven presidential
elections (one indirect) and rarely has the losing party acceded to
the defeat at the polls. Charges of election frauds and court
litigations for annulment of election results have been widespread.
This has been of serious consequence for the legitimacy and the
stability of the government regardless of the merit of the opposition
claims of vote rigging. The presidential election under study has
been no exception. This has undermined dialogue and compromise and
opened the way for the opposition to take a militant posture toward
the party which they regard as having acquired power through
illegitimate means. There is no question but that the incumbent
party has always been able to mobilize its resources and v/age electoral
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campaigns from the position of strength. The opposition, at great
odds to unseat the incumbents, however, has waged an intensely
emotional campai^m.
The sector of the party structure in the government is discussed
from the perspective of the behavior of the legislators in the
National Assembly. The prospective of having a fruitful dialogue
between the ruling and opposition legislators has been marred to a
great extent by the shared belief on the part of the oprosition
Assemblymen that the ruling oarty has cone to occupy the seat of
pjoverrwient throurh illegitimate means. The tvra parties collided on
the floor of the rational Assembly on issues which appeared to be
capable of resolution through compromise and debate. This situation
often ended in such militant tactics as opposition walk-out and the
"one party National Assembly." Such militant style of politics
dominated the life of the JJational Assembly in recent years, and
also in the later years of the Liberal Party regime. The fact that
no peaceful transfer of power was made in the post-liberation era
strengthens the arguement that party politics has failed to resolve
conflicts in Korean politics. Repeated constitutional amendments
and martial laws are eloquent illustrations of resolving conflicts
through physical and not political means. The opposition, on the
other hand, responded to the assault by the administration through
militant struggle to the point of violating constitutional order.
The opposition appeared to be incapable of wresting power.
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Without having tasted political power, the opposition party has
degenerated into a protest group rather than a responsible political
.
party. On the other hand, its irresponsible behavior has further
reduced its chance of taking the reigns of government.
Through a number of years of confrontation in the Kational
Assembly, the two major parties' Assemblymen appeared to have
internalized value systems peculiar to their own. As was the case
with the DP, the present IvTDP's major plank has been its expressed
concern for democracy and the prevention of dictatorship. The D.tP's
emphasis on modernization and policy output has made the leaders of
the r^alin? party impatient about the militant opposition tactics
within and outside the ^Jational Assembly. The collision of these
has
value systems and the different life-styles often resulted in the
paralysis of the legislative process, and the domination by the
executive branch in the law-making function in the i.ational Assembly.
It is no wonder that under these circumstances, the image of the
nation's legislature has been deteriorating in the eyes of the public.
Kost important of all, the National Assembly has failed to resolve
the great issues of the time through mediation and dialogue. In their
struggle for power, politicians have lost touch with the general
public and party politics has become a "game" among the elites.
Ultimately, Korean political parties should be judged on the
basis of their contributions to political stability, government
decision-making, and the general well-being of the Korean people.
lis
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An alien institution cannot be expected to take root in the short
span of twenty-five years. It should be remembered that there is
no iimnediate panacea for all the ills of Korean parties. The pathology
of the Korean political parties described in the preceding pages has
complex roots, and its cure lies in part in a careful examination
of the Korean political tradition and an unwavering commitment to
the values of liberal democracy on the part of both the leaders and
the masses. Any imorovement of the party system is likely to be
pieceneal and gradual.
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